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In 1985, the Victorian WorkCare workers' compensation system was implemented, 
replacing the private market in workers' compensation insurance coverage with a state 
monopoly fund scheme. Unfortunately for Victorians, WorkCare proved to be unworkable; it 
gave rise to increasing costs for employers, an "epidemic" of long-term disability claims, and 
huge unfunded liabilities. The WorkCare scheme was abandoned in 1992 hi favor of 
WorkCover, which uses a unique blend of private market and state monopoly principles. Thus 
the Victorian Government embarked on a comprehensive workers' compensation reform plan, 
which began with the introduction of WorkCover hi December 1992.
The WorkCover scheme restructured benefits, dispute resolution procedures, and 
administration of the system. Private insurers were incorporated into the system as "authorized 
insurers" (essentially marketing and claims management agents). The premium system was 
revised, introducing incentives for employers through experience rating and other devices. 
Additional legislation hi 1994 introduced the latest stage of Victoria's transition, making a 
number of minor adjustments hi the scheme to further streamline claims management and 
rationalize incentives for workers and employers. (Victorian WorkCover Authority, 1993-94 
Annual Report)
Thus far, the WorkCover scheme seems to be a great success (Boston Consulting, 
1994). The last step in the reform plan involves possibly privatizing the scheme, once past 
liabilities are fully funded and the fund itself is stable. This could happen as early as 1997, 
based on the rapid progress to date. Since WorkCover began hi December 1992, reported 
claims have dropped by 40 percent, and average premium levels have been reduced by 25 
percent, accompanied by a significant increase hi weekly benefit levels. Most significantly, the 
unfunded liability has been reduced from 53 percent to zero, a swing of over $2 billion in less 
than three years. (Victorian WorkCover Authority, 1994-95 Annual Report)
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Because of this recent history, and because the pendulum seems to be swinging back 
toward private market solutions in Victoria, as well as in Australia as a whole, there is an 
interest in other models of workers' compensation systems. It seemed relevant to the authors 
of this report to offer an outside perspective, one rooted in North American workers' 
compensation experience. Our hope is that a review of U.S. and Canadian experiences, as 
highlighted in careful reviews of two "successful" systems that have not wavered hi their 
dedication to private market and state monopoly principles respectively, might help inform the 
final debate on privatization in Victoria.
Of course, there is no universally accepted definition of "public" or "private" workers' 
compensation systems. In North America, "public" would be taken to refer to a state or 
provincial monopoly workers' compensation insurance system. "Private" would refer to some 
version of a system that allows private insurance carriers to sell workers' compensation 
insurance. In fact, of course, there is a continuum of systems and of system features that might 
affect the basic judgment as to whether a particular system is more public or private in its 
orientation. The question is how are different functions of the workers' compensation system 
allocated among government or public entities and private firms.
It should be clear that we do not mean "private" to be synonymous with "market- 
oriented," although there are a number of obvious linkages between these abstract concepts hi 
workers' compensation practice. The Victorian WorkCover system is an example of a hybrid 
system that uses private agents to sell the insurance, service the employers, and manage the 
claims, but retains public ownership of the underwriting and rate-making functions. In 
addition, Victoria maintains extensive private incentives through an aggressive experience 
rating program. Thus, private economic incentives are a strong influence on the Victorian 
WorkCover system, even though the fundamental underwriting and pricing functions are held 
in public hands.
Among the issues we will consider here are the following. Who carries the 
underwriting (insurance) risk for workers' compensation benefits? How is workers' 
compensation insurance priced, and by whom? What fundamental principles guide the 
insurance pricing system? Who monitors benefits for compliance with statutory requirements?
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Are the availability of coverage and the payment of insurers' claims obligations guaranteed? Is 
self-insurance allowed and, if so, for whom? How are incentives for prevention of accidents, 
and resulting workers' compensation claims, maintained? What is the performance of the 
overall system? In summary, how are these questions answered and what do the answers 
reveal about how these responsibilities are allocated among government agencies, other public 
entities, and private firms?
Since there are probably no universal statements that can be made about workers' 
compensation systems, we have selected two "exemplars" of successful public and private 
workers' compensation systems from North America to carry our analysis. While this may 
distort some comparisons, due to non-workers' compensation system factors, it has the 
advantage of grounding our judgments hi a specific factual context that can also provide 
examples and illustrations of basic principles.
Relevance of North American Experience
There are a number of reasons to believe that the lessons of North America may be 
relevant for the decision makers in Victoria. First, in a rough policy sense, the Canadian and 
U.S. models of workers' compensation bracket the Victorian WorkCover Authority scheme. 
That is, the Canadian systems represent one variant of the monopoly fund model that Victoria 
has been moving away from since 1992, and the U.S. systems represent one version of the 
privatized model that Victoria experienced previously. This is not to suggest that any specific 
North American model would fit the Australian environment, but simply to argue that 
experiences in the same "policy neighborhood" may be relevant. In addition, it is very clear 
that Australia, Canada, and the United States share a great deal of common culture and shared 
institutions, partially owing to our mutual British heritage. The commitment to representative 
government, free and independent trade unions, individual ownership of property, and private 
enterprise constitutes a powerful shared paradigm.
In the workers' compensation sense, it is also clear that Canada, the United States, and 
Australia share a good deal of common ground. In the first place, these nations are unique in 
that all have workers' compensation systems based at the state or provincial, rather than the
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national, level. 1 Thus, each nation's experience is the sum of many different state or provincial 
systems' experience. While Canadian models are less diverse, it is probably true that there is 
as much variety within both Australia and the United States as there is among all three 
countries. The point is that our 70 state and provincial workers' compensation models (total 
from Australia, Canada, and U.S.) have a great deal in common, as well as considerable 
differences. This is manifest hi the fact that the International Association of Industrial Accident 
Boards and Commissions (IAIABC), the professional organization for administrators of 
workers' compensation programs, includes members from the Australia, Canada, and United 
States. Apparently the administrators of the workers' compensation systems in these three 
countries have had sufficient common interest to hold them in the same association.
Why British Columbia and Michigan?
The choice of British Columbia and Michigan as exemplars of "public" and "private" 
workers' compensation systems, respectively, may not be entirely obvious. The first reason 
for then: selection is familiarity. Since the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
had conducted administrative inventories for each of these systems in the last five years, we 
had a basic familiarity with their institutional features and operations2 (Hunt and Eccleston, 
1990; Hunt, Barth, and Leahy, 1991; Hunt, 1992). Having the personal contacts to facilitate 
developing updated information on these particular systems rapidly and efficiently was 
especially important.
However, there is more than convenience to recommend the choice of these two 
systems. British Columbia is one of only three large Canadian systems (the others are Alberta 
and Saskatchewan) that are approximately fully funded today. This represents a signal 
achievement and indicates that there is something different about the system or its political
*See American Insurance Association (1993) for one description of the variety of systems operating in 
nine highly developed nations.
2The Administrative Inventory is a device developed by the Workers Compensation Research Institute 
(WCRI) in the United States. It represents a detailed examination and description of the structure and performance 
of an individual workers' compensation system using a common pattern that facilitates comparison across systems. 
To date, AI's have been published for 14 U.S. states and one Canadian province.
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setting. More impressively, there is evidence that this circumstance is not simply a matter of 
good luck. British Columbia started to spiral down into large-scale deficits in the mid-1970s, 
just like Ontario, Quebec, and other Canadian systems. (Vaillancourt, 1994) However, British 
Columbia turned this situation around in the early 1980s with policy choices that restored the 
Workers' Compensation Board (WCB) to financial health. Hence, British Columbia has a 
workers' compensation system that appears to be in balance and working relatively well. 
Presumably, that means that some or all of its system features may be viable for certain other 
jurisdictions.
Michigan too has justification for selection as an exemplar of U.S. private market- 
dominated workers' compensation systems. In the first place, Michigan was one of the first 
states in the U.S. to implement competitive rating for workers' compensation insurance. This 
bold commitment to the market mechanism in 1983 meant that Michigan abandoned the 
administered pricing model that had dominated workers' compensation insurance since the 
origins of these systems hi the early 20th century and embraced a competitive market system, 
which a majority of states have since implemented to some degree.
More fundamentally, like British Columbia, the record that Michigan compiled in 
reforming its workers' compensation statute in 1980, 1981, and 1985 showed that Michigan 
was willing and able to grapple with tough policy issues and arrive at sound long-term 
conclusions. (Hunt, 1986). This effort foreshadowed many similar reform movements in other 
states by 5 to 10 years, and was precipitated by the fact that Michigan had reached a point 
where the cost of workers' compensation was thought to be interfering with economic growth 
in the state. 3
In addition, there are a number of characteristics of these jurisdictions that make them 
interesting examples. They are both large, significant states with substantial workers' 
compensation exposure. Although British Columbia is characterized more by primary, or 
extractive, industries (fishing, logging, mining) and Michigan more by secondary, or
3Elson and Burton (1981) had calculated that Michigan workers' compensation insurance rates for a 
sample of manufacturing classifications were 80 percent above U.S. average in 1978.
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manufacturing, industries, they both have many employers with lots of injuries. They also 
both have heavily unionized labor forces, although Michigan's is much less influenced by 
labor than a decade ago, largely due to the downsizing of the auto industry in Michigan.
Limitations of Exemplars
There are also some reasons why these two jurisdictions are not perfect exemplars. 
Michigan is theoretically a "wage-loss" workers' compensation system, as opposed to an 
"impairment" or "loss of wage-earning capacity" system. This places it in a minority among 
U.S. jurisdictions. However, the "redemption" of employer liability available in the Michigan 
system is both an accommodation to make the wage-loss system more workable and a feature 
that makes the handling of permanent partial claims more like that in other jurisdictions. 
Michigan uses a litigation process to arrive at the permanent partial implicit ratings however.
More important, Michigan has one of the highest proportions of self-insurance hi the 
U.S., due largely to the fact that the auto industry is dominated by three huge firms, General 
Motors, Ford and Chrysler. All three firms have their corporate headquarters and, especially 
for GM and Chrysler, multiple large manufacturing installations hi the State of Michigan. This 
has produced an environment that is "friendly" to self-insurance. This has also been extended 
to include the participation of some 9,000 small firms in 35 different industry-specific group 
insurance plans in Michigan, which has increased the competitive pressures on private 
insurers.
Another unique aspect of the Michigan system is the "privatization" of the competitive 
state-owned Michigan Accident Fund in 1994. The trend of the last several years in the U.S. 
has been to create new competitive state funds (although no exclusive, or monopolistic, state 
funds beyond the six that have existed for years). At least six U.S. states have created new 
competitive state funds hi the last five years, and Michigan is the only state to be privatizing a 
fund. We regard this as an anomaly, that reflects the current Governor's philosophical position 
on government entities competing with the private market, rather than a major policy change.
While it may prove to have significant consequences in the long-run, it does not 
represent a dissatisfaction with the performance of the fund as an insurance company. In fact,
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it is ironic that the Michigan Accident Fund increased its market share from 3.4 percent in 
1982, the year before open competitive rating to 15.6 percent in 1993, while remaining 
profitable and increasing its net worth. Over this decade, the fund had earned a reputation for 
being willing to write the smaller risks that the large private carriers did not want to insure 
and did so successfully.
British Columbia, also, is somewhat unusual among Canadian jurisdictions in that the 
WCB structure also contains the Prevention Division (previously Occupational Safety and 
Health). The administrative inventory of the British Columbia system in 1991 urged the WCB 
to move to exploit the potential synergy between the prevention and compensation missions hi 
workers' compensation. (Hunt, Barth and Leahy, 1991) However, there is little evidence to 
date that being housed under the same roof provided significant performance advantages for 
the WCB. In addition, the WCB maintains their own world class worker rehabilitation center 
at the central offices in Richmond. This facility should make it possible to integrate 
compensation and rehabilitation more effectively. While this is a relatively unique system 
feature, it only involves a small minority of WCB claimants, so we believe it unlikely that it 
has a substantial impact on the system as we will analyze it here.
Administration of Public vs. Private Workers' Compensation Systems
In this volume, we maintain the hypothesis that, while there is no pure test of the 
public vs. private workers' compensation insurance mechanism, there are indicators of the 
significant differences that underlie these fundamental scheme choices. In other words, it 
would be inaccurate to say that any given system feature is necessarily characteristic of either 
public or private workers' compensation systems. All systems seem to be a unique blend of 
features that reflect the specific socio-political-economic environment within which they were 
created. However, we still think we see some specific aspects of our exemplary systems that 
reflect the underlying public/private scheme orientations that they represent.
Of course, relying on market mechanisms to organize the behavior of system actors can 
be shown to provide the highest level of consumer satisfaction in conventional competitive 
markets for consumption goods. However, the private workers' compensation insurance
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market has a great many discrepancies from such a simple "perfectly competitive" model. The 
lack of good information on both sides of the market, agent-principal problems of 
administering a program (insurance carrier) for a group of beneficiaries (injured workers) on 
behalf of another party (employer), public interest in guaranteeing certain outcomes, and many 
divergences from the perfect competition model exist. Some of the market imperfections, and 
the way they are dealt with, will be discussed below.
While economists (including the authors) have great respect for the unfettered market 
as an optimal resource allocation mechanism, the particular example of workers' compensation 
insurance does not yield to simple, knee-jerk judgments of the superiority of private markets. 
Traditional neo-classical economic analysis leads to the judgment that compensating wage 
differentials that arise from free and unfettered labor markets should be sufficient to optimize 
the social level of occupational injury and, perhaps, illness. 4 However, we know of no 
example where the market has been left completely alone to solve this social problem. 
Societies have seen fit to interfere in the market solution in one way or another, to one degree 
or another, in pursuit of what becomes a political-social-economic solution. This is certainly 
true of the workers' compensation systems we will examine here.
We believe that private market forces can be constrained to serve public goals in this 
case, without automatically leading to sub-optimal social outcomes. In one sense, the entire 
history of workers' compensation programs reflects the political judgment that the unfettered 
market solution (compensating wage differentials combined with employer's tort liability) was 
not an efficient or effective remedy to the problem of compensating injured workers for 
injuries sustained in the course of their employment. The political authority of the state found 
in the late 19th century that the tort solution to these increasingly frequent events was not 
sufficient. Thus, the very origin of workers' compensation programs at the dawn of the 20th 
century can be said to reflect interference with market forces.
Some economists would have us seek a market solution to this social problem, but this 
volume maintains an agnostic view. We seek to describe the institutions and probe the system
4See Moore and Viscusi (1990).
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performance for two exemplary workers' compensation systems in North America, one 
predominantly public, the other predominantly private. We attempt to distill from this 
examination some policy lessons that relate to the specific mix of public and private workers' 
compensation institutions that may prove relevant to other jurisdictions, including Victoria.
Obviously, the selection of a particular workers' compensation insurance mechanism 
has broad implications for the admrnistration of the system. The difference between public and 
private workers' compensation systems in North America seems to constitute a choice between 
direct system administration by a public entity (as hi Canada and those U.S. jurisdictions with 
"exclusive" state funds) or a market regulatory approach to system administration (as hi 
Michigan and most other U.S. jurisdictions). For example, in British Columbia the public 
administrative agent (WCB) makes all benefit payments and is directly responsible for making 
them correctly and promptly. In Michigan, the public administrative agent Bureau of Workers' 
Disability Compensation (BWDC) is responsible for monitoring the performance of private 
insurance carriers and self-insured employers in making such payments correctly and 
promptly. These are two very different roles and have different staffing and performance 
monitoring requirements. This accounts for the emphasis on regulation in U.S. jurisdictions, 
which is almost unknown in Canada.
The adjudication, termination, and re-opening of claims provide additional examples. 
In British Columbia, all these are the responsibility of the WCB and the staff they employ for 
this purpose. Fundamentally the public entity is determining whether benefits are payable in a 
given instance, based on the statutory, policy, and legal interpretive superstructure. In 
Michigan, private decision makers are deciding these things, with recourse to the dispute 
resolution procedures provided by the public entity in the event of a difference of opinion. 
However, it is fundamentally different for employers to have the right to seize the initiative, 
subject to a subsequent legal challenge, as in Michigan from having to secure the basic 
decision from a public entity as in British Columbia. Again, these administrative arrangements 
have manifold implications for worker and employer client satisfaction with the system.
This also applies to the appellate dimension. In the British Columbia system, appeal 
procedures allow workers and employers to seek redress from alleged errors by the public
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decision maker. Thus, the matter of the independence of appellate bodies has assumed great 
importance in Canada. In Michigan, by contrast, appeal procedures settle differences between 
private parties in interpretation of law or fact. Presumably, this is the reason for greater 
interest in, and utilization of, alternative dispute resolution procedures like mediation and 
arbitration in the Michigan system. Fundamentally, the interest of the public body is to secure 
an agreement between the private parties within the confines of the statutory and regulatory 
environment.
One area where we do not observe fundamental differences is in the approach to 
prevention of workplace injuries and illnesses. Both Michigan and British Columbia follow a 
3-pronged approach of incentives, regulation, and education to promote occupational safety 
and health. Prevention incentives are embedded in the workers' compensation systems hi the 
institution of experience rating for the premiums of individual employers, with their cost of 
insurance coverage varying with the number and cost of their claims. While there is greater 
scope for variation in premiums due to experience rating and other risk sensitive pricing 
adjustments in Michigan than in British Columbia, the institution is fundamentally the same.
In addition, both British Columbia and Michigan have aggressive regulatory 
approaches to occupational safety and health. Inspectors from the public sector visit and 
evaluate workplaces based on a set of standards, with punitive or remedial actions resulting. In 
addition, both programs utilize voluntary consulting and education programs to raise the 
awareness of prevention as a fundamental issue. The fact that the administrative agent for the 
workers' compensation system (WCB) in British Columbia also administers this program, 
while in Michigan it is a separate agency (Bureau of Safety and Regulation) does not appear to 
have significant programmatic implications, although in theory it could.
Finally, there is a significant difference hi what might be called the collective "voice" 
of the workers' compensation system. In the most basic sense, including private insurers in the 
workers' compensation system means that there is another powerful set of stakeholders whose 
interests will be defended. In British Columbia, the administrative agent (WCB) speaks for the 
system as a whole in a way that would be completely unacceptable in Michigan. While 
statutory initiatives from stakeholder interest groups are not unknown, they have been
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relatively rare in British Columbia, and are subject to examination and endorsement by the 
public body. In contrast, the multiplicity of stakeholders and their unique individual versions 
of "the truth" serve to fragment and confuse public opinion and statutory initiatives in 
Michigan and other U.S. jurisdictions. Frankly, it is difficult to determine what the public 
interest is under such a regime.
Only hi the State of Wisconsin does this problem seem to have been permanently 
averted, by recourse to the institution of a Workers' Compensation Advisory Council, which 
serves as a deliberative body to forge consensus recommendations from employer and worker 
stakeholder groups. 5
The council meets as needed to study legislative proposals 
submitted by labor, management and the division (public 
administrative agent), and to hold public hearings.... Council 
members reach agreement on proposed legislation through a 
series of meetings, public hearings, and negotiations, culminating 
in the submission of a single bill to the assembly and senate labor 
committees of the state legislature. To date, bills submitted by 
the council have been passed virtually unchanged. (Ballantyne 
andTelles, 1992, pp. 10-11)
However, there is nothing magical about the institution of an advisory council itself, since it 
has been tried hi other jurisdictions without achieving the same remarkable status of respect 
from legislators that seems to be enjoyed in Wisconsin. Further, the suspension of the 
Governing Board of the WCB hi British Columbia in the summer of 1995 raises the issue of 
whether the political authority will continue to allow the WCB to "speak" for the workers' 
compensation system. Certainly, it has become obvious that there has been a change in the 
degree to which all stakeholders hi British Columbia share the same set of assumptions about 
system structure and performance.
5Although temporary consensus has been reached in a number of jurisdictions, most recently Oregon and 
Maine.
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Core Workers' Compensation Insurance System Functions
Since a major focus of this report is the way that public and private workers' 
compensation insurance systems actually work, significant attention will be paid to the core 
functions of such an insurance system. Table 1.1 lays out the general principles of the public 
monopoly and private market models that will be treated here. While minimum workers' 
compensation benefit provisions are always specified by law, the exact insurance policy 
"design" features can vary substantially in the private market case. In all cases, statutes 
specify minunum benefits for injured workers and assign the financial responsibility for those 
benefits to the employer, individually or collectively. However, private insurers have proven 
to be more innovative hi meeting the perceived needs of their customers.
This is vividly manifest in the rush to managed care in the U.S. workers' compensation 
market over the past five years. Each insurance company has developed its own version of 
managed care and touts it as superior to all others. British Columbia, on the other hand, has 
just began to discuss the possibilities inherent in such systems. 6 It seems clear that this is a 
difference deriving from the competitive versus monopoly character of the workers' 
compensation insurance market.
Marketing differs very significantly between public monopoly and private market 
systems. In British Columbia, virtually every employee must have workers' compensation 
coverage, and there is only one source. In Michigan, there are over 100 insurance groups 
aggressively competing for the employers' business. While this competitive process insures 
more choice for the employer-consumer, it does not necessarily assure that the right choice is 
made for the workers. Therefore, the insurance regulatory function seeks to guarantee 
"adequate" performance by the carriers, i.e., to prevent excessive downward pressure on 
benefit payments. In addition, the marketing function must be funded out of policy revenues, 
and this is not a trivial cost to be absorbed, as we will see later.
Under the subject of underwriting selection, the public monopoly model essentially 
offers no choice; all employers who require coverage are automatically part of the system.
6See Hunt, Earth, and Leahy (1996).
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Under the private market model, insurers have a choice of who they want to insure. This is the 
obverse side of the marketing coin. Insurers want to insure "good risks," and they seek to 
avoid "poor risks." But there is also a more subtle selection process that insurers use to find 
risks that "fit" their prices. This means there is room for different underwriting strategies. In 
fact, some insurance carriers devote a great deal of time and effort to selecting the risks they 
want to insure, believing that this guarantees better results. So underwriting selection as it 
affects the availability of coverage is a major public policy concern in a private market system, 
because workers' compensation coverage is guaranteed to all workers, regardless of their 
likelihood of being injured.
Pricing/premium verification refers to the dual functions of setting the price for 
insurance coverage and verify ing that employers are being charged the appropriate price. 
Again, this is a universal concern and must be provided by either a public monopoly or private 
market system, but the range of pricing schemes available to an insurer may depend on its 
competition and the regulatory authority. The case is similar with loss prevention services. In 
most public monopoly systems, workers' compensation or another agency provides loss 
prevention services to employer clients. However, the loss prevention incentives employed by 
private insurers are likely to produce greater effort, since a major avenue to increased profits 
in a competitive system is cost reduction. This is offset by concerns that private incentives also 
produce behaviors designed to fight claims, which is thought to be less typical of public 
systems.
Claims adjustment and case management services would show little difference between 
a public monopoly and private market system, except insofar as the potential for cost reduction 
in the private system seems again to focus the attention of the insurer on reducing expenditures 
as opposed to making sure the injured worker receives every benefit to which he/she is 
entitled.
There is no necessary difference in the statistical reporting function, although in 
practice some additional statistical reporting may be necessary hi private, regulated systems to 
monitor insurer performance and compliance with statute. Public monopoly workers' 
compensation systems generally perform their own data collection and analysis, whereas
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private market systems generally use private statistical agents (who also must be regulated) to 
pool data across insurers, with the result that access to system data is usually restricted 
because of competitive concerns. Consequently, workers' compensation administrative 
agencies in private market systems tend to have their own statistical systems, although far less 
comprehensive than those in public systems.
The availability of insurance coverage is a major issue for private market systems. As 
indicated in the underwriting selection discussion, private insurers are generally not compelled 
to write policies for all comers. The result in private market systems is that some employers 
are left outside the voluntary market and must be provided coverage through some other 
system, generally a residual market or a state fund. This creates equity problems among 
employers, among insurance carriers, and potentially among injured workers. It can also 
impose additional administrative costs and other inefficiencies on the workers' compensation 
system. Severe residual market problems can even drive a workers' compensation system into 
crisis, as happened in Maine in the early 1990s.
Finally, the solvency of the system must be assured. Mechanisms must be provided to 
guarantee that the means to pay future benefits to injured workers will be safeguarded. In the 
event of an insurer, or self-insured employer, bankruptcy, the payment of future benefits to 
injured workers must be assured. There are similar issues for public systems, of course, 
particularly regarding the adequacy of reserves for future benefit commitments. Public insurers 
can be underfunded and accumulate huge deficits, which must eventually be resolved.7 While 
we are not aware of any public insurer that has ultimately failed to pay its claims obligations, 
the measures that may eventually be implemented to restore solvency could have significant 
equity effects on both employers and workers.
7The Ontario WCB accumulated a deficit of approximately $12 billion (CD) during the decade of the 
1980s.
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Workers' Compensation Insurance Market Failures
In theory, regulation is designed to address market failures that would otherwise impair 
economic performance and reduce social welfare. The purpose of regulation is to correct 
market failures, or at least minimize their negative effects, and improve allocative efficiency. 
The principal market imperfections that regulation is intended to address are: barriers to entry 
and exit; externalities, where transactions create costs for third parties; and internalities, i.e., 
costs and benefits of transactions that are not reflected in the terms of exchange (Spulber, 
1989). To correct or counteract these problems, regulators may impose controls on entry, exit, 
prices, product quality, inputs to production, refusal to serve, and other private activities.
Insurance markets, including workers' compensation, are subject to several types of 
market failures that insurance regulators seek to counteract. The principal market failure that 
led to insurance regulation in the U.S. is the problem of excessive risk of insurer insolvency 
that derives from inefficiencies created by costly information and agent-principal problems 
(Munch and Smallwood, 1981). Owners of insurance companies have diminished incentives to 
maintain a high level of safety to the extent that their personal assets are not at risk for 
unfunded obligations to policyholders caused by insolvency.
It is costly for consumers to properly assess an insurer's financial strength in relation to 
its prices and quality of service. Insurers also can increase their risk after policyholders have 
purchased a policy and paid premiums. Thus, hi the absence of regulation, imperfect consumer 
information and agency problems would result hi an excessive number of insolvencies. 
Solvency regulation is intended to limit the degree of insolvency risk in accordance with 
society's preference for safety. This regulatory function is considered to be particularly 
important for workers' compensation, to guarantee that injured workers will receive the 
benefits to which they are entitled.
One of regulators' concerns is that insurers' incentives to take on excessive financial 
risk and even engage hi "go-for-broke" strategies may result hi inadequate reserves and prices. 
Some consumers will buy insurance from low-price carriers without properly considering the 
greater financial risk involved. This potential is exacerbated for third-party liability lines such 
as workers' compensation where employers may seek to escape their obligations to workers by
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declaring bankruptcy in the event of then- insurer's insolvency. The regulatory concern is that 
poor incentives for safety could induce a wave of "destructive competition" in which all 
insurers are forced to cut their prices below costs to maintain their market position. Thus, it is 
argued that regulators must impose some degree of discipline by placing a floor under prices 
to prevent the market from imploding.
At the same time, circumstances may arise where consumer search costs can impede 
competition and lead to excessive prices and profits (Varian, 1992). Further, imperfect 
information and unequal bargaining power between insurers and consumers can make 
consumers vulnerable to misleading marketing and claims practices of insurers and agents. It 
also has been suggested that it is costly for insurers to ascertain consumers' risk characteristics 
accurately, giving an informational advantage to insurers already entrenched in a market and 
creating barriers to entry that diminish competition (Cummins and Danzon, 1991). Under 
these circumstances, regulators may seek to enforce a ceiling that will prevent prices from 
rising above a competitive level and to protect consumers against unfair market practices.
The tension between insurers' tendencies to either underprice or overprice insurance 
coverage may contribute to the cyclical pricing behavior that is observed in commercial 
property/casualty insurance lines, such as workers' compensation. This phenomenon is 
commonly termed the "property/casualty underwriting cycle." It is apparent that, over time, 
workers' compensation and other commercial insurance prices in the U.S. have moved up and 
down in relation to loss costs in alternating "hard" and "soft" markets.
The conventional wisdom is that this cyclical behavior is caused by "cash-flow 
underwriting," i.e., insurers cut prices below costs to increase their market share and rely on 
cash flows from premiums and investment income to sustain their operations, causing a "soft 
market." However, losses eventually mount as claims are paid, causing insurers to retrench, 
tighten their underwriting, and raise prices, which leads to a "hard market." The resulting 
improvement in profits establishes the conditions for another soft market, and the cycle is 
perpetuated.
Some analysts have challenged this explanation of the underwriting cycle and suggest 
other causal factors such as movements in interest rates and loss shocks (see Cummins,
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Harrington, and Klein, 1991). While these alternative theories are supported by empirical 
evidence, there appears to be a residual "behavioral" component to cyclical patterns in 
commercial insurance pricing and underwriting that defies explanation simply by changes in 
external economic variables. This cyclicality can increase uncertainty and instability for 
employers in terms of the availability and cost of worker' compensation coverage. Workers 
also may be adversely affected to the extent that market cycles influence insurers' quality of 
service.
Potential agent-principal problems raise other issues with respect to reliance on private 
markets to finance and deliver workers' compensation insurance. Private insurers, employers, 
and workers have different interests and incentives. Workers seek to maximize their wages and 
benefits, while employers and insurers seek to maximize their profits. Statutory provisions 
governing workers' compensation benefits necessarily leave some room for interpretation and 
application by insurers to specific claims. Insurers can increase profits by minimizing workers' 
compensation benefit payments within the parameters set by law. Employers may support 
insurers' efforts to minimize benefit payments if it serves to lower their workers' 
compensation premiums and total labor costs.
In theory, workers' ability to bargain for wages and other benefits should impose some 
check on employers' and insurers' inclination to "low-ball" workers' compensation benefit 
payments. However, in practice it is costly and difficult for workers and employers to monitor 
and control insurers' claims adjustment practices. Workers are unlikely to choose to leave an 
employer on the basis of its workers' compensation carrier, and an injured worker must 
engage in costly litigation if the worker cannot reach an agreement with the carrier on the 
payment of the claim. Consequently, under a system where workers' compensation benefits 
are privately financed, workers' interests may be compromised without regulatory protections.
The problems of adverse selection and moral hazard also plague insurance markets, 
including workers' compensation, and induce insurers to reject some risks and limit the 
coverage provided to others (Borch, 1990). Adverse selection refers to the greater tendency of 
high-risk individuals to seek insurance, particularly if the premium they would pay is less than 
their expected loss. Workers' compensation insurers are subject to adverse selection unless
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they are able to reject high-risk employers or charge them a rate commensurate with their 
higher risk. Insurers subject to adverse selection are forced to increase their prices to cover 
higher loss costs, which, in turn, leads to further concentration of high-risk employers among 
these insurers. Low-risk employers will be discouraged from buying insurance from insurers 
charging premiums that exceed the employers' expected loss costs. Insurers attempt to avoid 
adverse selection by coordinating their selection of risks and pricing so that every risk they 
insure is charged an adequate rate. This is the reason for insurance groups, with different 
companies and different prices designed for different market segments. However, this can lead 
to situations where some employers are unable to obtain workers' compensation insurance 
through the voluntary market.
Moral hazard occurs when insurance diminishes an insured's incentive to prevent or 
contain losses. Insurers counteract moral hazard by offering less than full coverage and using 
an employer's previous loss experience as a rating factor. Partial coverage is an issue in 
workers' compensation because of the concern that injured workers may become a burden to 
society, particularly if they fail to receive the benefits due them from the employer/insurers. 
Consequently, in the U.S., workers' compensation policies are structured so that insurers pay 
full benefits to workers and seek reimbursement from employers for any residual portion of 
benefit costs for which the employers are responsible.
Plan of the Presentation
As we describe these two exemplary workers' compensation systems, we will utilize a 
common framework. This comes from the desire to provide consistent descriptions of the two 
systems in spite of the considerable differences in details between them. After giving a picture 
of the general administrative organization of the workers' compensation system, we will 
describe the claims administration process. This will be followed by a discussion of the 
benefits provided to injured workers. Then the dispute resolution mechanisms employed will 
be described, followed by a discussion of the incentives implicit in the systems. This 
thumbnail sketch should be sufficient to give a flavor of the day-to-day operation of the 
systems, as they are experienced by injured workers, employers, and providers.
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Next, the insurance models will be examined in separate sections. There is less 
consistency in the treatment here, because there is not so much in common. The British 
Columbia section will describe the assessment structure and function at the WCB. Then some 
specific policy issues will be considered, including self-insurance, experience rating, and 
protection for extremely small risks. Last, the two basic performance issues of revenue 
sufficiency and cross-subsidization among classes of employers will be discussed.
The Michigan analysis is more formal and utilizes a structure-conduct-performance 
model to examine the Michigan insurance mechanism. This discussion should be particularly 
valuable hi identifying the issues and possible outcomes from different approaches to 
privatizing various workers' compensation functions. While this discussion focuses primarily 
on Michigan, it draws on other jurisdictions where needed, and uses U.S. averages as bases of 
comparison.
The parallel analysis culminates with a side-by-side comparison of system performance 
in British Columbia and Michigan. The coverage of the workers' compensation statute, the 
incidence of injuries and illnesses, the number of workers' compensation claims, vocational 
rehabilitation benefits, promptness of payment, dispute resolution, employer costs of workers' 
compensation coverage, and administrative cost levels are all considered.
The final section of the report extends our analysis to consider some policy 
implications of alternative approaches to public and private provision of these core workers' 
compensation system functions. Based on the underlying framework of the report and prior 
analysis, we discuss the potential outcomes of the options available to policy makers hi 
structuring the public and private sector roles in a workers' compensation system. This 
discussion also considers the interrelationship among the policy choices for administering the 
core system functions. While it is not possible to predict the effects of different measures in 
Victoria without a detailed study of its system features and environment, we do offer some 
observations on possible outcomes for policy makers in Victoria to assist hi considering 
options for privatization.
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Table 1.1 Core Workers' Compensation Insurance Functions
Core Functions Public Monopoly Model Private Market Model
Benefit provisions and policy 
design
Uniform benefits and 
coverages set by law
Law establishes uniform 
benefits and basic coverages 
but insurers may vary 
services and risk sharing 
with employer
Marketing/distribution Limited policy issuance 
activities performed by 
agency
Competition among private 
insurers necessitates 




Underwriting selection Employers are automatically 
part of system
Insurers evaluate and can 
refuse to accept certain risks
Pricing/premium verification Agency administers uniform 
price or cost allocation
Insurers determine prices 
and audit premiums 
governed by competition 
with limited regulatory 
oversight




Performed by agency Performed by insurers and 
third party administrators
Statistical reporting performed by agency Function shared by agency 
and private statistical agents 
appointed by regulators
Availability guarantee Not an issue in public 
system
Residual market mechanism 
administered by state or 
private entity under 
regulatory supervision
Solvency protection Not needed in public system Solvency regulated and 
claims obligation insured by 
private association of private 
insurers
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II. OVERVIEW OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (PUBLIC) WORKERS' COMPENSATION
SYSTEM
Introduction
In British Columbia, as in Canada generally, workers' compensation from the 
beginning was considered to be a public matter handled by a public body. The Workers' 
Compensation Board (WCB) of British Columbia has administered the Act continuously since 
1917 as an independent provincial agency. The WCB is charged with the responsibility to pay 
the benefits specified by the Act to injured workers, then- dependents and survivors.
It has the corresponding authority to assess employers subject to the Act for the monies 
necessary to "meet all amounts payable from the accident fund during the year" and to 
"provide in each year capitalized reserves sufficient to meet the periodical payments of 
compensation accruing hi future years in respect of all injuries which occur during the year." 
(Workers' Compensation Act, Section 39) Thus, the WCB does not administer a "pay as you 
go" system, but one that is intended to be fully funded and actuarially sound.
Coverage is mandatory for industries enumerated hi the Act, and since 1994 it is nearly 
universal. Certain occupations are excluded from the definitions of "worker" or "employer" 
by statute. These include casual workers (under eight hours per week), professional athletes, 
and members of the employer's immediate family. The Appeal Division of the WCB provides 
review of actions and policies taken to implement the Act, and its decisions are subject to 
judicial review only on the grounds of "denial of natural justice" or lack of WCB jurisdiction.
Organization of the Workers' Compensation System8
The WCB is an independent provincial agency whose Board of Governors is appointed 
by the Lieutenant Governor in Council. The Board is not dependent on the provincial 
government for any revenues, as these are raised by WCB assessment against employer
8See Hunt, Earth, and Leahy (1996) for a thorough discussion of the structure and performance of the 
WCB of British Columbia.
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payrolls throughout British Columbia. The Ministry of Skills, Training and Labour exercises 
general oversight of the WCB and it is this Ministry which transmits the Annual Report of the 
WCB to the Lieutenant Governor. In actual fact, the WCB has operated with very considerable 
independence from the provincial government. 9
There are 13 voting members on the Board of Governors of the WCB. It is presided 
over by a Chairperson, with five of the members designated as "representative of workers," 
five designated as "representative of employers" and two additional voting governors who are 
"representative of the public interest." In addition, the President of the WCB and the Chief 
Appeal Commissioner are non-voting members of the Board of Governors by virtue of their 
office.
The Board of Governors is the highest authority of the WCB, and Section 82 of the Act 
specifies they "shall approve and superintend the policies and direction of the board..." The 
voting members of the Board of Governors are part-time office holders. The Board issues its 
policy pronouncements in Decisions, which are published in the Workers' Compensation 
Reporter as well as through amendment of the various internal manuals that have been adopted 
by the Governors as their stated policy.
The Appeal Division was established by Bill 27 of 1989 and came into existence on 
June 3, 1991. The Division consists of a Chief Appeal Commissioner appointed by the Board 
of Governors and a variable number of Appeal Commissioners appointed by the Chief Appeal 
Commissioner and selected in accordance with policies established by the Board of Governors. 
The Appeal Commissioners are appointed expressly as representative of workers, 
representative of employers, or nonrepresentational members. The WCB is the final arbiter on 
questions of both law and fact, notwithstanding the existence of an independent Workers' 
Compensation Review Board.
9This may be changing. In the Summer of 1995, the Board of Governors of the WCB was replaced by the 
provincial government with a Panel of Administrators under emergency legislation. The justification for this 
action was the failure of the governors "... to put the interests of injured workers and their families before the 
interest of the individual governors and then- sectors." See Hunt, Barth, and Leahy (1996) for more details.
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The Appeal Division has authority to hear appeals from Review Board findings by 
employers or workers (or their dependents), referrals of Review Board findings from the 
President of the WCB, reconsideration of previous Appeal Division or Commissioners' 
decisions, occupational safety and health penalty appeals, appeals of assessment matters, and 
appeals of decisions under the Criminal Injury Compensation Act (which is also administered 
by the WCB).
Other Organizations in the WC System
While the Workers' Compensation Board is the primary player in providing benefits to 
disabled workers in British Columbia, there are a number of other organizations that play 
important supplementary roles in the workers' compensation system.
The decisions of the WCB are subject to review by the Workers' Compensation Review 
Board (WCRB). The Review Board is appointed and supervised by provincial government. It 
has jurisdiction over matters "with respect to a worker." As such it is the first line of appeal 
for workers and employers who feel that an error has been made hi adjudicating a claim for 
benefits under the Act.
There are also organizations created by the Act to facilitate access by workers and 
employers to its provisions. (See Figure 2.1) The Workers' Advisers Office (WAO) assists 
workers or their dependents in bringing claims, including actually representing them before the 
WCB or WCRB if necessary. Similarly, the Employers' Advisers Office (EAO) has a staff to 
perform advisory and representative services on behalf of employers subject to the Act.
All these organizations report administratively to the Ministry of Skills, Training and 
Labour and then: budgets are approved by the Ministry before being invoiced to the WCB to 
be included in the WCB assessment rates. Thus, the employers of British Columbia bear the 
direct cost of the entire workers' compensation system and its administration.
In addition, the Ombudsman of British Columbia is involved in oversight of the 
workers' compensation system, primarily through the request of injured workers for 
assistance. The Ombudsman is not permitted to become involved in an issue that is, or could 
be, subject to an appeal, so its direct involvement with claimants is limited.
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Other WCB Functions
The Board has responsibility for a number of other functions that are not typically a 
part of workers' compensation systems. First, the WCB also administers the occupational 
safety and health program in British Columbia. 10 The Prevention Division of the WCB 
administers a program of standards setting and enforcement throughout the province. The 
Division also maintains an extensive worker and employer safety education program.
The WCB administers the Criminal Injury Compensation Act in British Columbia, as 
well. This Act provides compensation for personal injury or death to victims of crimes within 
the province. Victims of criminal acts, or their dependents, are eligible for medical, loss of 
earnings, pain and suffering, and rehabilitation benefits up to $50,000. These claims are 
administered within the Legal Services Division of the WCB, and the claim costs are 
reimbursed by the provincial government.
Organizational Structure of the WCB
Figure 2.2 shows the overall organizational structure of the WCB. There are three 
main operational divisions, plus a number of special purpose divisions and departments, which 
report dkectly to the President/CEO. Each of the Divisions is headed by a Vice President. The 
next level is generally the department, headed by a Director. The Compensation Services 
Division is the largest division of the WCB. Compensation Services has responsibility for 
administering wage loss, pension, vocational rehabilitation, and health care benefits to injured 
and occupationally diseased workers. It is the benefit delivery agent for the WCB.
The Finance and Information Services Division is responsible for raising the funds for 
the WCB and allied organizations through its Assessments Department and for managing the 
Board's substantial investments by the Treasurer. Financial Services also includes the offices 
of the Controller, the Actuary, and the Statistical Services Department. Information Services is 
responsible for the information and data processing needs of the WCB; this includes 
supporting hardware, software, and database applications.
10Quebec, the Yukon, and New Brunswick also are organized in this way.
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Claims Administration
Since the WCB operates an "inquiry" as opposed to an "adversary" system, WCB 
adjudicators are obligated to both investigate and adjudicate claims for compensation to the 
best of their ability. Further, the Board has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions of 
fact and law in claims for compensation, and the decision of the WCB is final and conclusive 
and is not open to review in any court. While representation by the parties is allowed in initial 
adjudication, it is very rare.
The WCB is not bound by legal precedent, but decides each claim according to the 
merits and natural justice of the case. Board personnel making decisions on claims are guided 
by WCB policies, as promulgated by the Board of Governors. The Claims Adjudicator is not 
to begin fact finding with any presumption against the worker, nor with any presumption in 
his/her favor. However, the Act does specify that "... when there is doubt on an issue and the 
disputed possibilities are evenly balanced..., the issue is to be resolved in favor of the 
worker." (Section 99) The Claims Adjudicator is to examine the evidence to determine 
whether it is sufficiently complete and reliable to provide a conclusion with some confidence. 
This judgment, however, is up to the adjudicator operating within the law and WCB policy, 
subject to review by management or upon appeal.
In the majority of claims, the issues of compensation are determined with reference 
solely to the evidence submitted in the injured worker's application, the employer's report, and 
the attending physician's report. However, where this is not sufficient in the judgment of the 
Claims Adjudicator, the Board has broad powers of investigation, including the power to 
compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of materials germane to the claim (by 
subpoena). Once the Claims Adjudicator certifies compensability, wage-loss benefits 
commence, generally in 15 to 25 days from disablement depending on complexity of claim.
Temporary wage-loss payments (whether total or partial) continue as long as the 
temporary disability lasts. When the physical impairment is no longer temporary, either 
because it has become permanent or because the worker has recovered, a new determination of 
eligibility must be made. When an injured worker returns to work, his/her employer files an 
"Employer's Statement of Return to Work." Absent contrary evidence, this will terminate
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wage-loss payments, although medical benefits continue, if necessary, to effectuate as 
complete a recovery as possible. The entitlement to medical treatment and wage-loss benefits 
for the injury or illness never terminates, but is dependent on contemporary circumstances.
When a physician, or other qualified practitioner, determines that the worker has 
plateaued in his/her recovery, but some residual impairment remains, adjudication for a 
permanent pension must be conducted by the Disability Awards Department. Usually 
temporary total benefits are terminated before the Disability Awards Department can 
adjudicate the permanent pension entitlement. In this case, the Vocational Rehabilitation 
Consultant can authorize continued wage-loss payments in anticipation of permanent disability 
benefits.
Workers' Compensation Benefits
Injured workers in British Columbia are entitled to a wide variety of fairly generous 
benefits, depending on the nature and severity of their disability.
Health Care Benefits
Workers with compensable injuries or illnesses receive a very broad range of health 
care benefits. Under most circumstances the Board will pay all the costs of physician and 
hospital services, medications, diagnostic requirements and appliances. British Columbia 
allows the worker free choice of attending physician or other qualified practitioner. The latter 
include chiropractors, dentists, podiatrists and naturopaths. Health care services can also be 
provided by optometrists, dental mechanics, nurses, and physiotherapists.
Health care providers are paid according to a negotiated fee schedule. Presently, the 
WCB pays physicians at a rate of 104 percent of the rate agreed to between the government 
and the British Columbia Medical Association under the provincial health care system. The 
WCB also pays physicians to provide required medical reports to the WCB. Attending 
physicians are expected to provide such reports upon initial exam and at approximately two- 
week intervals during the course of the treatment.
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It is included under its health care provisions, that the Board will pay for six types of 
allowances and services, over and above the benefits already noted. They include:
clothing allowance
homemaker services
independence and home maintenance allowance
personal care or nursing allowance
subsistence allowance
transportation allowance
It is up to the adjudicator to determine which of these benefits are payable in a particular case. 
In 1993, the WCB processed 56,186 health-care-only claims at a total cost of $14.3 million 
(US), or $254 (US) per claim.
Temporary Disability Benefits
Where a worker has incurred a compensable impairment, he/she is entitled to a wage- 
loss benefit, beginning the first working day after the day that the injury or illness occurred 
(i.e. no waiting period). Indemnity benefits for temporary total disability are set at 75 percent 
of the worker's average gross earnings, subject to the statutory maximum and minimum 
benefits. Benefits are paid for the duration of the disability and are tax-free.
Temporary total disability benefits are terminated when the worker is no longer 
temporarily and totally disabled. If the worker returns to employment, total disability no 
longer exists. Where the worker's condition is judged to have stabilized or "plateaued," it is 
no longer temporary. The decision rests with the Claims Adjudicator, based upon information 
received from the worker and/or employer and from the biweekly reports of the attending 
physician or other practitioner. When temporary total disability benefits are terminated, either 
indemnity benefits end, temporary partial benefits are paid, or the person is evaluated for a 
permanent pension.
Temporary partial benefits are paid where the worker has some actual or potential 
earnings, after sustaining a compensable injury or disease. The worker is entitled to an 
indemnity benefit of 75 percent of the difference between the average earnings before the 
injury and the average amount earned, or that could potentially be earned, after the injury.
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This benefit is terminated when the worker no longer has any wage loss, or when the medical 
condition is judged to have stabilized. A decision to reduce or to terminate a wage-loss benefit 
may be appealed by the claimant. In 1993, the WCB paid $273.9 million (US) in wage-loss 
and health care benefits to 75,601 temporary disability claims, an average of $3,623 (US) per 
claim.
Permanent Disability Benefits
If a worker suffers a permanent residual impairment due to an occupational injury or 
disease, the worker may be entitled to a pension award for permanent disability. Depending 
upon the condition of the worker, the benefit can be either for permanent partial or permanent 
total disability. British Columbia employs a "dual" approach to benefits for permanent partial 
disability. A claimant receives benefits based on an assessment of either the degree of 
impairment, called a permanent functional impairment, or the loss of earnings capacity, 
whichever provides the larger award.
Permanent disability awards are the responsibility of the Disability Awards Department 
within the Compensation Services Division. As soon as it becomes evident that a permanent 
disability is likely to result from a claim, the worker's file is forwarded to that unit for 
purposes of determining the average earnings level. When temporary benefits are terminated 
the worker is examined by a Disability Awards Medical Adviser (DAMA). This examination 
results in a recommended value of Permanent Functional Impairment. Most physical 
impairments are "scheduled" according to values spelled out in the AM A Guides to the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, but other guidelines are also employed on occasion.
Benefits are based on the degree of impairment. If the worker is determined to have a 
permanent functional impairment of 20 percent, for example, the worker is entitled to a 
lifetime pension benefit of 20 percent of 75 percent of the worker's average earnings as 
determined by the Disability Awards Department, subject to the maximum and minimum 
earnings levels. The award is modified based on age so that for each year that the worker's 
age exceeds 45 at the date of the award, the percentage rate of compensation is increased by 
one percent up to a maximum of 20 percent (age 65) of the assessed impairment. This is to
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compensate for the reduced pension entitlement consequent upon the disability. After one year, 
permanent pension benefits are subject to revision semiannually based on changes in the 
consumer price index. In the vast majority of claims, the impairment is scheduled.
It has been noted that the worker's benefit is based on either the degree of impairment 
or on the loss of earning capacity, whichever is higher. Initially, the procedure is the same, 
since an impairment rating must be made first. Then, a Vocational Rehabilitation Consultant 
(VRC) prepares an employability assessment. It will describe the person's work history, the 
training and education that the worker has received, and any work activity since the injury. It 
is also possible that the worker will be sent by the rehabilitation consultant to the Functional 
Evaluation Unit (FEU). There the worker is evaluated over a two week period and a technical 
report on the worker's capabilities is prepared by the FEU. The report covers the areas of 
occupational therapy, remedial therapy, and functional evaluation based on activity in an 
occupational setting. This report is used by the VRC to prepare the employability assessment. 
With this information, the consultant is expected to identify two or three jobs that the worker 
could perform, and that are potentially available hi the relevant labor market. The pay rates for 
these jobs at the tune of the injury are also identified.
A numerical example may help clarify how the projected loss of earnings capacity is 
calculated. Suppose a worker is injured in 1994, with average earnings of $2,000 per month 
(below the earnings maximum at that time). He/she is assessed as having a 30 percent, 
scheduled, permanent functional incapacity. If the worker is below age 45 hi 1994, there is an 
entitlement to a lifetime monthly pension of .30 x .75 x $2,000 or $450 per month. 
Alternatively, the Disability Awards Committee accepts the rehabilitation consultant's 
determination that the worker is capable of working no more than 60 hours per month at 
clerical work (that is available) and that paid $10 per hour in 1994. Perhaps the worker is 
already employed at this job and working a 15 hour week. Or perhaps, the judgment is made 
that after a 3-month training course, the worker would be able to do that job, working up to 60 
hours per month, and that the pay in that job in 1994 was $10 per hour. Hence, the worker's 
monthly earnings loss due to the injury or disease is $2,000 minus $600 (60 hours @ $10 per 
hour) or $1,400 per month and there is an earnings loss entitlement of .75 x $1,400 or $1,050
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per month, clearly exceeding the benefit based solely on the assessment of permanent 
functional impairment. In this instance, the worker would receive a loss of earnings pension of 
$1,050 per month.
Benefits based on impairment assessment alone are payable for life, though they will be 
adjusted if the impairment assessment changes. Benefits paid for projected loss of earnings are 
not lifetime benefits for two reasons. First, the WCB will reassess the worker's income status 
two years after setting the pension. Thereafter, the WCB has discretion over whether or not to 
reassess the worker. In some cases, a physician's report or hospital charge will indicate that 
the worker's physical condition may have changed, in turn requiring that a new assessment be 
made of the permanent functional impairment and of the worker's projected earnings level. A 
second reason that the earnings loss is not a lifetime benefit is that workers are not projected to 
work and earn for a lifetime, but instead, to retire in their later years. However, the WCB is 
mindful that a worker's retirement benefits are likely to be reduced due to earnings losses as a 
consequence of a compensable injury or disease.
An injured worker may also be entitled to a lump-sum benefit where the injury or 
industrial disease results in a permanent disfigurement. This award will be paid only if the 
disfigurement is judged to be serious and potentially harmful to the worker's projected earning 
capacity. Thus, the WCB will take into account the worker's occupation and the visibility of 
any disfigurement. In practice such payments are rare.
The process of setting the permanent disability award is one of the most difficult, and 
potentially contentious, aspects of the benefits scheme. The use of schedules allows for some 
degree of consistency in the rating of permanent functional impairment. The core issue, 
however, is the extraordinary difficulty in identifying the worker's projected earnings 
capacity. Where the worker has suffered some earnings loss, the Board is asked to decide what 
type and quantity of work the person can be expected to achieve, that could reasonably be 
available, perhaps with the assistance of a retraining program and perhaps after geographic 
relocation. Of course, the worker always has a right to appeal the Board's decision. In 1993, 
the WCB accepted 3,778 permanent disability claims valued at $250.7 million (US), or 
$66,357 (US) per claim.
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Vocational Rehabilitation Benefits
Vocational rehabilitation services are provided to injured workers, and in some cases to 
the workers' dependents, in order to offset the effects of compensable injuries, industrial 
diseases and fatalities in accordance with Section 16 of the Workers' Compensation Act. 
Services provided include vocational assessment and planning, counseling, skill development, 
job readiness and placement assistance, and employability assessments.
The Vocational Rehabilitation Consultants also provide certain benefits to the injured 
worker to sustain rehabilitation efforts. Wage-loss equivalency benefits are payable when 
temporary wage-loss benefits have concluded. These benefits may be awarded when workers 
are awaiting or undertaking specific vocational programs. In addition, transportation and 
subsistence allowances, as well as accommodation at the WCB's Rehabilitation Residence are 
available in support of the vocational rehabilitation programs.
If work site or job modifications are required to facilitate reemployment, the WCB may 
provide the required financial assistance to accommodate the work site or job hi relation to the 
worker's functional needs, including expenditures for special equipment and tools. When 
training on the job is utilized as a training and placement strategy, the WCB will develop 
shared cost arrangements with the employer. When the WCB is supporting a formal training 
program for an injured worker, the benefits provided would normally include: a training 
allowance at wage-loss equivalency when enrolled in a mil-time program, tuition, fees and any 
required books, materials and equipment; and travel and subsistence allowance where 
appropriate. In certain cases, the WCB may contribute to the cost of starting a business in lieu 
of providing training.
In 1993, there were about 9,000 referrals for Vocational Rehabilitation Services. 
Approximately 60 percent of these received significant services with a return to work rate of 




In compensable death claims, funeral and accidental death expenses are paid by the 
WCB, subject to a maximum that is adjusted semiannually. Death benefits are paid to 
dependents of the worker, that is, family members who were wholly or partly dependent upon 
the worker's earnings. The benefit is determined by the family status and earnings level of the 
decedent. Children cease to be dependents when they become 18, or at age 21 if they are 
regularly attending school. Children who are handicapped dependents continue to receive 
benefits beyond age 21.
Where the surviving spouse has two or more children, the monthly compensation 
benefit, when combined with any federal benefits to or for those dependents, is the 
compensation rate that would have been paid had the worker been permanently and totally 
disabled at the date of death, plus a monthly stipend for every child beyond two in number. 
Where the surviving spouse with two or more children may receive a benefit under the Canada 
Pension Plan, the Board offsets the workers' compensation benefit so that together, benefits do 
not exceed 75 percent of the worker's average earnings, plus the stipend for any children 
beyond two. The worker's average earnings are subject to the permanent total disability 
maximum and to a minimum average earnings level that differs from the one utilized in cases 
of permanent total disability.
Where there is a surviving spouse and one child, the benefit is 85 percent of what 
would have been paid had the worker sustained a permanent and total disability at the date of 
death, As above, this benefit is subject to an earnings maximum and minimum, and an offset 
for any federal benefits. Benefits are subject to recalculation when children cease to be 
considered children, or where a dependent survivor is no longer an invalid.
If the dependent spouse has no children, the death benefit then depends upon the age of 
the person. Subject to the earnings maximum, if the survivor is 50 years of age or older, or an 
invalid, the survivor's benefit is 60 percent of the monthly compensation that would have been 
paid had the worker been permanently and totally disabled at the date of death, subject to the 
offset for any Canada Pension Plan benefits. There is a minimum benefit level set by the 
WCB, and hi such cases there is no offset for federal benefits. If the surviving spouse is
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without a child, not an invalid, and below the age of 40, the benefit paid is a capital sum, with 
an instalment paid immediately and the entire balance paid within six months. It is noteworthy 
that the size of this benefit (about $27,400 (US)) is invariant with respect to the worker's 
average earning level. In 1993, the WCB initiated payments to 124 fatal claims for a total 
incurred expenditure of about $24 million (US), or $188,000 (US) per claim.
Dispute Resolution
There are three bodies, excluding the court system, that constitute appellate bodies of 
the workers' compensation system in British Columbia. These are the Workers' Compensation 
Review Board, Medical Review Panels, and the Appeal Division of the WCB. The source of 
disputes is mostly decisions made by Board officers, that is, Claims Adjudicators, Claims 
Officers, or Vocational Rehabilitation Consultants in the Compensation Services Division of 
the WCB. If either a claimant or employer is dissatisfied, they may ask the officer to 
reconsider the decision, usually in the light of additional information that the complainant will 
provide. Where the matter is not reconsidered, or where it has been reconsidered but the party 
remains dissatisfied, a manager's review can be requested. The manager is able either to 
accept (including modify) or reject the appellant's view or return the file to the originating unit 
for further investigation. The manager's review was developed to allow aggrieved parties to 
have a rapid decision on an officer's decision without involving one of the three appellate 
bodies.
A party that wishes to formally appeal a decision at this point may have a choice. If the 
issue hi dispute is a medical one, the appeal can be to a Medical Review Panel (MRP), 
otherwise to the Workers' Compensation Review Board (WCRB). The decision of the MRP is 
final on medical issues and cannot be appealed. Findings of the Review Board can be appealed 
to the Appeal Division of the WCB.
Workers' Compensation Review Board
The WCRB has jurisdiction over appeals of decisions by any officer of the WCB with 
respect to a worker. It is required that the decision must affect a worker, hence there is no
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right of appeal to the WCRB by an employer on a decision regarding an assessment, for 
example. Employer appeals to the WCRB occur where the employer is dissatisfied with a 
WCB decision regarding a worker's claim. Virtually all appeals to the WCRB come from 
workers or their dependents.
The WCRB consists of 15 three-person panels, plus some single-person panels. A 3- 
member panel consists of one person drawn from the ranks of labor, another person with a 
background on the management side, and a third person, often a lawyer, who is a neutral. A 
one-person panel, always employing a person of a neutral background, is most frequently used 
in those cases that consist only of a "read and review" of the record. Usually, the choice of 
the one- or 3-person panel is left to the appellant. The chair of each panel, the 
nonrepresentational member, is called a Vice Chairman of the WCRB.
Appellants are frequently represented by union representatives, private lawyers or the 
Workers' Advisers Office. Employers may be similarly represented by private lawyers, the 
Employers' Advisers Office, or some other consultant. Witnesses are not normally sworn, oral 
hearings are taped but transcribed only if there is a subsequent appeal. When the panel 
completes its deliberations, it issues its findings, with reasons, in writing. The panel decision 
need not be unanimous, but a dissenting panel member must also explain in writing his/her 
decision.
The data in Table 2.1 highlight the types of issues appealed to the WCRB. The most 
frequent issue decided is the one of compensability; that is, one-fourth of Review Board 
decisions were hi cases where the WCB had disallowed the claim. In 45 percent of these, the 
WCRB decided either to allow benefits or to send the matter back to the WCB claims unit for 
further work. The next most frequently appealed issues were refusals by the WCB to reopen 
cases, WCB decisions to terminate wage-loss payments, and disputes over the size of a 
permanent partial disability pension awarded. The allowance rate for these appeals varies from 




The Lieutenant Governor in Council appoints physicians to serve as Chairs of Medical 
Review Panels. Currently, 16 persons serve in this capacity. When the Board accepts an 
appeal for an MRP, it sends a list of specialists practicing in the field hi which the medical 
dispute occurs to the worker and to the employer, asking them to choose a specialist. The 
party requesting the panel must exercise that choice within eight days, or no further action is 
taken on the matter. If the party that did not request the panel, usually it is the employer, does 
not choose a specialist from the list within eight days, a selection is made by the Ministry of 
Skills, Training and Labor.
In order to be allowed to appeal a decision to an MRP, there must be a bonafide 
medical dispute. That determination is usually left to the worker's attending physician who 
submits a letter (certificate) attesting to the presence of such a dispute. The certificate is 
evaluated by a medical appeals officer of the WCB. It is either accepted or the worker is given 
further opportunity to procure a certificate indicating that there is a good faith medical dispute. 
If the WCB finds that there is no bonafide medical dispute, that determination may be 
appealed to the Workers' Compensation Review Board. A set of 10 questions is given to the 
MRP with instructions that the panel limit its response to those issues only. The panel is 
absolutely bound by the WCB's nonmedical findings hi the case.
The panel chairman and the two specialists meet the worker, customarily at the 
chairman's office. The panel has access to any reports contained hi the WCB claim file. They 
each physically examine the worker; a medical history is usually taken as well. The panel is 
able to request that other tests be conducted if they believe it to be necessary. The three 
physicians then discuss their findings, and a report is prepared for the file by the chairman. 
The chairman also drafts the certificate and distributes it to the specialists for their approval. 
Only two of the three panel members need agree. This certificate contains the answers to the 
questions the panel was charged with.
Almost all MRP cases involve appeals by workers. A few issues seem to predominate. 
The most common issue that goes to an MRP is the question of causality, or work-relatedness 
of the condition. A second very common medical issue is the evaluation of the worker's
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condition. Though many types of conditions are assessed by MRPs, back conditions are the 
ones most commonly involved.
The WCB receives about 400 requests for Medical Review Panels per year. Of 
approximately 300 MRP decisions per year, about 50 percent uphold or partially uphold the 
WCB's previous decision.
Appeals Beyond the Board
Applications for judicial review can be made to the court system on the grounds that 
WCB decisions have deprived the litigant of his/her right to "natural justice" in the WCB 
administrative process. These applications would be to the British Columbia Supreme Court 
and the British Columbia Court of Appeals. In practice these appeals are not common, with 
only 2-3 cases annually. The Act contains a very strong privative clause prohibiting court 
review of the WCB decisions. WCB decisions are overturned where the court finds that the 
WCB has failed to comply with principles of natural justice or if it has rendered a patently 
unreasonable judgment.
Role of Lawyers
Aside from the three offices created by law to assist workers and employers in coping 
with the workers' compensation system (Workers' Advisers, Employers' Advisers, 
Ombudsman), persons also have access to private lawyers. However, WCB policy prohibits 
paying legal fees in workers' compensation cases. Nevertheless, lawyers represent the clients 
in about 15 percent of the appeals to the WCRB. Unlike most jurisdictions in the United 
States, there is no trial bar domination of workers' compensation adjudication or appeals 
systems. Part of the reason for this may be historical, but much of it is likely due to the strong 
posture in the Act and by the WCB that it should administer the law in an inquiry, rather than 
an adversarial, manner. The prohibition of legal fees and the virtual absence of lump-sum 
awards also surely play some role. It is apparent that the provision of public Workers' 
Advisers, and a tradition of representation by union representatives, along with an active office 
of the Ombudsman limit the perceived need to retain private lawyers to redress the inevitable
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errors of a system as large and complex as the workers' compensation system of British 
Columbia.
Incentives
In this section, we will reconsider the British Columbia workers' compensation system 
with a focus on the incentives present in the system. Incentives for employers to prevent 
accidents, for employees to return to work, provider incentives, and litigation incentives will 
each be considered. This discussion will help to frame the comparative analysis to be 
presented later.
Safety and Prevention Incentives   Mainly Employer
The WCB relies more on direct standards setting and enforcement mechanisms to 
promote safety and prevention activities than on indirect financial incentives. The "collective 
liability" principle and labor's strong philosophical opposition to experience rating dictate this 
result. Employers have some financial incentive to improve then- safety and health 
performance, but the most they could achieve (assuming they start at maximum demerit) would 
be a 50 percent reduction in their workers' compensation assessment bill.
The WCB Prevention Division conducted nearly 55,000 work site visits during 1993, 
resulting in over 60,000 orders written. Penalties and fines levied for violation of occupational 
health and safety standards in British Columbia hi 1993 totaled $1.5 million. A field services 
staff of nearly 200 persons provides sufficient coverage to insure that every business hi the 
province could be inspected about once in every three years. This is a much higher level of 
enforcement effort than exists in any jurisdiction in the United States.
Return-to-work Incentives   Mainly Employee
There are reduced incentives for injured workers to return to work in British 
Columbia. Wage replacement is quite generous at 75 percent of gross, and some workers 
actually realize more in spending power when disabled than when working, due to the high 
marginal tax rates in Canada. This is not meant to imply that injured workers do not have
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other incentives to return to work. In the first instance, the treating physician makes a medical 
determination whether an injured worker is ready to return to work at least every two weeks. 
Then the WCB claims Adjudicator makes a judgment as to whether a return to work is 
indicated by the whole record. There are also social and personal incentives that motivate 
individuals to seek an early return to work. However, repeated empirical studies in the U.S. 
environment have indicated that duration of disability is sensitive to income replacement rates. 
Both over time and across jurisdictions, the higher the average replacement rate, the higher the 
duration of disability, other things equal. 11
Also, since the WCB adjudicates the injured worker's claim, there is less pressure than 
in the U.S. from the employer to foster return-to-work. Unlike U.S. jurisdictions, the 
employer in British Columbia does not have the opportunity to influence the first 
determination of compensability. This is thought to provide a "softer" test of disability than in 
U.S. jurisdictions. While this initial employer/insurer decision is subject to public agency 
scrutiny or review, it is still very different from the decision a public agency might make. In 
addition, there is the specific provision in the Act, that the benefit of the doubt is to be 
resolved in the worker's favor when adjudicating workers' compensation claims.
Provider Incentives
Providers in British Columbia are essentially on a negotiated fee contract basis. They 
will be compensated for any procedure they perform on an injured worker, the only question is 
whether it will ultimately be paid by the provincial health plan or the WCB. If it is the latter, 
they will receive an additional 4 percent reimbursement, plus direct payment for the required 
medical reports. Since the "form fees" are quite large, it seems there are incentives to continue 
treatment until the patient cannot benefit from treatment any longer. 12 Given this possibility of
"See Worrall and Butler (1985), Butler and Appel (1990), Johnson and Ondrich (1990), Curington 
(1994).
12See Hunt, Barth, and Leahy (1996), Chapter 5.
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perverse incentives, it is unlikely that much pressure is generated to encourage providers to 
urge workers to return to work.
Litigation Incentives
There are some incentives for litigation in the British Columbia system. Relatively few 
claims are denied, but for those that are, the cost of appeal is low. The Workers' 
Compensation Review Board will most likely reconsider the case, and 50 percent of the 
original WCB decisions are overturned. So there is a very good chance for a "second bite at 
the apple." In addition, the British Columbia provincial legislature has seen fit to provide 
public alternatives to private lawyer representation in workers' compensation matters. Because 
of the Workers' Advisers Organization, and the active representation of injured workers by 
their unions, injured workers should not experience difficulty in pursuing their appeal rights. 
On the other hand, the WCB has been granted a strong role in the system that is not easily 
overturned, particularly not based on the facts. So, on balance, one would have to say that 
incentives for litigation in the British Columbia system are also low.
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Table 2.1 Reason for Appeal and Allow Rate at WCRB, 1990
Reason for Appeal




















Source: Workers' Compensation Review Board
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Figure 2,1
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HI. BRITISH COLUMBIA (PUBLIC) INSURANCE MODEL 
Introduction
The sophisticated economic analysis of market structure, conduct, and performance that 
will be presented hi Section V below for the private market-oriented workers' compensation 
system hi Michigan is simply not appropriate for the British Columbia environment. There is 
only one insurance carrier, so the market structure is that of a monopoly. Further, this 
insurance carrier is also the workers' compensation administrative agent, so there are few 
issues of market conduct, and they tend to arise hi different ways than hi a private market 
system. Since the state controls the market, there is little or no need for regulation, 
particularly regulation that is designed to ensure that the private market provides a socially 
desirable outcome. Thus, the discussion of the public monopoly insurance model of workers' 
compensation hi this section (British Columbia) is much briefer than that of the private market 
insurance model hi Section V (Michigan). These very different workers' compensation systems 
need to answer the same fundamental questions, but they go about it hi very different ways.
The WCB of British Columbia operates a workers' compensation system under the 
principle of "collective liability." This means that all employers share the responsibility for 
paying compensation benefits to injured workers. In historical terms, this is referred to as the 
German, or Bismarck, system as opposed to the English "individual responsibility" system 
that is more dominant in the United States. In practice, this has meant the development of an 
elaborate assessment system to determine each employer's financial contribution to the 
collective liability.
However, there were major exceptions to this principle of collective liability, right 
from the beginning. The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1917 in British Columbia provided 
for 12 separate classes of employers for the assessment of revenues sufficient for the payment 
of workers' benefits, not one rate for all employers as the pure collective liability principle 
would suggest. Thus, back hi 1917, there was a basic policy choice made that the collective 
liability principle was not absolute. In particular, it should allow room for another fundamental
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principle, that the cost of workers' compensation should be somehow proportional to the 
hazard rate. This provides, at least theoretically, that the price of the goods and services 
produced should include the cost of compensating and rehabilitating workers injured in 
producing those goods and services.
The objective of the WCB Assessment Department is stated in the Assessment Policy 
Manual as follows:
The primary objective of the Assessment Department is to 
maintain the Accident Fund at a sufficient level required to 
administer the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. 
This objective must be met through the orderly and equitable 
collection of assessments from the employers under the Act, 
since the underlying economic theory of workers' compensation 
is that the economic loss through personal injury or industrial 
disease resulting from employment should be borne by industry, 
and considered a component of production costs. (Section 
10:20:00)
This section of the report will describe the WCB assessment procedure and consider its 
performance. The overall adequacy of funding (macro) will be considered, as will the question 
of equity among and between classes of employers within British Columbia.
WCB Assessment Structure and Function
As shown earlier (Figure 2.2), the Assessment Department of the WCB reports to the 
Vice President, Finance and Information Systems. It is responsible for registering and 
canceling employer accounts, administering the classification system, establishing the 
assessment base, collecting assessment receivables, maintaining data on employers, and 
ensuring employer compliance. In short, it is the job of the Assessment Department to 
determine who is an employer, their assessable payroll, the assessment rate to be applied to 
that payroll, and the collection of assessments due.
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Registration and Classification
The Registration Section is really the front line of the WCB in terms of its relationship 
with employers. It is the Registration Section that new employers first encounter when they 
seek information about their obligations under the Workers' Compensation Act. It is up to the 
Registration Section to determine: (a) whether they are mandatory for coverage, (b) whether 
they might be eligible for Personal Optional Protection, or (c) whether they are not allowed to 
be covered under any circumstances because they are in an excluded category, such as casual 
workers (less than 8 hours per work) or professional athletes.
Once employers are determined to be subject to the Act, then it is up to the Assessment 
Department to assign them to one of 71 particular sub-classifications for purpose of 
determining their basic assessment rate. Under the collective liability system, members of a 
given sub-class bear all the claim costs, and appropriate pro rata share of administrative and 
other costs, for the workers of all employers in the sub-class. The WCB of British Columbia 
maintains a classification system with 71 sub-classes for which separate assessment rates are 
determined.
As shown hi Table 3.1, other Canadian provinces range from a minimum of 6 rate 
classes (Yukon) to 321 classes (Quebec), with most jurisdictions providing more rating classes 
than British Columbia. 13 In a rough sense, the number of classifications can be taken as an 
expression of the degree to which the individual versus collective liability principle is 
maintained. The fewer the number of classifications, ceteris paribus, the more likely there will 
be significant cross-subsidization effects between employers because they will be grouped into 
a smaller number of classification units with more diversity.
The Assessment Policy Manual offers the following general guidelines for assigning 
classifications.
Classifications are assigned to accounts on the 
basis of the industry in which the employer is 
operating. In assigning the classification, some of 
the factors considered are the type of product or
13U.S. jurisdictions would generally maintain 300 to 350 active classifications.
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service that is being provided and the type of 
industry with which the employer is in 
competition. It is desirable that the assessment 
classification system not be an economic factor in 
the way business is conducted in the province. 
(Section 30:20:10)
However, the Manual also contains the following; "This manual does not contain the specific 
criteria for putting a firm in a particular classification, because of the immense number and 
detailed nature of these rules." (Section 30:20:10) This is an explicit recognition of the 
complexity of the classification decisions, and of its significance for the employers involved. 
Once the Assessment Department has determined the sub-class (or classes) to which an 
employer will be assigned, the base assessment rate is set. These rates are changed each year 
according to the collective experience of each sub-class and the system as a whole.
Audits and Collections
Employers in British Columbia report then- payrolls, and calculate and send in their 
WCB assessments on either a quarterly or annual basis. These payments are on a retrospective 
basis, they are for past insurance coverage. Those firms whose total assessment is expected to 
be under $500 file annually; those with larger assessments file quarterly. 14 Since the WCB 
Assessment system is a self-reporting system, there is a need for an audit function to ensure 
that all employers are meeting their reporting requirements and payment obligations in an 
accurate and timely manner. The audits are the "enforcement" side of the Assessment 
Department, but they also serve a vitally important equity function by assuring employers that 
everyone is carrying their fair share of the load.
The audits are performed by Assessment Officers, who are the WCB field 
representatives for assessment matters. They audit a variety of financial, payroll, and other 
records of registered firms to determine the accuracy of the reported assessable earnings.
14Some smaller firms also file quarterly. These are in industries characterized by wide swings in 
assessments, such as logging, construction, etc.
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Depending on the outcome of the audit, they adjust assessments as necessary and communicate 
this information to the employer involved. They also review the industry classification of the 
audit target firm, and perform other related assessment functions, as needed. About 10 percent 
of registered firms are audited annually.
The Collections Section is responsible for collecting delinquent employer accounts, i.e. 
those who have failed to send hi their WCB assessment payments on time. About 10 percent of 
employer accounts involving 4 percent of WCB assessments are delinquent at the end of each 
year. About 60 percent of this money will be recovered and 25 to 30 percent written off 
during the following 12 months. In addition, this Section performs the "clearance" function 
where employers, for purposes of contract or sub-contract, need to certify that they have 
current WCB coverage. The WCB processes approximately 100,000 clearance requests 
annually from registered employers to prove that they are registered and current hi their WCB 
obligations, mostly for sub-contract purposes.
Self-Insurance at the WCB
As discussed above, British Columbia and other Canadian jurisdictions, have adopted 
the principle of collective liability among employers for workers' compensation benefits. This 
means that British Columbia employers as a whole have the responsibility of paying for 
workers' compensation benefits to injured workers, rather than the individual employer 
holding this responsibility.
Section 42 of the Workers' Compensation Act provides that:
The board shall establish subclassifications, 
differentials and proportions in the rates as 
between the different kinds of employment hi the 
same class as may be considered just; and where 
the board thinks a particular industry or plant is 
shown to be so circumstanced or conducted that 
the hazard or cost of compensation differs from the 
average of the class or subclass to which the 
industry or plant is assigned, the board shall 
confer or impose on that industry or plant a special 
rate, differential or assessment to correspond with
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the relative hazard or cost of compensation of that 
industry or plant, and for that purpose may also 
adopt a system of experience rating, (emphasis 
added)
From the beginning of workers' compensation in British Columbia, separate classifications 
were maintained for the railroad operating companies. These classes are the progenitors of 
today's Deposit Accounts, which include the provincial government, Canadian Pacific 
Limited, Air Canada, and the railroads.
These accounts involve a "deposit" of approximately two month's benefit costs, and 
then monthly billing by the WCB for benefit payments on behalf of the firm involved, plus a 
pro rata share of administrative costs. 15 In effect, these firms are self-insured for workers' 
compensation benefits, with the WCB acting as the claims administrator and guarantor of 
benefits. Self-insurance is not available to any other firms in British Columbia. Deposit 
Accounts have generated 5 to 7 percent of assessment revenues in recent years.
Experience Rating (ERA)
The first experience rating plan for employers subject to the collective liability 
principle was adopted for the forest industry in 1932. In 1941, this plan was extended to 
include metal mining. By 1957, the logging portion of the forest industry was able to secure its 
own experience rating plan, i.e. separate from the general forest industry plan, and in 1960 yet 
another plan was extended to the construction industry.
In 1986, this piecemeal approach was swept away by the introduction of the new 
simplified ERA (Experience Rated Assessment) experience rating program. Employer interests 
had long favored such a move on the basis of equity among employers with different accident 
and claims experience. They argued that it was counter-productive to force an employer with a 
good safety and claims record to pay the same WCB assessment rate as an employer with a 
bad record.
15Pension awards, however, are capitalized and billed immediately.
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During 1986-88 the WCB gradually phased in a universal experience rating plan after 
extensive public consultation. The ERA plan was moderate hi its provisions; it sought to 
encourage individual employers to create safer workplaces, but without unduly compromising 
the fundamental principle of collective liability. The maximum merit and demerit was set at 33 
percent; that is, the best (worst) employers would receive merits (demerits) of 33 percent, and 
hence would be assessed up to one-third less (more) than the average for their sub-class. This 
means that the worst employers in a sub-class pay exactly twice the assessment rate paid by the 
best employers in that sub-class. It should be noted that this is far less than the variance within 
classifications in the U.S. 16
The WCB applies ERA prospectively, as a reward for good performance in the past, 
rather than retrospectively, to try to balance the individual employer's claims cost with his/her 
assessments after the fact. The WCB also uses two years of claims data to determine the ERA 
merit/demerit as a compromise between the two opposing goals of quick feedback (suggesting 
a short term) and actuarial credibility (suggesting a longer term). Further, the ERA plan is 
designed to be balanced, that is, each sub-class is supposed to show a balance between costs 
and revenues on an annual basis, after all positive and negative deviations are summed. 
However, this goal has not been achieved with 10 of 63 sub-classes showing at least $10 
million unfunded liabilities as of the end of 1993. Three sub-classes had surpluses of $10 
million or more on the same date. 17
An additional compromise was made on the participation of smaller firms hi the ERA 
program. Actuarial credibility argues against the participation of small firms, since their short- 
term accident and claims record reflects a much greater influence of chance than is true for 
larger firms. But equity and policy objectives argue that they should also have the opportunity 
to reduce their workers' compensation costs through effective injury prevention programs, or 
pay more if their performance is inadequate. The WCB allows smaller employers a reduced 
degree of participation hi ERA. Those employers with aggregate assessable payrolls of less
16There is perhaps a tenfold to twentyfold variation within most classifications in Michigan. 
17The cross-subsidization issue at the WCB will be examined in more detail below.
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than twice the maximum assessable wage base for each of the past two years ($98,600 CD in 
1993) participate in ERA, but only at the 50 percent level. This means that their maximum 
merit/demerit is only one-sixth of the average assessment rate. 18
To keep the claims experience upon which the merit/demerit is based as recent as 
possible, two years of actual incurred claims costs are the basic determinant of experience 
rating. 19 Further, since there must be some specific point in time at which the ERA 
merit/demerit factor is calculated, the WCB adopted June 30 as the cutoff point for claims cost 
accumulation when calculating the relative claims costs for ERA purposes. This means that 
long duration claims will not count against an employer's ERA merit/demerit beyond the two 
and one-half year maximum period. It also means that if inefficient claims adjudication, 
retarded medical recovery, or slow appeal procedures delay the award of a permanent 
disability pension beyond two and one-half years from date of injury, this amount will not 
count against the employer's experience rating evaluation.
In addition, industrial diseases with average latencies of two years or more are 
excluded from the calculations on the theory that it is inappropriate to punish employers for 
the mistakes of the distant past, since there is nothing they can do now to correct these 
mistakes. Therefore, the feeling is that this does not encourage safer workplaces, but merely 
operates as a punitive measure. However, the aggregate impact of these various exclusions is 
estimated by the Assessment Department to result in only about one-third of all claim costs 
figuring in the ERA determination. Another way of interpreting this is that British Columbia 
employers' experience rated workers' compensation assessments are determined more by the 
frequency of injuries than by their severity.
18Farm industry classifications have an additional step. The smallest firms only participate in ERA at the 
25 percent level.
19Versus three to five years in U.S. jurisdictions.
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Personal Optional Protection Program
Personal Optional Protection (POP) is available to individuals who do not require 
mandatory coverage, and who are not prohibited from coverage. Generally speaking, these are 
individual owner/operators engaging in contract work, or proprietors or partners involved in 
small businesses. Because of the need by contractors to require proof of WCB coverage from 
all sub-contractors, so as to insure they do not inadvertently acquire WCB liability for such 
individuals, there is a large demand for POP accounts from individuals who are entering sub 
contractor status. This means that they need to be registered, classified, and absorb all the 
administrative effort that goes into setting up a new employer account.
Relief of Cost Applications
Under Section 39(l)(d) and (e) of the Act, employers are entitled to "relief of cost" for 
assessment purposes when claims are paid that involve pre-existing conditions, or that result 
from disasters. Because of ERA experience rating, employers have a direct financial interest in 
the claims that are charged against their account. If they can shift responsibility for a particular 
claim, their ERA merit/demerit will be proportionately affected. Over the last five years, an 
aggressive consultation industry has grown up to help employers find examples of, and file 
applications for, relief of these costs, thereby lowering their assessment bills retrospectively. 
The consultants generally receive one-third the firm's recovery as a contingent fee.
There are a number of unfortunate aspects to this situation. First, it feeds the fears of 
labor that ERA's major impact is to encourage "claims avoidance" behavior rather than 
accident prevention. Second, it is obvious that these allocations affect individual employer 
costs, but it is hard to see what difference it makes to the general welfare whether a given 
claim is charged to one individual employer or to the sub-class as a whole. In fact, since the 
WCB can not go back and reassess everyone for the relevant time period, it could be argued 
that these after-the-fact adjustments threaten the adequacy of claim reserves.
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Performance Issues
The major performance issues that arise in the British Columbia (or other public 
monopoly) system are two: "Are sufficient revenues raised to finance the scheme?" and "Are 
they raised from the right sources?" The first is usually expressed in the unfunded liabilities of 
the scheme, at least in North America. The second is a question about class equity; are costs 
being allocated fairly, or are there significant cross-subsidizations occurring? This section will 
consider these two issues as they relate to the workers' compensation system of British 
Columbia.
Revenue Sufficiency
Table 3.2 lays out 10 years of experience on the assessment revenue side, together with 
the statement of cumulative unappropriated balance/unfunded liability at the end of each year. 
British Columbia began the decade with an unfunded liability of $241 million (CD) and ended 
it with an unfunded liability of $191 million (CD). However, for nearly the entire decade in 
between the fund maintained an unappropriated balance ranging from $50.9 million to $291.9 
million. Further, this was done with very substantial reductions in average assessment rates 
(37 percent) from 1985 through 1990, followed by a 20 percent rise through 1993. So for the 
entire decade, the average assessment rate fell by 3.0 percent per year.
The table also shows that this was done on the basis of a 5.9 percent annual increase in 
the maximum assessable wage and a 9.8 percent annual growth in total assessable payrolls. 
Actual assessment income grew by 4.8 percent per year for the decade shown in Table 3.2. In 
fact, the performance of the WCB fund was so strong that $115 million (CD) was returned to 
employers in the form of special rate abatements in 1987 and 1988. The decade ends with a 3 
percent unfunded liability, in other words 97 percent of expected future benefit payments have 
been collected and are invested for the time they will be needed.
Table 3.3 shows how important the investment income from those reserves has been in 
furthering the WCB's financial performance. Investment revenues have grown at 9.1 percent 
annually, rising from 25 percent of total income in 1984 to 37 percent in 1990, then falling 
back slightly to 33 percent in 1993. The result has been that assessments have had to grow at
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only 4.8 percent per year, while compensation expenses grew more than twice as fast, at 10.8 
percent per year. The operating surplus/deficit column shows that the WCB operated with a 
surplus in 4 of the 10 years. The only clouds in this rosy picture are a rapid rise in 
administrative costs (12.0 percent annually) and the fact that recent years have tended to deficit 
rather than surplus.
Cross-Subsidization Issues
While the overall financial performance of the WCB has been outstanding by North 
American standards, Table 3.4 indicates that there may be some problems at the sub-class 
level. The table shows the estimated assessment income and claims costs for each of the 64 
sub-classes in use for calendar year 1993.20 A pro rota share of administrative expenses and 
investment income are added to these figures to derive the current year surplus or deficiency. 
Investment income should be offsetting long-term claim costs, so this current year measure 
tells us the adequacy of assessment income to meet current costs. Table 3.4 reveals that only 
14 sub-classes showed a surplus for 1993, while 46 show a deficit. The total current year 
deficit for all classes during 1993 was estimated at $97.3 million (CD), or about 16 percent of 
claim costs in that year.
While any given sub-class in a single year may be subject to adverse experience based 
on policy changes, natural disasters, etc., the fact remains that the goal is to achieve overall 
balance and sufficiency of funding over time. From that perspective, the data in the last 
column of Table 3.4 are somewhat concerning. According to these data, fully half the sub 
classes are in long-term surplus or deficit (unappropriated balance/unfunded liability), 
amounting to more than 1-year's claims costs for the sub-class. Further, 21 of these are in a 
state of unfunded liability (deficit), while only 9 show an unappropriated balance (surplus).
20The table includes the deposit class employers as well, but they will not be considered hi this 
discussion.
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This tendency to unfunded liability has plagued most of the public workers' compensation 
systems in North America. 21
The difficulty of tackling these persistent problems in a public system can be illustrated 
by the recent British Columbia experience with sub-class 6-21, Retail Stores. It has been 
obvious that there was a persistent imbalance in this class since about 1991. The unfunded 
liability mounted steadily from 1989 and reached nearly $64 million (CD) by the end of 1994. 
Also, it was common knowledge that the large food supermarkets in the province were 
virtually all at maximum demerit and therefore were being subsidized by the rest of the firms 
in the sub-class.
This problem was attacked recently by the WCB when a decision was reached to split 
the sub-class into three parts; supermarkets, department stores, and general retail. This will 
provide more accurate pricing for these different lines of business and reduce the implicit 
cross-subsidization that has been going on. The Board adjusted the assessment rates to reflect 
past claims experience, setting the supermarket base rate at $2.57 per $100 (CD) of payroll, 
the department store rate at $1.36 per $100 (CD) and the general retail rate at $1.01 per $100 
(CD), compared to the old combined sub-class rate of $1.31 per $100 (CD). But, to resolve 
the unfunded liability problem, the WCB elected to levy a special 5-year assessment of $.30 
per $100 (CD) on all previous members of the 6-21 sub-class to pay down the accumulated 
deficit. Since general retailers had about 63 percent and department stores 14 percent of the 
total payroll hi the old sub-class, this meant that only a minority (approximately 23 percent) of 
the unfunded liability would assessed against those employers who were directly responsible.
Needless to say, the general retailers and department stores are extremely unhappy 
about this decision. The need for a general classification study and review at the WCB was 
cited in the 1992 Assessment Department Administrative Inventory (Hunt, 1992), but facing 
the political fallout of "correcting" such inequities is not a pleasant task. More importantly, 
this example illustrates the difficulty of making significant marginal adjustments in the status 
quo. Most public workers' compensation agencies in North America have not been willing to
21See Vaillancourt (1994) for an analysis of the Canadian experience.
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do so, and the result is huge unfunded liabilities, the most noteworthy and best-documented 
being the Ontario WCB deficit of $11.5 billion (CD) at the end of 1993. This is a problem that 
public workers' compensation systems need to resolve.
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Source: Association of Workers' Compensation Boards of Canada, "Workers' 
Compensation Industry Classifications, Assessment Rates, and 
Experience Rating Programs in Canada, 1995," p. 11.
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Table 3.4 WCB Sub-Class Financial Performance, 1993








































































































Table 3.4 WCB Sub-Class Financial Performance, 1993 (Continued)





























































































































Table 3.4 WCB Sub-Class Financial Performance, 1993 (Continued)























































































































Table 3.4 WCB Sub-Class Financial Performance, 1993 (Continued)






















































































































Table 3.4 WCB Sub-Class Financial Performance, 1993 (Continued)














































































































Table 3.4 WCB Sub-Class Financial Performance, 1993 (Continued)


































































































IV. OVERVIEW OF MICHIGAN (U.S.) WORKERS' COMPENSATION MODEL 
Introduction
Michigan adopted its Workmen's Compensation Act in 1912. The entire Act was 
reorganized hi 1969 and called the Worker's (sic) Disability Compensation Act of 1969. 
Employers with one or more full-tune employees (35 hours per week) are subject to the law. 
The Michigan system is a "voluntary pay" system, which means that employers or their 
insurance carriers are expected to pay compensation claims voluntarily, i.e. without 
intervention by the state. This ideal is achieved in more than 80 percent of compensable 
claims.
Organization of the Workers' Compensation System
The Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation (BWDC) is the administrative 
agency hi the Department of Labor responsible for administering most aspects of the Workers' 
Compensation Act. This includes monitoring benefit payments by insurance carriers and self- 
insured employers, providing mediation for disputes and supporting the formal adjudication by 
the Board of Magistrates, providing public information, determining self-insurance status, and 
other functions. The BWDC is headed by a director, who is appointed by the governor for a 3- 
year term with the advice and consent of the Senate and reports to the director of the 
Department of Labor. Figure 4.1 shows the overall organization within state government. 
Costs of administering the system are borne principally by the State General Fund, with 
supplementary funding from redemption fees and penalties.
Organizational Structure of the BWDC
As shown in Figure 4.2, the BWDC is organized into five divisions. The Claims 
Processing Division administers the Act as it relates to voluntary payment claims and litigated 
cases. It processes injury reports, handles inquiries from claimants and employers, sets and 
serves applications for mediation or hearing, and sends out decisions and orders. It also
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maintains the automated database, which serves the needs of both the BWDC and the Board of 
Magistrates. During 1993, the Claims Processing Division received 765,695 pieces of 
correspondence, including 88,259 Employer's Basic Report of Injury. A total of 60,541 new 
wage-loss claims were established (initial payments made in 1993). The Division also set and 
served 22,496 new applications for mediation or hearing. They mailed out 9,251 decisions, 
8,900 mediation orders, and 15,542 redemption orders.
The Mediation Division handles a variety of situations. Foremost among these are 
formal mediation hearings, hi which an application for hearing has been filed and the case is 
referred to a mediator hi an attempt to resolve the case before a trial is scheduled with a 
magistrate. Informal mediations are those in which the parties request a conference to resolve 
the case without a formal application for hearing. In addition, the Mediation Division handles 
vocational rehabilitation, health care service, and other miscellaneous disputes. During 1993, 
the Division held 8,069 formal hearings (resolving 44 percent) and 1,252 informal hearings 
(resolving 73 percent). They also were involved in settling 462 vocational rehabilitation 
disputes and over 5,000 disputes involving health care services rules. The Division also held 
hearings on over 1,000 cases referred by magistrates and logged over 68,000 phone calls 
related to workers' compensation issues.
The Insurance Division is responsible for verifying insurance coverage for insured 
employers and certifying self-insurance eligibility for individual and group applicants. There 
are over 600 self-insured employers in Michigan, plus about 9,000 smaller employers in 35 
different group self-insurance funds. The self-insured employers, including self-insured 
groups, made 46 percent of all wage-loss payments in Michigan during 1993.
The Health Care Services Division is responsible for administering the Workers' 
Compensation Health Care Services Rules as established under Section 418.315 of the Act. 
The rules establish reimbursement amounts for health care providers and require carriers to 
maintain certified professional utilization review programs. They also collect data on medical 
costs and conduct training seminars for insurers and providers. The Division was responsible 
for oversight on over 525,000 medical claims during 1993, at an average cost of $696 (US)
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per claim. The Division estimates that their activities saved Michigan employers some $70 
million (US) in health care costs during 1993.
The Vocational Rehabilitation Division monitors vocational rehabilitation efforts by 
private carriers and self-insured employers in Michigan. This unit provides referrals to 
certified private and public sector vocational rehabilitation providers, and responds to requests 
for information and assistance. During 1993, the Division reported that the average vocational 
rehabilitation success rate was 38 percent, resulting in a total of 3,621 injured workers assisted 
back to work through rehabilitation programs.
Other Organizations in the Workers' Compensation System
As shown in Figure 3.1 the Board of Magistrates, the Appellate Commission, and 
Funds Administration are separate entities who play major roles in the workers' compensation 
system in Michigan. In addition, the Bureau of Safety and Regulation provides safety standards 
setting and enforcement and voluntary consultation on safety and health matters under terms of 
the Michigan and federal Occupational Safety and Health Acts (MIOSHA and OSHA).
Board of Magistrates
The Board of Magistrates is an autonomous entity in the Department of Labor that 
conducts hearings and issues decisions in workers' compensation cases in which there is an 
unresolved dispute. Each of the 30 Magistrates is appointed by the Governor with 
confirmation by the Michigan Senate. The Qualifications Advisory Committee (QAC) 
evaluates the performance of magistrates and makes recommendations for magistrate 
appointments. It is quite unusual in the U.S. for the first-level hearing officers to be political 
appointees, but this was part of a move in the mid-1980s to make the Michigan system more 
responsive to political changes in the state. Magistrates are appointed to 4-year terms for a 
maximum of 12 years total service. The term limit was another move designed to prevent the 
establishment of a permanent bureaucracy, unresponsive to political forces in the state. The 
Chairperson has general supervisory control and serves at the pleasure of the Governor. 
During 1993, the Board of Magistrates received 22,034 petitions for hearing. It produced
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23,580 dispositions during the year, including 8,338 decisions and 15,065 redemption 
approvals. There were 24,162 cases pending at the end of the year, approximately one year's 
output.
Appellate Commission
An Appellate Commission of seven members serves as "an independent body with the 
authority to review the orders of the BWDC Director and the orders and opinions of the 
Magistrates." Members of the Appellate Commission are recommended by the Qualifications 
Advisory Committee and appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, and they must be attorneys who are members of the state bar as well. They serve 4- 
year terms, limited to a maximum of 12 years total service. The Chairperson of the 
Commission has general supervisory control and is in charge of the employees of the 
Commission. The chairperson also assigns and schedules the work of the Commission.
In its review process, the Commission functions as a panel of three members, randomly 
assigned to each case. The decision reached by a majority of the three member panel is the 
final decision of the Commission. The Appellate Commission does not take direct testimony. 
They review the written record of the case and determine whether the law has been correctly 
applied. Attorneys have the right to move for oral argument, but this is rare. By statute, the 
findings of fact by the magistrate are to be overturned only on the basis of "substantial 
evidence." In cases that may establish a precedent with regard to workers' compensation, or 
any matter which two or more members of the commission request, is reviewed and decided 
by the entire Commission. During 1993, the Appellate Commission received 1,178 claims for 
review, disposed of 636 cases by opinion and 475 by order (generally minor issues). At the 
end of the year, a backlog of 1,197 cases remained, approximately one year's output.
The decisions of the Appellate Commission can be appealed to the Michigan Court of 
Appeals, whose decisions can, in turn, be appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court. The 




Other agencies carry out limited responsibilities in the Michigan workers' 
compensation system. The Attorney General represents the special funds and the BWDC in 
legal matters. The Insurance Commissioner regulates workers' compensation insurance 
providers. Funds collected from fees on redemption settlements are kept in a revolving fund 
with the State Treasurer's office. The Bureau of Safety and Regulation, Michigan Department 
of Labor enforces the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act (MIOSHA), Act 154 of 
1974. It also provides safety information and holds seminars and on-site consultation with 
employers and employees on the subject of preventing workplace injuries. It is not directly 
associated with the workers' compensation system, but both agencies report to the same 
Deputy Director of the Labor Department. The Public Health Department promulgates and 
enforces occupational health standards and supports the Labor Department in promoting safe 
and healthy workplaces in Michigan.
Funds Administration
There are four separate funds relevant to workers' compensation claimants in 
Michigan: the Second Injury Fund; the Silicosis, Dust Disease and Logging Industry 
Compensation Fund; the Self-Insurers' Security Fund; and the Compensation Supplement 
Fund. The first three fall under the authority of the Funds Administration, while the last one is 
administered by the Claims Administration Division of the Bureau of Workers' Disability 
Compensation.
The Funds Administration is legally separate from the BWDC, but works closely with 
BWDC administrators. The Funds are governed by a 3-member Board of Trustees consisting 
of one representative of the insurance industry, one representative of self-insured employers, 
and the director of the BWDC. The first two are appointed by the Governor with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, while the director of the BWDC is an ex officio trustee.
The Funds operate like a pay-as-you-go insurance system with a variable assessment 
level. The difference is that generally speaking they are reimbursing carriers or self-insured 
employers for payments made to individuals with entitlements. The Second Injury Fund makes
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payments directly to permanently and totally disabled claimants, and to claimants in multiple 
employer cases. As might be expected, there is a significant amount of litigation involved hi 
the administration of these funds. The Attorney General represents the Funds for legal 
purposes, plus the Fund employs part-time attorneys on a geographically dispersed basis to 
represent the Funds as necessary, under the direction of the Attorney General.
Second Injury Fund
The Second Injury Fund (SIF) in Michigan has a number of responsibilities. First, the 
SIF compensates those permanent and total disabilities that result from a subsequent injury. If 
an employee has a permanent disability in the form of the loss of a hand, arm, foot, leg, or 
eye and subsequently has another disability resulting in another of the these losses, he/she is 
deemed to be totally and permanently disabled and the SIF pays the benefits for permanent and 
total disabilities after completion of payments for the second injury. In addition, SIF is 
responsible for the payment of limited inflation adjustment benefits to claimants who are 
permanently and totally disabled. These payments are designed to bring claimants up to the 
maximum weekly benefit payable at the time of then* injury.
The Second Injury Fund also is involved in paying workers' compensation benefits for 
disability beyond 52 weeks (104 weeks for those hired before July 30, 1985) to persons who 
have been certified as "vocationally handicapped individuals" prior to then- (re) injury. This 
provision is designed to encourage the employment of individuals with pre-existing 
impairments of the back or heart, or who are subject to epilepsy or diabetes.
The Second Injury Fund is financed by assessments on workers' compensation insurers 
and self-insureds in Michigan according to the total indemnity payments (excluding medical, 
rehabilitation, and death benefits) hi the previous year. Carriers and self-insured employers are 
assessed a sum equal to their pro rota share of 175 percent of the total disbursements made 
from the fund during the preceding calendar year, less net assets in excess of $200,000 at the 
end of the year. By statute the assessment shall not exceed 3 percent in any year. For 1993, 
total assessments were $29.3 million.
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Silicosis, Dust Disease, and Logging Industry Compensation Fund 
The Silicosis, Dust Disease and Logging Industry Compensation Fund has 
responsibility for various occupational diseases and special circumstances. The Silicosis and 
Dust Disease Fund reimburses carriers and self-insured employers for weekly benefits paid in 
excess of $25,000 for employees disabled due to silicosis or other dust disease. The Logging 
Industry Compensation Fund was established effective January 1, 1982 and provides for 
reimbursement of weekly benefits to insurers for indemnity costs greater than $25,000 for a 
single claim in the logging industry. Total assessments during 1993 by the Silicosis, Dust 
Disease, and Logging Industry Compensation Fund were $9.5 million.
Self-Insurers Security Fund
The Self-Insurers Security Fund provides for payment of workers' compensation 
benefits to employees of private, self-insured employers who have become insolvent. Payments 
from the Self-Insurers Security Fund are raised by assessment against private, self-insured 
employers only and totaled $3.2 million in 1993.
BWDC Compensation Supplement Fund
The Compensation Supplement Fund pays inflation adjustment supplements in cases 
involving injury dates between September 1, 1965 and January 1, 1980. The supplement is 
computed using the total annual percentage change in the state average weekly wage from the 
year of injury (but not earlier than 1968) to 1981. The supplement is limited to 5 percent or 
the inflation rate, whichever is smaller, compounded for each calendar year in the adjustment 
period. It is paid as a percentage of the weekly compensation rate by the carrier or self-insurer 
and reimbursed by the Compensation Supplement Fund. Lump-sum payment cases (i.e. 
redemptions) are not eligible for supplement payments. During calendar year 1993, 
reimbursements were processed for about 8,000 claims totaling $14.8 million.
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Claims Administration
In the event of a workplace injury, an employee should provide a notice of injury, 
either oral or written, to the employer within 90 days after the occurrence of the injury. Most 
injuries are reported much sooner, usually on the same day as the injury. The absence of such 
notice, however, does not preclude the injured worker from receiving benefits. In the event of 
a workplace injury that results in disability extending beyond seven consecutive days, or an 
injury that results in a death, or a loss of body member enumerated in a schedule, the 
employer is required to submit a report of injury to the BWDC. It is the employer's 
responsibility to see that notice is given to the workers' compensation insurer, if any, that is 
carrying the risk on behalf of the employer.
A claim for compensation may also be made directly by the employee to the BWDC, 
and a copy is mailed to the employer. A claim for compensation is not valid unless made 
within two years from the date of injury, or the date the disability manifests itself, or the last 
day of employment with the employer against whom the claim is being made. The employee 
must also obtain and furnish to the employer and/or insurance carrier, a report setting forth the 
medical history, the diagnosis, the prognosis, and other information reasonably necessary to 
properly evaluate the injury. Usually this is not an extra burden since the employee must go to 
the employer-chosen physician for treatment in the first 10 days of the disability. Thereafter, 
at reasonable intervals, not more than 60 days, the employee must obtain and furnish a current 
medical report containing the same information.
Once the insurer or self-insured employer is notified of the injury, and assuming there 
is no dispute, payment is required within 30 days, or else a penalty may be assessed. It is 
possible that the employer will be responsible for payment of the penalty if it is found that it 
failed to notify the carrier of the claim; however, this is rare in actual practice.
It is sometimes the case that the first notice of a claim that the BWDC receives is by 
way of a request for a hearing. In recent years, about 10 percent of case files have started by 
this method. This indicates that the employer is unaware of the injury alleged (especially in the 
case of an occupational disease or cumulative trauma claim) or simply has not filed a notice of 
injury, and the employee has not filed a claim for compensation.
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In most instances where there is compensable lost time, benefits for temporary total 
disability, specific loss, or death benefits commence with no controversy. In that case the self- 
insurer or insurer is required to file a Bureau informational form on the day after the first 
payment is disbursed. The BWDC enters the information into its computerized database for 
future tracking. Weekly compensation rates and other audit checks are also performed at this 
time. Additionally, if a death occurs as a result of the workplace injury, a supplemental report 
of fatal injury is filed by the insurer or self-insured employer.
If the employer or insurer chooses to contest compensability of the claim, it can simply 
refuse to commence payment. To protect against possible penalties, they would also file a 
Notice of Dispute with the BWDC. If the employee persists with the claim, he/she may 
request a hearing or mediation on the issue. At the time of filing an application for hearing, 
the claimant must provide the carrier or employer with any medical records relevant to the 
claim that are in his/her possession. The BWDC will then set the matter for hearing by the 
Board of Magistrates and send out a notice of mediation or pre-trial. The opposing party to a 
request for hearing or mediation must file an answer within 30 days of receipt of notice from 
the BWDC, along with all copies of medical records in its possession.
Once weekly payments have begun, they continue until the worker returns to work and 
no longer experiences a loss of wages, or the insurer or self-insured employer files a notice of 
stopping compensation along with a medical report that releases the worker to return to 
work.22 If the payment of compensation is a result of a final order directing payment of 
benefits "until further order," benefits may not be terminated until a hearing can be held based 
on the filing of a petition to stop. Otherwise, the initiative lies with the employer or insurance 
carrier.
If a worker objects to the stopping of compensation, the burden is then on the worker 
to prove in a hearing that his/her disability continues and payment of compensation should be 
resumed. The injured worker generally attempts to prove this through his/her testimony,
22In the case of a specific loss or death claim, benefits continue for a specified number of weeks. An 
individual receiving benefits for a specific loss may, however, be evaluated at the end of the specified time period 
for general disability benefit eligibility.
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together with a medical report from a physician that contradicts that of the defense (sometimes 
referred to as "dueling docs"). In such cases, the worker is nearly always represented by an 
attorney.
Workers' Compensation Benefits
The Michigan Workers' Disability Compensation Act authorizes six different types of 
benefits. They are:
  medical benefits
  wage-loss benefits
  total and permanent disability benefits
  specific loss benefits 
death benefits
  rehabilitation benefits
Medical Benefits
The Act provides that the employer shall furnish reasonable medical treatment for 
employees injured at work. It also states that after ten days from the inception of medical care, 
the employee may treat with a physician of his or her choice. This means that the employer is 
able to choose the physician who will provide treatment during the first 10 days.
The right to medical treatment begins immediately and continues indefinitely as long as 
the condition is related to a compensable injury or occupational disease. Disputes over medical 
treatment are relatively infrequent. The disputes generally result when the employer denies any 
relationship between the work and the claimed injury, or asserts that, after a certain tune, the 
continuing medical problems are no longer related to the compensable injury. In these cases it 
is the responsibility for the medical bills, as well as compensability of the disability that is at 
issue.
Wage-Loss Benefits
Wage-loss benefits are based on the weekly compensation rate. For injuries and 
illnesses occurring after January 1, 1982, this rate is equal to 80 percent of an injured
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worker's after-tax average weekly wage and is subject to stated maximum and, in some 
instances, minimum benefit levels. The value of fringe benefits (those that do not continue 
during the disability) are to be included in the base average weekly wage. Wage-loss benefits 
are free of all state and federal tax.
The after-tax average weekly wage on which benefits are based is defined as the 
average weekly wage (for the best 39 of the last 52 weeks) reduced by the weekly amount that 
would have been paid for federal Social Security taxes and state and federal income taxes, 
based on the employee's number of dependents. A table of the average weekly wage and 80 
percent of after-tax average weekly wages is published annually to simplify conversion of an 
average weekly wage into a weekly compensation benefit.
The maximum benefit for all benefit types is adjusted once each year in accordance 
with the change in the state average weekly wage in covered employment. Workers with an 
injury occurring in any given year are subject to the maximum benefit rate as established for 
that year for the duration of their claim; there is no inflation adjustment for general benefits. 
The maximum rate is established as 90 percent of the state average weekly wage for the 12 
months prior to the previous June 30, adjusted to the next higher multiple of $1.00. The 
maximum weekly benefit was $475 in 1994. The minimum benefit differs depending on the 
type of benefit. There is no minimum for general disability benefits. For total and permanent 
or specific loss benefits the weekly minimum is $132, and for death benefits the minimum was 
$264 in 1994.
Benefits commence on the eighth day after the injury. If the incapacity continues for 2 
weeks or longer, compensation is paid from the date of the injury (i.e. a 7-day waiting 
period). If a disabled worker returns to work and earns wages equal to or greater than his or 
her pre-injury average weekly wage, no wage-loss compensation is payable. If the disabled 
worker returns to work and earns wages lower than the pre-injury average weekly wage, the 
amount of compensation will depend on what the current earnings are. A partially disabled 
worker receives the difference between 80 percent of the after-tax value of the current average 
weekly wage and 80 percent of the after-tax value of the pre-injury average weekly wage. This 
would continue for the duration of any wage loss due to disability.
IV-75
Generally, wage-loss benefits extend for the duration of the disability. However, for 
workers' compensation recipients of retirement age, benefits are reduced 5 percent each year, 
beginning with the year of the worker's 65th birthday and continuing until the 75th birthday. 
By that time, benefits will have been reduced by 50 percent; they then continue at that level. 
This reduction does not apply if the worker is not eligible for federal Social Security benefits, 
or if the worker's compensation benefit is being coordinated with other income maintenance 
benefits.
Total and Permanent Disability
The Michigan legislature has created a conclusive presumption that a worker is totally 
and permanently disabled if he or she fits into a specifically listed impairment category.23 
Those meeting this criterion are compensated according to the formula described above, but hi 
addition their benefits are partially indexed to the state average weekly wage. These 
"differential benefits" are paid by the Second Injury Fund and are designed to bring weekly 
benefits up to the maximum benefit allowed at the time of disablement. They should be 
distinguished from those partial inflation adjustment benefits paid by the Compensation 
Supplement Fund described earlier.
An injured worker who is totally and permanently disabled may receive benefits for 
life. However, the conclusive presumption of total and permanent disability extends only for 
800 weeks (just over 15 years). This means that for 800 weeks an injured worker who is 
deemed totally and permanently disabled will receive benefits, even if he or she is working 
and receiving wages. At the end of 800 weeks, either the employer or Second Injury Fund can 
file a petition and seek to prove a change in the plaintiff's condition. The burden of proof,
23These conditions are:(a) total and permanent loss of sight of both eyes; (b) loss of both legs or both feet 
at or above the ankle; (c) loss of both arms or both hands at or above the wrists; (d) loss of any 2 members of 
faculties in subdivisions (a),(b), or (c); (e) permanent and complete paralysis of both legs or both arms or of one 
leg and one arm; (f) incurable insanity or imbecility; (g) permanent and total loss of industrial use of both legs or 
both hands or both arms or one leg and one arm; for the purpose of this subdivision, such permanency shall be 
determined not less than 30 days before the expiration of 500 weeks from the date of injury.
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however, is on the employer or the fund to establish that the plaintiff is no longer totally and 
permanently disabled.
Specific Loss Benefits
The Act also provides a precise number of weeks of benefits for certain specific 
losses.24 Benefits are paid for the number of weeks specified, regardless of whether or not 
wages are being earned. The rate of weekly benefits is determined as with any other disability. 
When the specific loss period expires, an injured worker may be entitled to continuing wage- 
loss benefits if the disability continues to cause reduced earnings. If the worker suffers 
successive specific injuries, benefits are paid consecutively rather than concurrently. A worker 
who suffers concurrently from a specific loss and a separate general disability may receive 
concurrent benefits. Payments of specific loss benefits commence with the tune that the hope 
of restoring the member is abandoned.
Death Benefits
If death results from a work-related injury, weekly benefits are paid to persons wholly 
dependent on the worker for a period of 500 weeks. 25 If there are no dependents, the only 
compensation due is a burial allowance of $1,500. The benefit rate is calculated hi the same 
manner as general disability benefits. If at the expiration of the 500-week period any 
dependent person is still less than 21 years of age, the dependent may continue to receive 
weekly compensation until the dependent reaches age 21. If the worker leaves dependents that 
are only partially dependent upon his or her earnings, the weekly compensation is equal to the 
same proportion of the weekly benefits payable to wholly dependent persons as 80 percent of 
the amount contributed by the employee to such partial dependents bears to the annual earnings 
of the deceased at the time of injury. Wholly dependent persons are defined as a spouse who
24The specific losses enumerated in the schedule include loss of fingers, toes, hand, arm, foot, leg, or an 
eye.
25Most U.S. jurisdictions do not restrict death benefits to a specific term. This provision is an 
anachronism.
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lives with the deceased worker at the time of death, or is found to be living apart for justifiable 
cause, and a child under the age of 16, or over 16 if he or she is physically or mentally 
incapacitated from working.
Rehabilitation Benefits
Michigan was one of the first states to include vocational rehabilitation hi its workers' 
compensation act, hi 1965. The statute mandates that if a worker is unable to perform work 
for which he or she has been trained as the result of a workplace injury, he or she is entitled to 
such vocational rehabilitation services as may be reasonably necessary to restore them to 
useful employment. If such services are not voluntarily offered and accepted, the BWDC on its 
own motion or upon application of the employee, carrier, or employer may refer the employee 
to a Bureau-approved facility for vocational rehabilitation services. The self-insured employer 
or insurance carrier pays for the vocational rehabilitation expenses.
The statute mandates that vocational rehabilitation services shall not extend for more 
than 52 weeks, except in cases when the director of the BWDC has made special provision. If 
there is an unjustifiable refusal to accept rehabilitation pursuant to a decision of the BWDC, 
there may be a loss or reduction of compensation, hi an amount determined by the BWDC for 
each week of the period of refusal (except for specific loss or total and permanent disability 
compensation). Disputes over vocational rehabilitation issues can be heard by mediators or at a 
magistrate hearing. The vast majority of the disputes are resolved voluntarily   without the 
need for a formal order.
Coordination of Benefits
Michigan has one of the most aggressive benefit coordination programs hi the U.S. 26 
An employer's workers' compensation liability is reduced proportionately for virtually any 
other benefits the worker receives that were financed by the employer. Specifically, the 
employer's obligation to pay weekly benefits is reduced by:
26British Columbia does not coordinate benefits, except for certain retired workers.
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  50 percent of the amount of the old-age insurance benefits received under the 
Social Security Act;
the after-tax amount of the payments received under a self-insurance plan, or 
under a disability insurance policy provided and paid for by the employer;
  the proportional amount, based on the ratio of the employer's contributions to 
the total insurance premiums for the policy period involved, of the after-tax 
amount of the payments received pursuant to an insurance policy provided by 
the employer;
the after-tax proportional amount of the employer's contributions to a pension 
plan or retirement plan;
the after-tax proportional amount of the employer's contributions to a profit 
sharing plan.
This coordination of benefits, combined with a rebuttable presumption that retired 
workers did not suffer wage loss, significantly reduced a problem with retirees that were 
securing benefits in the Michigan worker's compensation system prior to this reform. 27
Total Benefit Payments
Injured workers in Michigan received about $934 million (US) in indemnity benefit 
payments hi 1993, $505 million (US) of which was paid by carriers (54 percent), and $429 
million (US) was paid by self-insurers (46 percent). Total medical payments to workers' 
compensation claimants were $374 million (US) in 1993. Thus, medical payments are about 29 
percent of all workers' compensation benefit costs, relatively low by U.S. standards.
Dispute Resolution
A dispute may arise on a variety of issues on any type of claim. The resolutions of 
these disputes are also diverse. Sometimes, issues are resolved by the parties themselves, 
without any agency intervention at all. The claim may be accepted voluntarily by the insurer, 
or withdrawn by the worker. Other times, mediation or a pre-trial hearing will provide the 
opportunity for the parties to work things out. In a minority of cases, about 6 percent in 1993,
27See Hunt (1986), pp. 76-77.
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a formal Board of Magistrates' decision is required. The emphasis in Michigan is on getting 
the parties to agree on a solution, rather than imposing one.
The most common resolution of disputed claims in Michigan is the "redemption 
agreement." This compromise and release settlement "redeems" the employer's liability for 
the claim in exchange for the payment of an agreed sum of money, generally a lump sum, and 
possibly though not usually future medical benefits. Nearly 60 percent of disputed cases in 
1993 were settled with a redemption agreement. The Board of Magistrates requires a review of 
redemption agreements, but these hearings are very simple, with the Magistrate simply 
insuring that the claimant understands that he/she is releasing the employer and/or insurer 
from any further liability for the injury in question. 28
An application for hearing cannot be denied; if either party requests a hearing, the 
Board of Magistrates is obligated to provide it. At present, it is taking approximately 12 
months from application to receive a formal hearing on a workers' compensation dispute in 
Michigan, although there is some variation across magistrates. Cases that come from 
mediation tend to be scheduled for earlier trial dates than cases that go through the pre-trial 
conference procedure.
Formal Hearings
The hearings use formal rules of evidence, and a transcript is prepared by a court 
reporter. However, the atmosphere is less rigid than in a court of law, and normally there is a 
fairly easy give-and-take among participants. Decisions are based on a preponderance of the 
evidence and the magistrates' findings of fact are final. Both parties are nearly always 
represented by attorneys, although occasionally a plaintiff, and very rarely a defendant, will 
appear without benefit of counsel. As outlined earlier, magistrate decisions can be forwarded 
to the Appellate Commission for a decision on whether the law was correctly applied to the 
facts, as determined by the magistrate.
28Such agreements are not allowed in British Columbia.
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Medical testimony is taken by deposition (sworn interrogatory), but the claimant 
usually is asked to testify on his/her own behalf. There may be other witnesses called to testify 
as well, depending on the nature of the claim or the strategy of the defense. However, it is 
quite common that the plaintiff will be the only person to testify. Magistrates are supposed to 
issue then* written opinions within 30 days, but this goal is frequently not achieved.
About 70 percent of the hearings result in redemption orders (compromise and release 
settlements). Generally, redemptions include a final release from liability of the insurer for the 
injuries claimed in the petition for hearing. A lump-sum payment is made to the claimant, less 
attorney's fees (generally 15 percent of settlement) and litigation costs (usually several hundred 
dollars for medical depositions or other costs). In addition, there is a $100 (US) redemption 
fee paid to the BWDC by each party to a redemption.
About 30 percent of the formal hearings result in BWDC decisions or other 
dispositions (ignoring withdrawals and dismissals). Generally, this involves an order by the 
magistrate directing the carrier or self-insured employer to begin paying weekly compensation 
to the claimant, or denying the claim if it is found to be not meritorious. There are also orders 
involving medical costs, vocational rehabilitation issues, and other matters.
The gap between the number of applications for hearing and the number of magistrate 
dispositions is accounted for by washouts and pending claims. Washouts are those petitions 
that are withdrawn or dismissed for lack of prosecution. Little is known about these claims, 
but they may re-enter the system at a later date. The system absorbs extra petitions for 
hearings by lengthening or shortening the queue for hearings.
Role of Attorneys
Attorneys are involved hi almost all cases with disputes. Typically an attorney gets 
involved when an insurer denies compensation to a claimant. Given the degree of litigation in 
the system, it would be surprising if most claimants did not know that they could resort to an 
attorney to help them win benefits. There is some advertising by attorneys for workers' 
compensation claimants hi Michigan. Attorneys fees in Michigan are a contingent percent fee, 
and depend on the final outcome of the case. For cases "tried to completion" a maximum fee
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of 30 percent of accrued compensation, after deducting the costs of litigation, is specified by 
administrative rule. For redemptions, a fee of 15 percent of the first $25,000, and 10 percent 
of any amounts over $25,000 is conventional, again after deducting the costs of litigation from 
the total amount. Typically the attorney pays the costs of litigation for cases that are not 
compensated.
Incentives
In this section, we will reconsider the Michigan workers' compensation system with a 
focus on the incentives present in the system. Incentives for employers to prevent accidents, 
for employees to return to work, provider incentives, and litigation incentives will each be 
considered. This discussion will help to frame the comparative analysis to be presented later.
Safety and Prevention Incentives ~ Mostly Employer Side 
The Michigan system provides strong incentives for employers to prevent injuries. 
Large employers hi Michigan are very likely to be self-insured, which provides the maximum 
connection between the employer's cost and performance in preventing workers' compensation 
claims. 29 Those large employers that are not self-insured will be fully experience rated by their 
workers' compensation insurance carrier. This means that an employer's actual premium level 
will adjust to the claim costs he or she experiences over time. Most experience rating plans in 
Michigan are based on 3 to 5 years of loss experience. The range in experience modification 
factors in Michigan is approximately tenfold, that is, the worst employer in a class will pay up 
to ten times what the best employer will pay for equivalent insurance coverage. In addition, 
large employers are likely to receive significant loss-reduction services from their carriers 
designed to assist them in reducing claims costs.
However, for smaller employers the picture is different. Below a premium level of 
$4,000 annually, experience rating is generally not provided. The justification for this is that
29Most self-insured employers will also have some kind of excess, or reinsurance, policy to protect them 
against catastrophic claims.
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the experience of such small employers is dominated by random events rather than their own 
efforts at prevention. Thus, smaller employers are only class rated. 30 The obvious problem 
with class rating is that it dilutes the financial incentives for prevention. 31 If a small employer 
constitutes an insignificant percent of the class, his or her experience will have no significance 
for the costs of the class as a whole. Thus, their individual performance will not impact the 
cost of insurance coverage and the incentive to prevent injuries is accordingly reduced.
The existence of group self-insurance can mitigate this lost incentive effect. To the 
extent that the group is small enough that each employer believes he/she matters to the overall 
performance, or to the extent that the group administrator makes this clear to members of the 
group, the incentives for prevention can be restored. In Michigan, a number of self-insured 
groups are known to screen applicants for their past claims experience and their current 
commitment to safety and prevention activities. This probably means that the insured sector in 
Michigan is subject to rather heavy adverse selection tendencies.
Return-to-work Incentives ~ Mostly Employee Side
Paralleling employers' prevention incentives, are employer and employee incentives to 
return to work as soon as possible. From the employer perspective, the cost savings from early 
return to work can be nearly as great as the incentives to prevent the injury in the first place. 
One study that sought to quantify these effects among a cross-section of Michigan employers 
found that the payoff to return-to-work policies was about half the size of the payoff to 
prevention strategies. (Hunt, Habeck, Scully, and VanTol, 1993) Based on comparisons 
among a random sample of 222 establishments in seven industries, the study concluded that 10 
percent better performance on safety diligence was associated with nearly 17 percent fewer lost 
workdays per 100 employees. On the other hand, 10 percent better performance on proactive 
return-to-work behaviors was associated with just over 7 percent fewer lost workdays per 100
30There is a "merit" rating in Michigan for employers with premiums of $500 to $4,000 per year, but it 
provides very limited premium swings ( 10 percent).
31As in a public monopoly system without experience rating, or with restricted experience rating, as in 
British Columbia.
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employees. Both results control for a large number of objectively measurable employer 
specific factors that were included in the estimation models.
There is a growing recognition among employers that they can influence their workers' 
compensation costs. This has been assisted by a program in the Michigan Department of 
Commerce that urged employers to "shop around" for then* workers' compensation coverage. 
This became critically important after the introduction of open competitive rating for workers' 
compensation insurance in 1983.
Employee incentives promoting return to work are not so straight forward. However, 
the policy justification for replacing less than 100 percent of lost earnings in temporary 
disability cases is to maintain the economic incentive to return to work. In Michigan, with a 
replacement rate of 80 percent of estimated spendable earnings, this incentive seems strong. 
Using spendable earnings as the basis for a tax-free income benefit ensures that no injured 
workers will benefit financially from staying away from the job. For workers with earnings 
above the average weekly wage, this incentive is even stronger since they actually receive less 
than 80 percent due to the imposition of the benefit maximum.
Some would argue that the 7-day waiting period before income replacement benefits 
begin also constitutes an incentive to return to work swiftly. However, the fact that all days of 
disability are compensated if the disability lasts beyond 14 days may negate this. Once a 
disability has lasted for 5 or 6 days, the incentive is very strong to remain off 14 days or 
more.
In addition, Michigan has gone farther than any other U.S. state in coordinating 
workers' compensation with other benefits paid for by the employer. The only benefit that is 
not coordinated by BWDC is Social Security Disability Insurance, and that is because the 
federal government enacted a statute that allowed them to coordinate first. 32 Thus, federal 
Disability Insurance payments will be reduced to reflect any workers' compensation payments 
for Michigan workers, rather than the other way around. Employer financed pensions, 
unemployment insurance, even Social Security Old Age and Survivors Insurance benefits are
32States that enacted coordination of benefit provisions before the federal statute continue to coordinate.
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coordinated with workers' compensation benefit payments in Michigan. The purpose of these 
provisions is to reduce employer's costs and maximize employee incentives for return to work. 
Last, it is clear that giving the employer (or insurance carrier) the initiative in stopping 
benefits (assuming medical evidence justified this action), allowing the employer to stop 
benefits if the worker refuses an offer of reasonable alternative employment, requiring the 
worker to cooperate with vocational rehabilitation efforts, and other such provisions all 
operate to reinforce the financial incentives for injured workers to return to work as soon as 
they are able. In sum, there are substantial incentives for early return to work in the Michigan 
system.
Provider Incentives
Incentives for various service providers are also built into the system, either explicitly 
or implicitly. Fees for medical treatment are controlled in Michigan by a fee schedule and 
utilization review procedures. Since fees are easier to monitor than utilization, it is a logical 
deduction that the incentive effect is to promote extra treatment at a fixed cost. Whether this 
promotes more rapid return to work is not clear.
Litigation-Settlement Incentives
Attorneys also affect and are affected by incentives in the workers' compensation 
system. Since claimant's attorney fees are regulated as a percentage of the award (15 percent 
of lump-sum settlements and 30 percent of accrued liability in weekly payment cases), the 
attorney clearly has an incentive to make the disability liability as large as possible. The 
attorney understands that the size of the settlement depends crucially on how badly disabled 
the worker is. Therefore the emphasis, at least through the hearing date, is on demonstrating 
disability, not the residual work ability that remains.
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V. MICHIGAN (PRIVATE) INSURANCE MODEL
The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm
The analysis of private systems for providing workers' compensation insurance 
presented here is based on principles of market function commonly used by industrial 
organization economists. Economists postulate a theoretical relationship between market 
structure and market results, which is labeled the "structure-conduct-performance hypothesis." 
The basic hypothesis is that market structure determines market conduct, which determines 
market performance. An atomistic market structure causes firms to behave independently and 
competitively, which hi turn leads to good market performance.
Market structure encompasses the number of buyers and sellers and their size 
distribution, the height of barriers to entry into (and exit from) the market, cost 
structures, the degree of vertical integration, the character of buyer and seller 
information, and the degree of product differentiation.
  Market conduct refers to the actual behavior (i.e., degree of independence) of firms hi 
setting prices and output levels, product design, advertising, innovation, and capital 
investment.
  Market performance covers price, profit, and output levels, production and allocative 
efficiency, the rate of technological progress, and equity. The solvency of firms and the 
availability of coverage also are important performance parameters in insurance 
markets.
The empirical analysis of markets is complicated by the presence of regulation and 
other forms of government intervention, which affect structure, conduct and performance. It is 
important to identify and evaluate government institutions and policies that may significantly 
influence market behavior. This is often a difficult task, given the complex interaction between 
regulation and market forces, but it is necessary to understanding all of the relevant 
determinants of market outcomes.
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Market Structure
The first step in understanding how well workers' compensation markets function is to 
examine their underlying structure. This examination starts with looking at the number of 
insurers and their size distribution to determine whether insurers possess sufficient market 
power, individually or collectively, to affect market price and output levels. This is followed 
by an analysis of entry and exit conditions to assess whether entry or the threat of entry helps 
to impose competitive discipline on workers' compensation markets.
Number and Size of Firms
The workers' compensation insurance market in the U.S. has a large number of 
competitors at the national level. At least 359 private insurers wrote workers' compensation 
insurance in 1993. 33 In addition, 26 state funds provided workers' compensation coverage as of 
1993. Among the states, the average number of workers' compensation insurers was 92. There 
were 107 carriers in Michigan. The number of carriers in a state tends to vary with the size of 
the market.
The degree of concentration hi the market is more significant than the number of firms. 
Workers' compensation insurance in the U.S. is not dominated by one or a handful of 
insurers, but there typically are several leading carriers which write a significant share of the 
market in the various states. These leading carriers vary somewhat from state to state, and 
their positions change over time. Table 5.1 shows the top 20 writers of workers' compensation 
in Michigan in 1993. The Michigan State Accident Fund was the largest writer with a 16 
percent market share in 1993. The America Group and the Liberty Mutual Group were the 
second and third largest carriers with 9.7 percent and 7.2 percent market shares, respectively.
Market concentration is typically measured in terms of "concentration ratios," which 
represent the combined market share of some given number of the largest sellers, or in terms
33As used here, the term "insurer" refers to a group of affiliated companies under common ownership or 
control or a stand-alone company that is not a member of a group. This figure is based on insurers filing annual 
financial statements with the NAIC. There may be a small number of other insurers who write workers' 
compensation but do not file a statement with the NAIC.
V-89
of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is the sum of the squares of the percentage 
market shares of each firm. The HHI reflects the distribution of the leading firms' market 
shares as well as the composition of the rest of the market. The HHI also weights the market 
shares of the larger firms more heavily, which better reflects their relative market power. 34
While neither economic theory nor experience establish a critical level of concentration 
for the absence of competition in a particular industry, the U.S. Department of Justice has 
established merger guidelines for industries which refer to the HHI (DOT, 1984). Under the 
Justice Department guidelines, a post-merger market with an HHI in excess of 1,800 is 
considered highly concentrated. A proposed horizontal merger between two firms that would 
result hi such a market is likely to provoke a challenge from the Justice Department, 
depending on other circumstances. A post-merger market with an HHI between 1,000 and 
1,800 is considered to be moderately concentrated. A proposed horizontal merger resulting in 
this land of market would be less likely to be challenged. A post-merger market with an HHI 
of less than 1,000 is considered to be unconcentrated. A horizontal merger resulting in such a 
market is unlikely to encounter opposition. It should be pointed out that these criteria have 
been developed to evaluate mergers in national industries, broadly defined. Higher 
concentration levels may be expected and acceptable hi smaller state insurance markets where 
there is a greater threat of entry that undermines insurers' ability to exert market power.
Table 5.2 shows Michigan, state average, and U.S. concentration ratios and HHIs for 
workers' compensation insurance for the period 1982-1993. All insurers writing workers' 
compensation are reflected in the U.S. figures. 35
34For example, a market with four firms, each with a 25 percent market share, would have an HHI of 
2,500. If the firms' market shares were 50, 30, 15 and 5 percent, then the HHI would be 3,650. The highest 
possible HHI is 10,000 which would occur when one seller has the entire market, i.e. a monopoly.
35States with monopolistic state funds are excluded from the state average to avoid distortions. Arguably, 
because state funds are generally managed to provide coverage at the lowest possible cost or to serve other public 
policy objectives, their effect on market concentration should be considered separately.
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Market concentration in workers' compensation insurance at the national level 
increased during the early and mid-1980s but has declined in recent years. 36 The increase in 
concentration is the result of extremely soft market conditions in 1983 and 1984, which drove 
some carriers out of the market. In 1993, the top four insurers accounted for 20.3 percent of 
the workers' compensation premiums written nationwide and the top eight insurers accounted 
for 34.6 percent. The HHI fell from 309 in 1988 to 238 in 1993, which is considerably below 
the Justice Department threshold for even moderate concentration.
As expected, concentration is higher at the state level, but generally not high enough to 
cause concern about the structural competitiveness of state markets. The average four-firm 
concentration ratio (CR4) among the states in 1993, including competitive state funds, was 
47.2 percent and the average eight-firm concentration ratio (CR8) was 63.6 percent. Excluding 
monopolistic fund states, state HHI values ranged from 307 in Indiana to 4,702 in Rhode 
Island; all but 12 states had HHIs below 1,000. The states with high market concentration tend 
to have small markets and/or competitive state funds with large market shares. The average 
state HHI in 1993 was 1,198, including competitive state funds, and 918, excluding all state 
funds.
While concentration is declining at the national level, it appears to be on the rise at the 
state level. This reflects some insurer withdrawals from and retrenchment in state workers' 
compensation insurance markets. It also could reflect the growth in the residual market which 
concentrates more direct business in the hands of a limited number of larger companies which 
are servicing carriers for residual market mechanisms.
Michigan's workers' compensation market is relatively unconcentrated compared with 
other states. The top four insurers (including the state accident fund) wrote 38.1 percent of the 
Michigan market, and the top 20 insurers wrote 76.3 percent. The 1993 Michigan HHI was 
548, including the state fund, and 293, excluding the state fund.
36Market concentration estimates are based on direct premiums written by insurers. There is a possibility 
that market concentration estimates are affected by the growing amount of residual market business assigned to 
authorized servicing carriers which are a limited group of large insurers.
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Concentration has increased in Michigan as it has in other states. In 1983, 117 insurers 
wrote workers' compensation insurance in Michigan and the HHI was 352, excluding the state 
fund. The increase in concentration is due to the significant growth hi the state fund.
Entry and Exit Conditions
In some respects, entry and exit conditions appear to be relatively conducive to 
competition in workers' compensation insurance. The property-casualty insurance industry 
generally is not characterized by significant barriers to entry. The initial investment in physical 
facilities needed to start an insurance company is relatively small compared with other 
industries. Almost 80 percent of property/casualty insurers' assets are held in cash, bonds and 
stocks that can be quickly sold to pay claims. Insurers can easily move their capital from 
unprofitable to profitable markets. The amount of capital that most states require insurers to 
have to sell insurance ranges from $500,000-$6,000,000, which is a small amount compared 
to the premium volume of most insurers. For safety and competitive reasons, new insurers are 
generally capitalized at higher levels than state regulatory minimums but even these levels do 
not impose a significant barrier.
Insurers do incur costs in setting up marketing, underwriting and claims operations to 
service various markets, but they can also take advantage of "economies of scope." 
Independent agency companies can essentially plug into the agency network hi any given state 
in order to market their policies. 37 Entry for direct writers is more difficult in that they must 
set up their own agent network to sell policies. However, both agency companies and direct 
writers can use the same facilities and personnel to market several different lines of insurance. 
In commercial lines, the economies of scope involved in packaging several types of coverage, 
including workers' compensation, may be more significant than efficiencies achieved from 
being a direct writer. Carriers also can utilize regional or central underwriting and claims
37Independent agents sell insurance for more than one insurance company. Alternatively, direct writers 
sell insurance through exclusive agents or agents who are employees of the direct writer.
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facilities to service insureds in various states. This greatly facilitates entry into and exit out of 
a specific state.
The experience insurers gain in writing workers' compensation business, generally, and 
certain occupations or industries, specifically, represents an investment which could serve as a 
deterrent to entry and exit. Insurers also acquire private information about the specific 
employers that they write. Cummins and Danzon (1991) hypothesize that insurers holding 
private information about favorable risks are able to maintain prices above competitive levels. 
If the policyholders return to the market to seek insurance from a different company, much of 
this private information is lost. Policyholders with favorable risk characteristics may be 
charged a higher price in the open market because other carriers do not have as much 
information on the policyholders' risk characteristics. Thus, policyholders may be willing to 
pay a supra competitive price without switching. This kind of informational barrier may be 
less significant in workers' compensation than in other lines of insurance, given that historical 
workers' compensation experience information on employers is available to all insurers 
through mandated experience reporting.
There are also costs involved with exit. Insurers will lose the value of any sunk 
investments they have made in establishing operations in the market from which they 
withdraw. These costs will serve as some deterrent to entry. They also may induce insurers to 
sustain inadequate profits for a period of time before withdrawing from a market. Government 
exit restrictions also can discourage entry. At present, exit restrictions hi workers' 
compensation are generally limited to prior notice requirements and residual market 
assessment obligations. While these restrictions should not prevent insurers from withdrawing 
from a market, they can delay and/or raise the cost of withdrawal.
Data on the frequency of entries into and exits from workers' compensation markets in 
the U.S. suggest that barriers have not been high enough to significantly restrict insurers' 
movement. Table 5.3 shows the pattern of entries into and exits from workers' compensation 
insurance markets in Michigan, states on average, and the U.S., over the period 1983-1993. 
There have been some entries and exits every year at the national level, with marginally more 
exits than entries. The highest level of exits occurred from 1987 to 1988 hi response to the soft
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market and declining profits that occurred in 1983 and 1984. On average, over the period 
1985-1993, 21 insurers have entered the U.S. market and 24 insurers have left the market 
every year. These figures represent approximately 5.6 percent and 6.3 percent of the insurers 
selling workers' compensation insurance countrywide, respectively.
As would be expected, the rate (in percentage terms) of entry and exit is somewhat 
higher at the state level than at the national level. Over the period 1985-1993, seven insurers 
entered and nine insurers exited the average state market every year. These figures represent 
7.9 percent and 9.3 percent of the average number of insurers operating hi a state, 
respectively. Exits have out paced entries to a greater degree at the state level than at the 
national level, reflecting the fact that some carriers have reduced the number of states in which 
they write workers' compensation business. This is consistent with an overall industry trend in 
which insurers are consolidating their operations hi states where they have a more significant 
market presence. A large number of market exits have been concentrated among a minority of 
states with significant market problems. Klein, Nordman, and Fritz (1993) found that only half 
of the states experienced a net decrease in workers' compensation writers over the period 
1986-1991, and only five states lost more than 10 percent of their carriers.
Entries and exits have occurred at a somewhat slower pace in Michigan. On average, 5 
insurers have entered and 6 insurers have exited the market every year over the period 1983- 
1993. These figures represent 4.3 percent and 5.5 percent of the total number of carriers hi the 
Michigan market, respectively. Michigan experienced a relatively large number of exits (11) in 
1983 after the introduction of competitive rating and lost 12 carriers in 1986 at the tail of the 
soft market.
These data tend to support the view that entry and exit barriers are not significant 
impediments to competition hi workers' compensation insurance. At the same tune, the costs 
of entry and exit are not incidental and could have some effect on the industry's performance. 
To the extent that entry and exit are costly, competition could be unpaired, resulting in higher 
prices. The impact on prices will be limited by the magnitude of entry and exit costs.
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Conduct
The second major area that is examined is the market conduct of workers' 
compensation insurers. This aspect is more elusive than structure and performance because it 
involves assessing whether insurers are making pricing and output decisions independently and 
not taking other strategic actions to impede competition. This study examines two sources of 
evidence on the conduct of workers' compensation insurers: (1) the distribution of insurers' 
manual rates and their "competitive" adjustments to those rates; and (2) observations on 
insurers' efforts to develop innovations to improve service and lower costs.
Pricing
Evaluating market conduct hi workers' compensation insurance is difficult because of 
the complexity of the product and the pricing system. One parameter that is sometimes 
examined is the degree of independence in insurers' pricing. If a market is competitive, 
insurers will not be able to set their prices in concert to increase profits or protect inefficiency. 
Historically, workers' compensation insurers were forced to use uniform bureau rates with 
little opportunity for deviation. Regulation of bureau rates substituted for competition. In 
recent years, many states have moved away from administered pricing systems, although they 
may still review and approve advisory rate filings. Today, in most states, insurers can file 
independent rates or deviations from advisory rates. In states with "loss cost" systems, 
insurers must file full independent rates or multipliers applied to advisory loss costs. Insurers 
also can compete through various kinds of adjustments to manual rates to determine the 
premium for a specific employer. At the same time, the publication of advisory rates or loss 
costs and other advisory rating information could serve as a focal point for insurers' pricing 
systems and diminish independent price competition.
The rates and rating rules filed by insurers with regulators are based on extensive 
analysis of a huge amount of data. Historical data on losses, expenses and premiums are 
developed to a current basis and then projected forward to the period in which the filed rates 
will be hi effect. This projection considers the effect of medical cost and indemnity trends, law 
changes, payroll trends, investment income and many other factors. If projected costs,
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including a provision for insurers' cost of capital, exceed projected premiums, a rate increase 
is requested. If projected premiums exceed projected costs, a rate decrease is filed. The 
indicated rate change is allocated to the various classifications according to their relative 
historical costs.
It is difficult to ascertain whether insurers are setting prices independently simply by 
looking at the distribution of prices. In theory, in a perfectly competitive market, all insurers 
will charge the same price for a common policy. The structure of insurance markets is more 
akin to monopolistic competition than perfect competition, however. Even in workers' 
compensation, insurers are differentiated by their quality of service and underwriting 
standards, and their prices should vary accordingly. Hence, in a monopolistically competitive 
workers' compensation market, we would expect to see a range of prices among insurers. On 
the other hand, similar employers would not be expected to pay widely varying prices for the 
same coverage, unless acquisition of information about rates is very costly.
Detailed information on insurers' pricing structures for workers' compensation has not 
been compiled and summarized at the national level. However, information on the distribution 
of insurers' workers' compensation prices has been compiled in Michigan, as part of its 
competition monitoring efforts. Table 5.4 reproduces an exhibit from the most recent 
Michigan report, which shows the distribution of policies by insurers' manual rates for the 100 
largest classes in 1993. This table shows the highest and lowest rate for each class as well as 
the percentage of policies written at rates in each of five equal divisions between the low and 
high rates. The distribution of prices tends to be skewed towards lower rates but some policies 
are written at relatively high rates. On average, 88 percent of all policies were written at rates 
within the lowest three divisions. Nine percent of all policies were written in the first division 
and 36 percent of all policies were written in the second division. These data indicate that 
insurers' manual rates for a given classification range widely.
While these data do not suggest that workers' compensation insurers are engaging in 
concerted pricing hi Michigan, the Michigan report expresses concern that employers with 
"similar" operations pay such different manual rates, depending on which insurer they place 
their business with. There is a problem if some insureds are paying excessive premiums for
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the amount of coverage and quality of service that they receive. Unfortunately, this cannot be 
discerned from manual rate distributions alone. As the Michigan report observes, there are a 
number of possible explanations for manual rate differences that would not represent a market 
failure. First, differences hi manual rates could be offset by differences in the other rating 
adjustments that insurers apply in calculating final premiums. Second, insurers with higher 
manual rates could offer better service in terms of loss prevention, claims adjustment, financial 
strength, etc. Third, experience rating and schedule rating adjustments may not fully account 
for differences in risk among employers within the same rating classification. Consequently, 
insurers with lower rates will tend to apply tighter underwriting standards, which forces 
higher-risk employers towards higher-rate carriers. Finally, some variation in prices is to be 
expected in a dynamic market affected by changes hi external factors, requiring pricing 
adjustments which take time to implement.
Some information is available on the "competitive" pricing adjustments insurers make 
to the advisory manual rates approved by regulators. Insurers use these adjustments to fine 
tune the price for a particular employer to respond to the employers' particular risk 
characteristics as well as competition from other insurers. Thus, even in states that appear to 
maintain uniform rates across employers, there may be more variation in final, realized prices 
than appears at first glance.
Deviations are pricing adjustments made by individual insurers to the manual rates filed 
by the advisory or rating organization. They are applicable only in states that still allow the 
advisory organization to file full manual rates that include expense and profit loadings. A 
deviation is a departure, usually downward, from the rates filed on the insurer's behalf by the 
advisory organization. Many insurance departments require that deviations be supported by 
appropriate loss and expense information. Often insurers will file a deviation for one or more 
affiliated insurers within a group. This allows the insurer group to have more than one set of 
manual rates on file within the group. Having more than one set of manual rates on file allows 
underwriters to place an employer hi a company with a filed downward deviation if the risk 
represents a better than average exposure to loss.
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"Schedule rating" attempts to reflect risk characteristics that are not included in the 
experience rating plan. It attempts to measure such variables as: condition and care of the 
premises; type of equipment and its care and condition; classification peculiarities; cooperation 
of management with respect to medical facilities and safety programs; and selection, training, 
supervision and experience of employees. Although some states have taken measures to 
ascertain that schedule rating plans have been appropriately applied, these plans are often used 
for competitive purposes when an insurer wants to reduce the price it is quoting to an 
employer. This is evidenced by the fact that schedule rating typically results in a credit (as 
opposed to a debit) hi those states where it is allowed.
The competitive pricing adjustments discussed above are front-end adjustments. 
Policyholder dividends are back-end price adjustments that occur after the policy has already 
expired to reflect favorable loss experience of the insurer. The insurer and the policyholder 
contractually agree to participation hi the dividend program. In most jurisdictions, the insurer 
is prohibited by law from guaranteeing that dividends will be paid. Actual payment of 
dividends is not determined until the board of directors of the insurer has reviewed the 
insurer's loss experience over the time period for which the dividend is being calculated. Flat 
dividend plans pay a certain percentage of premium back to each policyholder, regardless of 
the policyholder's loss experience. Loss-sensitive plans pay dividends based on the favorable 
loss experience of the policyholder. These plans are usually based on a schedule that returns a 
certain percentage of premium for achieving a certain loss ratio after application of the 
individual experience modification, if any.
Table 5.5 tracks these competitive pricing adjustments as a percentage of standard 
earned premium for Michigan and all NCCI states combined over policy years 1984-1993. 
These data indicate that competitive pricing adjustments hi all NCCI states fell from 12.9 
percent, in 1984, when the soft market bottomed out, to 6.4 percent, in 1991, and then rose 
slightly to 6.9 percent hi 1993. In Michigan, competitive pricing adjustments fell from 18.2 
percent hi 1984, to 7.3 percent in 1987, and then rose to 9.4 percent in 1993. The use of these 
adjustments indicates that insurers exercise some further discretion in pricing workers' 
compensation insurance, beyond setting different manual rates.
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At the same time, the cyclical pattern revealed in the use of these adjustments suggests 
that insurers' pricing decisions are not completely independent. As noted in Section I, the 
cyclical nature of commercial lines, pricing is a topic of considerable discussion among 
industry observers. Analysts differ on the question of whether these price movements are 
driven primarily by external economic factors (i.e., changes in interest rates, loss shocks, etc.) 
or rising and falling tides of competition (Cummins, Harrington, and Klein, 1991).
Product Service/Design
Economists sometimes evaluate the pace of innovation in an industry as an element of 
market conduct. In a competitive market, firms are expected to explore new products and 
services to meet consumers' needs and new technologies to lower production costs. Insurance 
companies innovate by developing more efficient ways to market and distribute their products, 
underwrite, handle claims, and provide loss prevention services. Insurers also innovate by 
developing new products and services that help policyholders tailor their transfer of risk and 
related functions to fit their particular circumstances. Because of statutory restrictions, the 
ability of insurers and employers to vary policy provisions is somewhat more constrained for 
workers' compensation than for other commercial lines.
Despite these restrictions, workers' compensation insurers have managed to find ways 
to vary their products and services. Innovations have occurred in the form of policies that 
allow employers to retain greater risk for lower premiums, and in the unbundling of insurance 
services so that employers need only purchase those that they cannot perform efficiently for 
themselves. Under a retroactive rating plan, an employer's premium varies within a prescribed 
range, depending on the employer's claims experience under the policy. With a large 
deductible policy, an employer reimburses the insurer for losses up to a certain amount. These 
types of policies allow employers to lower their premiums by purchasing less than full 
insurance. This can ultimately lower costs for these employers to the extent that they are 
induced to more effectively prevent accidents or reduce claim costs and also are able to avoid 
insurers' expense and profit loadings on the loss costs retained by the employer. Some insurers 
have enhanced their loss prevention and claims management services to better control claims
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costs and lower premiums. Insurers also have unbundled and sold loss prevention and claims 
services to self-insured employers. These innovations suggest that the conduct of workers' 
compensation insurers is responsive and adaptive to economic forces in ways that improve the 
efficiency of the market.
Performance
According to economic theory, a competitive market will achieve an optimal allocation 
of resources. Specifically, this means that the market price will equal the cost of producing the 
last unit of output, each firm will produce at a level of output where its average cost is at a 
minimum, and investors will receive a rate of return just equal to the cost of the capital they 
have invested.
While competition ensures that prices will be as low as possible, it does not ensure that 
a given commodity will be "affordable," or that prices will not rise over tune. Indeed, an 
unavoidable increase in the cost of production requires an increase in the market price. Hence, 
the efficiency of workers' compensation insurance markets should be judged in terms of the 
relationship of premiums to the benefits received by employers and their employees. The level 
and growth of claim costs, the availability of coverage, and insurer solvency also are 
important aspects of workers' compensation market performance.
Prices
The level and rate of growth of workers' compensation insurance premiums are not, by 
themselves, indicative of the market's efficiency, but they can be symptomatic of market 
problems. This is definitely an issue in the U.S., where workers' compensation rates have 
risen rapidly in many states hi recent years. Table 5.6 shows benefit payments and workers' 
compensation costs to employers, each as a percentage of covered payroll, for the period 
1982-1993. Costs rose fairly steadily over this period in the U.S. until 1991 from $1.75 to 
$2.40. In 1992, however, the tide turned as employer costs fell to $2.31 and then to $2.30 in 
1993. This is consistent with NCCI filings for rate/loss cost decreases in a number of states in 
response to system reforms and improving experience.
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In Michigan, prices declined from 1982 as competitive rating was instituted, then rose 
faster than the national trend hi 1984-1987. Michigan prices dropped relative to the U.S. 
average again through 1990. As for the country as a whole, Michigan rates declined absolutely 
hi 1992 and 1993. Rising workers' compensation premiums have been a significant issue hi 
many states, imposing political pressure on the rate regulatory process and benefit provisions, 
as well as inducing employers to look for lower cost alternatives to standard insurance 
coverage. Some analysts contend that regulatory suppression of voluntary and residual market 
rates has diminished employers' incentives to contain costs, which in turn has contributed to 
cost inflation. 38 It appears that the economic and political pressures to contain workers 
compensation costs have had some effect and reversed the steady upward trend since the early 
1980s.
Benefit Costs
Benefit costs represent the largest portion of the total costs of the workers' 
compensation system in the U.S. and are the principal driver of the premiums paid by 
employers. In evaluating the efficiency of different workers' compensation systems, it is too 
simplistic to start from a premise that "high" benefit costs are either good or bad. Ideally, the 
system should adequately compensate workers for their medical costs and lost wages due to 
injury, while also encouraging and facilitating their rapid return to work. Thus, benefits costs 
that are too low can be just as much of a problem as benefit costs that are too high. 
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to determine whether the "right" amount of benefits are 
going to the "right" workers. The amount and distribution of benefits is primarily determined 
by statute and workers' compensation administrators, but the way in which benefits are funded 
and provided also has an impact.
In theory, private workers' compensation insurers should have an incentive to minimize 
benefit costs consistent with state law. Insurers also should seek to provide these benefits 
efficiently by minimizing their loadings for nonbenefit costs. This implies that a higher ratio of
38See Hager (1991) for an overview of this and other troubling policy issues as seen by the NCCL
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benefit costs to total premiums represents greater efficiency, but that is not necessarily the 
case. Insurer expenditures for claims adjustment and loss prevention, up to a point, might 
yield more than commensurate savings hi benefit costs and result hi a lower benefit/cost ratio. 
Hence, it is necessary to evaluate the level of benefit costs in relation to system provisions and 
other relevant economic variables, as well as the relationship between benefit costs and 
premiums.
As was shown in Table 5.6, benefit costs as a percentage of covered payroll have risen 
over the past decade in Michigan and the U.S. In Michigan, benefit costs increased from 1.59 
percent, hi 1984, to 1.99 percent, hi 1991, representing a 25 percent increase (3.3 percent 
annually). Benefit costs have increased at a faster pace hi the U.S. as a whole, from 1.21 
percent to 1.79 percent, representing a 48 percent increase (5.8 percent annually). Benefit 
costs in the U.S. increased further hi 1992 to $1.82 then fell sharply hi 1993 to $1.68, 
following the drop hi overall employer costs.
Rapidly rising costs hi workers' compensation have been blamed on a number of 
factors, including: more frequent workplace accidents and occupational illnesses; emergence of 
new types of compensable injuries; medical cost increases and cost shifting; high benefit levels 
that encourage claims; excessive litigation; and fraud (Burton, 1992). Inadequate rates and the 
lack of cost containment incentives for residual market servicing carriers also have been 
identified as contributing factors (Harrington, 1992; and Klein, Nordman and Fritz, 1993). 
Additionally, cost pressures in the insured sector could be exacerbated by adverse selection, if 
low-risk employers are moving to self-insurance to lower then* workers' compensation costs. 
The recent decrease hi benefit costs could be the result of system reforms as well as private 
insurer and employer cost containment efforts, particularly with respect to managed care 
(Burton, 1995).
Table 5.7 provides information on the ratio of benefits (i.e., losses incurred) to direct 
premiums earned for private insurers and selected state funds for Michigan and the U.S. for 
the period 1982-1993. The benefit/premium ratio has been somewhat volatile over this period 
hi Michigan, ranging from 59.4 percent to 102.0 percent. The benefit/cost ratio was 68.6 
percent in 1993, which was somewhat below the historical average of 77.9 percent. The ratio
V-102
for private insurers has been generally lower than that for the state fund in Michigan. 
Benefit/cost ratios have been higher at the national level, both for private insurers and state 
funds, These ratios were 80.2 percent and 94.8 percent respectively for private insurers and 
state funds for the period 1982-1993.
Expenses
The second largest component of workers' compensation insurance cost is insurers' 
expenses. Insurers perform a variety of functions in administering insurance policies that 
generate costs. These functions include marketing, distribution/acquisition, loss prevention, 
claims adjusting, investing, and general administration. Some of these are services that 
employers might otherwise have to perform for themselves, such as loss prevention, claims 
administration, and investing funds accumulated to pay losses. Other activities are necessitated 
by the use of government or private entities as risk-pooling mechanisms. Of course, only 
competing private insurance companies are forced to incur marketing costs; these are 
precluded if all insurance is provided through a private or government monopoly.
Evaluating the relative costs of monopolistic versus competitive insurers involves a 
difficult calculation. Competitive insurers incur additional marketing and acquisition costs and 
also may not fully exploit all potential economies of scale. On the other hand, market 
competition may be a more cost-effective way to achieve maximum efficiency in the 
performance of insurance functions than the government oversight required for monopolistic 
insurers. Of course, that is one of the major questions of this paper.
It is impossible to conclusively judge the relative efficiency of the different insurance 
mechanisms in the U.S. from the information available. Detailed financial data on private 
insurers' expense costs are available but there is no comparable metric on the quantity and 
quality of services provided. Hence, it is hard to discern whether higher expenditures on 
claims adjustment, for example, are due to better service or greater inefficiency. The analysis 
is complicated by the fact that different jurisdictions have different legal and administrative 
requirements which necessitate different levels of service. Another consideration is that higher 
expenditures on some services, such as loss prevention and claims adjustment, may yield more
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than commensurate savings in loss costs. Consequently, lower benefit/premium ratios and 
higher expense/premium ratios may actually reflect more efficient provision of workers' 
compensation benefits to injured workers.
With these considerations hi mind, insurer expense data are reviewed here to gain some 
perspective on the cost of the different functions performed by insurance carriers. While it is 
not possible to reach definitive conclusions about the relative efficiency of different systems 
with these data, relatively high expenses would raise the possibility of inefficiency and would 
invite further investigation.
Table 5.8 shows expense costs reported for Michigan and the U.S. for 1992 and 1993. 
The largest portion of these costs is allocated loss adjustment expense, which was 15.9 percent 
of direct losses incurred in Michigan in 1993, compared to 16.2 percent in the U.S. Sales 
expense was somewhat higher hi Michigan, 9.7 percent of direct premiums earned compared 
to 8.1 percent nationally. State taxes on workers' compensation insurance were lower in 
Michigan, 2.9 percent of premiums earned compared to 3.9 percent nationally.
These costs have been drifting upward hi the last three or four years. The increase is 
due primarily to higher loss adjustment expenses, which could reflect more vigorous cost 
containment efforts on the part of insurers.
Profits
Unfortunately, it is not easy to measure insurers' profitability for workers' 
compensation. Most insurers do not confine their operations to one line of insurance, so it is 
necessary to allocate expenses and investment income from insurers' total operations to 
estimate profits for a specific line such as workers' compensation. An additional complication 
is that insurers' surplus must be allocated to each line hi order to estimate total profits and a 
rate of return on net worth. Further, insurer financial data are primarily reported on a 
calendar-year basis, but calendar-year profits are a very imperfect measure of insurers' 
performance. Premiums are collected over the relatively short term of a policy year, but claim 
payments associated with that policy will stretch out over a number of years. Calendar-year 
profits reflect premiums and investment income earned, losses incurred and expenses paid
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during the course of the calendar year. For a given calendar-year, these amounts originate 
from a mix of policies written in many different years.
Understanding these limitations, two different measures of profitability are analyzed - 
operating profits as a percentage of premiums earned and the estimated rate of return on net 
worth. Table 5.9 shows these measures for Michigan and the U.S. for the period 1985-1993. 
The data are taken from the NAIC's Report on Profitability By Line and By State and are 
adjusted from a statutory reporting basis (SAP) to a generally accepted accounting 
principles(GAAP) basis to facilitate comparisons with other industries which are subject to 
GAAP accounting. 39
The first measure reflects the portion of employers' premium dollars that insurers 
retain as profits, after inclusion of all investment income and payment of all taxes. Investment 
income represents a considerable portion of insurers' total income and is an important factor in 
their pricing decisions. This is particularly true for long-tail lines such as workers' 
compensation, where insurers hold policyholders' funds in reserve for long periods to pay 
claims. Here we also see the cyclical nature of workers' compensation profitability, driven by 
cyclical pricing. Despite its highly competitive market structure, profits in Michigan have been 
higher than hi the U.S. as a whole. In Michigan, total profits as a percentage of net premiums 
earned varied from 21 percent in 1985 to -0.1 percent in 1991, and then rose again to 23.2 
percent in 1993. Michigan profits averaged 13.3 percent over the entire period, compared to 
7.3 percent nationwide. Of course, the national average could be a reflection of low or 
negative profits in some states because of high loss costs and regulatory constraints on prices.
Estimating the rate of return on net worth for workers' compensation insurers permits 
rough comparisons with the rates of return for the property/casualty insurance industry and 
other industries. Figure 5.1 compares the estimated rate of return on workers' compensation 
insurance, in Michigan and the U.S., against the estimated rate of return for all 
property/casualty insurance and Fortune 500 companies for the years 1985-1993. This analysis
39These GAAP adjustments are only an approximation based on statutory financial information. See 
NAIC (1994) for explanation of the methodology used.
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confirms that insurers' profits for workers' compensation in the U.S. as a whole have fallen 
below the rates of return in other industries. The estimated average U.S. rate of return on net 
worth for workers' compensation for the period 1985-1993 was 8.3 percent, which was below 
the estimated 10.8 percent rate of return for all property/casualty lines for that period and the 
12.1 percent rate of return earned by the Fortune 500 companies. Property/casualty insurance 
profits have been depressed by recent catastrophes as well as soft markets in certain 
commercial lines, so the Fortune 500 average may be a better benchmark. The 1985-1993 
Michigan rate of return for workers' compensation was 12.9 percent, which does not suggest 
that workers' compensation profits in Michigan were excessive compared with the return that 
investors might earn in other industries. The relatively high profits in Michigan in the mid- 
1980s may reflect the rebound in rates that occurred after significant price cutting hi the years 
immediately following the introduction of competitive rating. (See Table 5.6)
Profitability differs substantially by state. Table 5.10 suggests that there is a strong 
relationship between increases in benefit costs and operating losses. The ten most profitable 
states in 1990 had an average operating profit of 37.1 percent and only an 11.1 percent 
increase in average benefit costs over the period 1985-1989. The ten least profitable states had 
an average operating loss of 15.9 percent and a 39.5 percent increase hi average benefits costs 
over this same period.
A positive relationship between operating losses and rising loss costs could be 
explained by insurers' failure to accurately project future loss costs and set adequate prices or 
it could be caused by government constraints on insurers' ability to increase prices to match 
expected cost increases, or some combination of both. There is some evidence to suggest that 
insurers have underestimated rising loss costs. The NAIC's examination of the National 
Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI), the primary industry advisory organization, 
concluded that NCCI rate making procedures have, on average, underestimated loss 
development by 3-5 percentage points and trend by 8-10 percentage points (Milliman & 
Robertson, 1991). NCCI studies also suggest that insurers' reserves are substantially 
understated which could cause insurers' loss projections to be underestimated.
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The differential performance of state funds contributes to the variation in state market 
results. Some state funds are run at substantial deficits. In 1991, loss ratios ranged from 63.3 
percent for the Minnesota state fund to 288.6 percent for the Nevada state fund. State funds 
had a combined loss ratio of 109.7 percent compared to a loss ratio of 85.6 percent for private 
insurers. There is a concern that several state funds are building up sizeable liabilities that will 
have to be paid either by taxpayers or special assessments on employers and/or private 
insurers (Kenney, 1991). This reflects a problem with the politicization of rates for some 
government insurers.
Availability
Availability is a very important aspect of market performance in insurance, particularly 
in lines such as workers' compensation where coverage is mandatory for most employers hi 
most states, but no mandatory service requirements are imposed on private insurers. 
Availability is a general term which can be interpreted in various ways. In theory, availability 
could be defined in terms of whether the supply of insurance is adequate to meet the quantity 
of insurance demanded at competitive prices. Strictly speaking, virtually all employers have 
some source of workers' compensation insurance coverage available to them through residual 
market mechanisms. However, the residual market has a number of disadvantages for 
employers and is generally not a desirable source of coverage.
A more meaningful indicator is the availability of workers' compensation coverage in 
the voluntary market. However, this variable is not easily observable from empirical data. 
Different employers may face quite different circumstances in terms of the number of carriers 
that are willing to offer them coverage and the terms they offer. A commonly used proxy for 
availability is the proportion of total premiums written through the residual market. This is a 
less than perfect proxy for availability as some risks may actually choose to obtain coverage 
through the residual market when they could purchase coverage in the voluntary market. This 
can occur when residual market rates are inadequate and some employers can obtain a lower 
premium by insuring through the residual market. Still, the residual market share serves as an 
important barometer of market conditions, recognizing that it is influenced by a number of
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factors including the relative competitiveness of the residual market. A large and growing 
residual market indicates significant problems which can ultimately lead to the collapse of the 
voluntary market.
As shown in Table 5.11, the proportion of direct premiums written in the residual 
market in the U.S. increased sharply from 9.9 percent in 1985 to 28.5 percent in 1993. 40 
Operating losses for the residual market in NCCI states, as calculated by the NCCI, 
mushroomed from $0.4 billion for policy year 1983 to $2.3 billion (excluding Maine) for 
policy year 1989, and then fell back to $1.0 billion hi policy year 1993, as residual and 
voluntary market reforms took hold. Insurers are assessed to cover these operating losses 
based on their voluntary business. The countrywide residual market burden (operating losses 
divided by voluntary market premiums), according to the NCCI, increased from 10.3 percent 
of voluntary premiums written hi policy year 1985 to 18.3 percent hi policy year 1989, and 
then fell back to 8.7 percent in policy year 1993.
The large growth in the residual market hi the U.S. could be a function of both 
diminished availability of voluntary market coverage as well as regulatory policies that have 
made the residual market the preferred source for coverage for some employers. Increases in 
voluntary and residual market rates appear to have reduced operating losses and should 
improve the availability and desirability of voluntary market coverage as insurers and 
employers respond to improved incentives.
If premiums in the residual market are insufficient to cover losses and servicing carrier 
fees, then an operating deficit will necessarily occur. This deficit, in turn, must be recovered 
through assessments on insurers. To the extent that insurers are able to recover the 
assessments through higher voluntary market rates, the burden of the residual market is borne 
by employers who purchase workers' compensation coverage. This increases employers' 
incentive to self-insure. Alternatively, to the degree that insurers are not allowed to recover 
assessments through higher rates, they are induced to decrease their voluntary market
40It should be noted that the residual market share of premiums will be affected by the types of risks 
written and the level of rates charged hi the residual market.
V-108
business. This can force the voluntary market into a "death spiral" in which growing residual 
market losses feed further shrinkage of the voluntary market which in turn increases residual 
market losses. The NCCI has suggested that, historically, a state residual market share in the 
range of 30 percent appears to be a critical threshold, beyond which further residual market 
growth and losses escalate rapidly.
Regulators do not deny the potential for a death spiral to occur but they also raise other 
issues about the performance of the residual market. Regulators have expressed significant 
concerns about the quality of service that residual market risks receive and the incentives 
servicing carriers have to properly administer policies and control costs. This can exacerbate 
cost pressures as more employers are thrust into the residual market. Regulators also have 
expressed concerns that an inordinate number of smaller employers are forced into the residual 
market.
The severity of the residual market problem varies significantly among the states. In 
some states, the residual market is virtually nonexistent while in other states it accounts for 
almost half of the business written. In 1993, the residual market share ranged from 2.6 percent 
in Idaho to 48.0 percent in South Carolina. Similarly, the residual market burden for policy 
year 1993, as evaluated by the NCCI, ranged from zero in New Mexico to 47.9 percent in 
Kentucky. While these results indicate significant market problems in some states, they are 
considerably improved from several years ago when the markets in a few states, like Maine, 
were threatened with total collapse. Several factors can influence the size of the residual 
market and the burden it imposes on the voluntary market in a given state. These factors 
include: the adequacy of/and relationship between voluntary market and residual market rates; 
the stringency of residual market application requirements; the presence and underwriting 
standards of a state fund; and the general condition of the voluntary market.
Insurers contend that the residual market growth and operating losses are caused by 
inadequate voluntary and residual market rates. If insurers are unable to charge a premium to 
an insured that is sufficient to provide a fair return on investment, they will be disinclined to 
offer coverage voluntarily. The greater the degree of rate inadequacy, hi this view, the greater 
the number of employers that will be thrust into the residual market.
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Solvency
An insurer's solvency is critical to the integrity of its contracts. State insurance 
regulators' primary responsibility is to protect policyholders and claimants against insurer 
insolvencies. This responsibility is met through financial regulation and state guaranty funds. 
While guaranty funds ensure that the workers' compensation claims against insolvent insurers 
will be paid, they diminish employers' incentives to purchase coverage from low-risk insurers. 
Regulation must compensate by stringently monitoring and limiting insurers' insolvency risk.
State regulators seek to reduce but not necessarily eliminate the incidence and cost of 
insolvencies. There is a need to balance insolvency risk with the cost and availability of 
insurance. Some possibility of failure is inherent in a competitive market. Insolvency costs 
paid by guaranty funds are initially passed back to solvent insurers through uniform pro rota 
assessments on premiums. Some states allow insurers to recoup guaranty fund assessments 
through higher rates while others allow premium tax offsets. Either way, a large number of 
failures of workers' compensation insurers will impose significant costs on employers and/or 
taxpayers.
As shown in Table 5.12 the number and proportion of insolvent insurers, with 
workers' compensation as then: principle line of business, increased during the middle to late 
1980s. It is not clear what these figures indicate with respect to the relationship between 
workers' compensation market conditions and insolvencies. The insolvency of workers' 
compensation writers may or may not have been caused or significantly influenced by their 
workers' compensation experience. It is interesting to note that the number of insolvencies 
represented by workers' compensation writers peaked at 9 in 1985, following the extremely 
soft market conditions in 1983 and 1984.
Some analysts contend that regulatory suppression of workers' compensation rates 
poses a significant threat to insurer solvency (Fein, 1991; and Kramer, 1991 and 1992). 
Kramer claims that financially weaker and insolvent insurers tend to write a greater portion of 
their business in states subject to rate suppression. While Kramer's data indicate a relationship 
between poor financial performance and concentration in low profit workers' compensation 
markets, his methodology does not necessarily support the conclusion that low profits and
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insolvency are caused solely or primarily by rate regulation (See Klein, 1992b). Regardless of 
the underlying cause, workers' compensation losses do pose a solvency threat to insurers with 
a large portion of business in this line. This threat has not escaped the attention of insurance 
company rating agencies. In 1992, Moody's downgraded Liberty Mutual from an Aa2 to an 
Aa3 rating and Kemper National from an Aa2 to an Al rating because of their concentration in 
the workers' compensation market.
Regulation
The reliance on private insurers to provide workers' compensation coverage 
necessitates a regulatory scheme to ensure reasonable rates, fair market practices, availability 
of coverage, and solvent insurers. This section outlines the principal areas of regulation that 
affect workers' compensation markets in Michigan and other states. It also discusses the 
important considerations hi shaping regulatory policies to promote good market performance 
as well as the public objectives for the workers' compensation system.
Entry/Exit
Entry into state workers' compensation insurance markets is regulated principally by 
minimum capital and surplus standards and other financial requirements that determine 
whether an insurer will be issued a certificate of authority to do business. Insurers are required 
to obtain a certificate of authority for every state hi which they do business. The minimum 
capital and surplus requirement to become licensed to write workers' compensation hi most 
states is less than $2 million, and in Michigan it is $1.5 million. These amounts are not 
significant hi relation to the premium volume of most U.S. insurers, and their effect on entry 
is probably minimal.
Other solvency requirements, however, affect an insurer's ability to enter a market and 
retain their authority to sell insurance. States also regulate insurers' investments, and reserving 
practices and may take informal or formal action against companies determined to be in 
hazardous financial condition. Many states require insurers to set aside a certain amount of 
reserves for workers' compensation claims, based on a statutory formula.
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These regulatory actions have an impact on insurer pricing and underwriting decisions 
for workers' compensation. To the extent that solvency regulation forces an insurer to commit 
more capital, increase loss reserves, or choose more conservative investments, insurers will be 
compelled to reduce their supply of coverage and raise their rates. Regulators also may force 
an insurer to raise prices and/or tighten its underwriting selection for financial reasons.
Pricing
Because employers are required by law in most states to carry workers' compensation 
insurance, there is an implicit governmental responsibility to ensure that coverage is available 
at "reasonable" rates. This, in turn, has led to fairly close regulation of workers' 
compensation rates and policy forms and other government involvement in the workers' 
compensation market. Every state requires insurers to file workers' compensation rates with 
the insurance commissioner. Historically, the primary concern was that workers' compensation 
coverage should be available for employers and employees, rather than that rates be 
"reasonable" or "affordable." Indeed, the main regulatory objective was to prevent destructive 
price competition and ensure adequate rates. This was to prevent insolvencies and a 
contraction of the market, which would leave employers without a source of workers' 
compensation coverage. In the 1970s, the concern began to shift to excessive prices, as benefit 
costs and rates began to climb rapidly in many jurisdictions.
Before 1980, every U.S. state that permitted private workers' compensation insurance 
effectively had an "administered pricing" system. This is a system where all insurers use 
uniform rates, filed by a rating bureau, which received the prior approval of the state 
insurance department. Some states allowed deviations from bureau rates, and insurers typically 
retained flexibility with respect to dividends paid to policyholders, but aside from these 
exceptions, true price competition was essentially nonexistent.
The NCCI has been the primary advisory/rating organization hi workers' compensation 
insurance and provides full services in 32 states and limited services in approximately half of 
the others. State advisory/rating organizations serve regulators and insurers in the other states 
that do not have monopolistic state funds. Advisory/rating organization activities include: the
V-112
compilation and distribution of statistical data; development and filing of supplementary rating 
information and manuals; development and filing of standard policy forms and endorsements; 
administration of a uniform classification plan and experience rating system; administration of 
the residual market; and research and public information activities.
Since 1980, a number of states have increased competition by easing requirements for 
adherence to bureau rates and permitting insurers to file deviations. Other states, including 
Michigan, went further and instituted a competitive rating system in which rates are not set by 
a rating bureau or subject to prior approval, but are essentially governed by market forces. 41 
From a procedural standpoint, under competitive rating, insurers' rates are generally subject to 
file and use (or use and file) requirements but are typically not disapproved. Under most 
competitive state rating laws, including Michigan's, the commissioner must find that the 
market is not competitive before disapproving a rate filing or reinstituting prior approval 
requirements.
Under competitive rating, an advisory/rating organization files either advisory final 
rates or advisory loss costs or both. In the first case, insurers can either adopt the advisory 
rates, file a deviation from the advisory rates, or develop and file their own rates. If the 
advisory/rating organization files loss costs only, insurers must develop their own final rates 
which are usually a combination of the advisory loss costs and their expense and profit factors. 
Alternatively, insurers may base their rates on their own loss costs or the advisory loss costs 
modified by some factor. Under a loss cost system, advisory/rating organizations continue to 
perform many of the functions they perform under the traditional bureau rate or advisory rate 
system.
The movement to competitive rating began with the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioner's (NAIC) adoption of a model competitive rating act in 1982 which included 
workers' compensation insurance. A separate model competitive rating act for workers'
41Some analysts use the term "competitive rating" broadly to include prior approval states where insurers 
are allowed to deviate from bureau or advisory rates. In this report, the term is used more narrowly to encompass 
only systems where rates are not subject to prior approval regulation.
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compensation was adopted in 1983. Both the original "all lines" model and the separate 
workers' compensation model provided for file and use approval of rates and a loss cost 
system. In 1993, the NAIC incorporated workers' compensation into the "all lines" 
competitive rating model act.
Since 1982, 31 states have instituted competitive rating laws and/or loss cost systems 
for workers' compensation. Michigan had the distinction of being one of the first states to 
enact a competitive rating and loss cost system in workers' compensation which became 
effective hi 1983. Table 5.13 summarizes state rate regulatory systems for workers' 
compensation insurance. States vary somewhat in their approaches to competitive rating and 
advisory rates/loss costs. Michigan's approach is the most competitive in terms of minimizuig 
insurers' reliance on advisory organization services.42
Regardless of the type of system, regulators are charged with the responsibility to 
ensure that rates are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. Regulators 
scrutinize rate filings to determine whether these standards are met. 43 Hearings are often held 
either as contested cases or on a fact-finding basis. In assessing whether a filing is excessive, 
regulators evaluate the quality of the underlying data as well as the assumptions used by the 
filer with regard to loss development, trend, expense and profit loadings. Legitimate disputes 
often arise over the choices made by filers in developing their final rates. Actuaries often 
disagree over appropriate methodologies and assumptions contained hi the filings. Because rate 
making involves developing a forecast or a "best guess" of the appropriate rate level to be 
charged for a future time period, only hindsight will reveal the accuracy of the rates being 
proposed. Disagreements that affect the overall rate level most often center around the choice 
of trend factors, expense assumptions and profit loadings.
42See Klein (1991) for a review of states' approaches to loss cost systems.
43The intensity of the review depends on the type of rate regulatory system and the filing. Advisory/rating 
organization filings typically get close review, regardless of the type of system. Generally, under competitive 
rating systems, regulators will not intensively analyze individual insurer filings, although this is not true in all 
cases. In competitive rating states, regulators tend to focus their efforts on monitoring insurers' prices and market 
conditions, rather than dissecting insurers' rate filings.
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It is important to point out that the way in which states administer their rate regulatory 
statutes also varies. For instance, although voluntary market rates are subject to file and use 
approval hi some states, residual market rates are always subject to prior approval and 
regulators may or may not allow them to exceed voluntary market rates. Consequently, 
residual market rates effectively serve as a regulatory ceiling for voluntary market rates.
Prior approval states also vary in terms of how stringently they regulate rates. Insurers 
and some analysts contend that a number of states suppress workers' compensation rates below 
a competitive level (Fein, 1991; Harrington, 1992; Kramer, 1991 and 1992). It is argued that 
the business climate and political pressures cause regulators to enforce inadequate rates. Klein, 
Nordman and Fritz, (1993) determined that regulation has lowered premiums in some states 
but also found evidence to indicate that rising costs and fierce price competition have hurt 
insurers' profitability.44
While the evidence suggests that regulation is not the sole source of depressed profits 
in workers' compensation in the U.S., there is no doubt that rate regulation can become 
politicized with adverse consequences for the long-term performance of the market. 
Unfortunately, complex and highly technical rate regulatory decisions must be made hi a 
politically charged environment where various groups have significant economic interests at 
stake. Workers' compensation can be expensive for some employers, particularly in high-risk 
industries and high-cost states. Business groups often argue that workers' compensation rates 
can have significant implications for a state's economic climate and its ability to compete 
nationally and internationally for jobs. Economic competition with bordering states can be a 
particular concern. Groups which have a considerable economic stake in rate regulatory 
decisions exert substantial political pressure on the process.
Government involvement with workers' compensation insurance rates extends beyond 
the insurance commissioner in many states. Historically, state legislatures had confined their 
involvement to setting the statutory parameters for rate regulation, but in recent years they
^Klein, Nordman and Fritz (1993) discuss the different perspectives on the issue of regulatory rate 
suppression and the contribution of other factors to market problems in workers' compensation.
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have become directly involved in setting insurance rates. Legislators also may seek to 
influence regulatory decisions through more informal means, e.g. exerting leverage through 
the appropriation process, threatening to withhold passage of insurance legislation, or voting 
against confirmation of regulatory appointments. Governors also have actively intervened in 
workers' compensation rate regulatory decisions because of concerns about the economic 
effect of rate increases.
Until recently, there has been little empirical research on the effects of alternative 
regulatory systems hi workers' compensation. The primary reason for this is that no state had 
a competitive rating and/or loss cost system until 1982 and only a handful of states had 
established such systems by 1985. Consequently, relatively few states have had a sufficiently 
long experience with alternative rate regulatory systems to permit an empirical evaluation of 
their long-term impact. While the conclusions of the researchers who have looked at this 
question are not unanimous, they do not make a strong case for retaining strict control of 
workers' compensation insurance prices.
Early studies by Klein (1986) and Hunt, Krueger, and Burton (1988) found that 
competitive rating lowered workers' compensation premiums and profits in Michigan. The 
General Accounting Office (1986) reviewed a number of state reports on the impact of 
competitive rating which reached similar conclusions. Subsequent studies by Burton (1990), 
Klein (1991), and Roberts and Madden (1992) suggest that there may be somewhat of a 
rebound effect after competitive rating has been in place for several years. This research 
indicates that prices and profits fall rather significantly in the years immediately following 
deregulation, but then begin to rise again, although not necessarily to the same level they were 
at before deregulation. Carroll and Kaestner (1995) also found evidence that competitive rating 
decreases workers' compensation insurance prices, where prices are measured by the ratio of 
premiums earned (minus dividends to policyholders) to the number of work-related injuries or 
employees.
However, cross-section studies by Appel, McMurray, and Mulvaney (1992) and 
Schmidle (1995) found some weak evidence that net workers' compensation costs to employers 
may be higher and no evidence that costs are lower in competitive rating states, where
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employer costs are measured by adjusted manual rates. The different indication of these 
studies compared with the other studies may stem, in part, from their use of different employer 
cost or price measures, different specifications of regulatory and other explanatory variables, 
and data from different time periods.
Research by Klein, Nordman and Fritz (1993) indicates that prior approval regulation 
lowers loss ratios (i.e., raises prices) in some states and raises loss ratios in other states, 
depending on the degree of regulatory stringency. This result would be consistent with, 
although it does not necessarily prove, the industry's contention that some states have 
suppressed prices below competitive levels. On the whole, the research literature does not 
provide strong support for the view that administered pricing or prior approval rate regulation 
is necessary to prevent excessive prices in workers' compensation insurance.
Quality of Service and Market Practices
States regulate other aspects of the workers' compensation insurance market besides 
rates, including policy forms and market conduct. To the extent that workers' compensation 
benefits are set by statute, workers' compensation policies are more regimented than other 
commercial policies. Recently, some states have permitted large deductible workers' 
compensation insurance policies, and several states have enacted or are considering legislation 
that would permit some form of 24-hour coverage that combines workers' compensation 
insurance with accident and health insurance.
Market conduct regulation deals with insurers' marketing/sales, underwriting, and 
claims adjustment practices. Regulators respond to consumer complaints and conduct 
examinations to check whether insurers are charging correct premiums (according to their 
approved rating plans) and paying claims appropriately. States generally do not interfere with 
insurers' decisions with respect to which employers they accept for coverage, although 
Missouri recently attempted to promulgate rules which would have required insurers to accept 
employers which met certain minimum criteria. Also, states typically do not regulate ancillary 
services provided by insurers such as safety consulting, loss prevention, or third-party claims 
administration for self-insured employers.
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Data Reporting and Advisory Organizations
In the U.S., statutory data reporting requirements help to ensure that public officials 
have adequate information to regulate private insurance markets. Statistical data collection is 
an important component of any insurance system, public or private. In workers' compensation, 
statistical data are used to determine prices and evaluate system performance. Historical 
information on losses and premiums by state and classification are collected and used to 
develop overall rate levels, classification rate differentials, and factors for other rating 
adjustments. Expense data, which also are used in these rate calculations, are reported on a 
statewide basis for some categories of expenses (allocated loss adjustment expense, acquisition 
costs, state taxes and fees, and dividends to policyholders) and on a countrywide basis for 
others (unallocated loss adjustment expense, general expense). In addition, these data, along 
with other insurer financial information, are utilized to monitor market structure, conduct and 
performance.
Data on individual employers' loss histories are collected and maintained for the 
purposes of experience rating. Access to these data allow insurers to determine price and 
perform appropriate experience rating adjustments for an employer even if they have not 
previously insured the employer. Maintenance of a common data base on the loss experience 
of individual risks is critical to maintaining competition in workers' compensation and helps to 
reduce the informational barriers to competition that are present in other lines of insurance.
Another area that is somewhat unique to workers' compensation is the collection of 
detailed data on claims which are used to track cost drivers and evaluate the potential impact 
of changes to benefits and other system provisions. These data are collected through the 
NCCI's Detailed Claims Information (DCI) system which was substantially expanded in 1989 
to meet requirements established by a new NAIC model law and regulation on workers' 
compensation data reporting. The NAIC models were further refined in 1994.
Insurers are compelled by law to report statistical data according to a standardized 
format. State rating laws authorize the insurance commissioner to require insurers to report 
any statistical information deemed necessary to ensure that rates comply with the standards 
contained in the laws. The commissioner may designate a statistical agent to collect the data
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according to an established statistical plan promulgated or approved by the commissioner. In 
practice, data collection for workers' compensation has been delegated to advisory /rating 
organizations, recognizing the close association between statistical and rating functions. 
Supplementary financial data also are obtained through the annual and quarterly financial 
statements that insurers are required to file with state insurance departments and the NAIC.
The NCCI functions as a multi-state statistical agent for workers' compensation and 
coordinates with the state advisory organizations to pool their data with the national data. This 
is important for some components of rate analysis where individual state loss data is not 
sufficiently credible to produce reliable cost estimates. The NCCI utilizes a uniform statistical 
plan for all states for which it collects data with supplemental state reports to respond to 
unique state requirements.45 In Michigan, the Compensation Advisory Organization of 
Michigan (CAOM) is the designated statistical agent for workers' compensation, although it 
contracts with the NCCI for some actuarial and data processing services.
The CAOM is supervised hi its data collection and distribution functions by the Data 
Collection Agency (DCA), which consists of stakeholder representatives who approve the 
format and content of the loss cost data distributed to insurance carriers. Seats are designated 
for representatives of large, medium and small insurers, employers, the public, the Governor 
and the Insurance Bureau (regulatory authority). The DC A must also approve the methodology 
used in developing the advisory loss cost figures (termed "pure premiums") which insurers 
presumably use in setting their individual rates. This structure was put in place at the same 
time as competitive rating was started in 1983 and has provided some additional "public" 
oversight of actuarial procedures in Michigan.
Role of State Funds
State funds play an important role hi the workers' compensation insurance market hi 
the U.S. State funds are classified either as exclusive (monopolistic) or competitive. Nevada,
45A uniform statistical plan means that all insurers in all states governed by the plan report the same 
standard data elements according to a common set of instructions and definitions. Uniformity (or at least 
consistency) is essential to pooling data among different insurers for different states.
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North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming have exclusive funds which 
are essentially the sole providers of workers' compensation insurance in those states, as is true 
of all provinces in Canada. 46
Twenty other states have competitive state funds which compete with private carriers. 
In 1991, competitive state fund market shares ranged from 6.2 percent in South Carolina to 
73.5 percent in Montana. Michigan had a competitive state fund until 1994, when the state 
sold it to Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Michigan. The Michigan State Accident Fund, as a state 
government created entity, was the leading writer of workers' compensation hi Michigan with 
16 percent of the market in 1993. State funds are significant writers in most of the states in 
which they operate.
State funds were established initially to ensure the availability of workers' 
compensation coverage to employers. Some have continued to operate as the insurer of last 
resort. Others have relinquished that role with the establishment of other residual market 
mechanisms, but still may be used as a means to provide coverage at a lower cost to promote 
economic development or other public objectives. Some competitive state funds, such as 
Michigan's, have tended to specialize in insuring small employers who traditionally have had 
greater difficulty in obtaining voluntary market coverage. State funds have been established 
recently in Louisiana, Maine, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Texas, and have 
been considered hi several other jurisdictions as a solution to market problems.
The decision to private the Michigan State Accident Fund is interesting given its 
relative market success and the recent trend hi other states to establish state funds where they 
have not existed before. Michigan is thus seen to be "swimming upstream" on this policy 
matter. In fact, the policy decision taken reflects a strong philosophical commitment to the 
private sector on the part of the Governor. He was elected on a "less government is more" 
platform in 1992 and has regarded the Michigan State Accident Fund as a needless public
46Private carriers in exclusive fund states may still provide excess coverage to self-insured employers or 
write special sub lines or classes such as longshore workers.
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competition with private enterprise. When the Governor's party secured control of both houses 
of the legislature in 1994, he moved directly to divest the state of the Accident Fund.
Residual Market Mechanisms
Residual market mechanisms play an important role in workers' compensation 
insurance in the U.S. and have contributed significantly to market problems in recent years. 
As discussed above, the size and growth of the residual market varies widely among the states, 
and in some jurisdictions it has come close to swallowing the entire market. Nationally, the 
residual market share of total market premiums has grown at an alarming rate from 5.5 
percent in 1984 to 28.5 percent in 1993. Michigan has fared better in this regard than many 
states with a residual market share of 15.4 percent in 1993.
The existence of residual market mechanisms in most states reflects policy makers' 
recognition that insurance should be available to all employers given that they are required by 
law to carry this coverage for their employees. It also reflects the regulatory policy which 
allows insurers to refuse to sell coverage to certain employers, leading to the possibility that 
some employers may not be able to find any insurer who will insure them. Consequently, 
residual market mechanisms were established to ensure that employers who were unable to 
secure coverage from the "voluntary market" would have an alternative source of coverage.
In most states, workers' compensation residual market plans are authorized by law. 
The residual market plan of operation hi each state is filed with the insurance commissioner 
and subject to regulatory approval. Plan activities subject to regulatory oversight typically 
include approving rates, monitoring classifications, and monitoring the process used to assign 
risks to servicing carriers.
Several states use their competitive state funds as the market of last resort, either by 
custom or statutory obligation. The need for a residual market mechanism is obviated in the 
exclusive fund states.
The day-to-day functions of the residual market are delegated to servicing carriers who 
must meet certain qualification and performance standards. Servicing carriers perform the 
normal insurer functions, such as issuing and underwriting policies, paying and servicing
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claims, providing loss prevention or loss minimization services to policyholders, auditing, and 
supervising litigation and other defense duties. Servicing carriers also are required to file 
quarterly reports on premiums written, losses paid and known outstanding losses. Servicing 
carriers receive fees for performing these functions.
The NCCI administers the residual market in many states subject to regulatory 
oversight. There are nine states where independent rating bureaus administer the residual 
market mechanism. The role of each of these independent rating organizations is similar to that 
of the NCCI hi administering residual market plans.
The funding of residual market mechanisms is a critical issue and can have significant 
implications for the structure and performance of the voluntary market. Residual market rates 
are set separately from voluntary market rates (particularly in competitive rating states) and 
may or may not fully reflect any cost differential between the risks in these two markets. 
Insurers are assessed for any shortfall hi premium income necessary to support the residual 
market mechanism. The residual market operating loss is determined by subtracting incurred 
losses and the servicing carrier cost allowance and other pool operating expenses from earned 
premium and then adding pool interest income on cash flow (NCCI, 1991). An insurer's 
assessment is typically based on its voluntary market share.
The magnitude of the residual market deficit (and implicitly the subsidy to residual 
market risks) and its distribution between insurers and voluntary market risks affects insurers' 
incentives to supply coverage and employers' demand for that coverage. If insurers are not 
able to fully recoup residual market assessments through rate adjustments, the supply of 
voluntary coverage will shrink, forcing more employers into the residual market. To the extent 
that residual market assessments are passed through to voluntary market employers through 
higher rates, those employers will be induced to reduce payrolls or self-insure. Either way, the 
effect is to shrink the voluntary market and expand the residual market and residual market 
burden, which exacerbates the problem.
Residual market administration also influences servicing carriers' incentives to properly 
handle residual market risks and control claim costs. Historically, servicing carriers have had 
limited incentives to control their assigned risk claim costs because these costs are fully ceded
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to state or national pools. In effect, a servicing carrier "pays" only a small fraction of its 
assigned risk claim costs through the quota share reinsurance arrangement. Further, inadequate 
residual market rates can diminish the incentives of residual market risks to limit claim costs. 
These factors can become significant cost drivers in states with large residual markets and help 
to propel the deterioration of the voluntary market.
Self-Insurance
Regulations governing an employer's ability to self-insure for workers' compensation 
can also have an impact on the performance of the voluntary insurance market. In self- 
insurance, a firm or group of firms sets up a fund to cover losses rather than purchasing 
coverage from a private carrier or state fund. In effect, self-insurance is a substitute for and 
competes with purchased insurance. Self-insurance may be cheaper for a given employer 
because of: (1) administrative efficiencies it can achieve through funding its losses; and/or (2) 
market inefficiencies created by structural barriers or government-imposed cross subsidies in 
the rating structure. State regulatory criteria determining which employers are allowed to self- 
insure also affect the size of this segment of the market.
Some self-insurance activity is expected, even under ideal market conditions, because 
of efficiencies achieved through eliminating distribution and other transaction and 
administrative costs when employers fund their own losses. Self-insurance also can give an 
employer a greater incentive and ability to control losses. Of course, insurers also offer 
potential efficiencies through their ability to spread risk and achieve economies of scale and 
scope in loss prevention and servicing claims. Purchased insurance also offers some tax 
advantages in that insurers can deduct discounted reserves for future claims payments as a 
business expense, but self-insured employers cannot unless they establish a captive insurer. 
Self-insurance tends to be more economical for large employers who can achieve lower unit 
costs in claims administration and who are in a better position to sustain a large loss without 
going bankrupt than small employers. In addition, self-insurance is facilitated by the 
availability of separate loss prevention and claims services as well as excess insurance 
coverage to reduce risk.
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The ability to self-insure gives large employers greater bargaining power in negotiating 
price concessions from workers' compensation carriers. Consequently, insurers have been 
forced to develop various devices to lower premiums for large employers and allow them to 
retain a greater portion of their risk as an alternative to self-insurance. These devices include 
premium discounts, experience rating, retrospective rating plans, dividend plans, schedule 
rating and large deductible policies.
Despite the use of these pricing adjustments, the use of self-insurance for workers' 
compensation has grown dramatically in the last several years. This increase is at least 
partially attributable to rising workers' compensation insurance rates and higher residual 
market assessments. According to estimates by Johnson & Higgins (1992), the proportion of 
U.S. workers' compensation premiums accounted for by self-insurance grew from 18.1 
percent in 1980 to 29 percent in 1991. Self-insurance accounts for a relatively large proportion 
of workers' compensation benefit payments in Michigan (39.7 percent in 1989), but this 
proportion has remained fairly steady during the last half of the 1980s. This high incidence 
reflects the presence hi Michigan of a significant number of very large manufacturing firms, 
particularly in the auto industry. Michigan allows both individual and group self-insurance.
The growth of self-insurance has important implications for the private workers' 
compensation insurance market. A problem arises when low-risk employers are induced to self 
insure because market rates are not actuarially fair. In this instance, the movement to self- 
insurance can accelerate the deterioration of the voluntary market.
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Table 5.1 Michigan - 20 Leading Workers' Compensation Insurers, 1993*
Insurer







Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Company
Hartford Fire & Casualty Group
Employers Insurance of Wausau
Kemper Insurance Group
Continental Corporation
Hastings Mutual Insurance Company
Fireman's Fund Group




Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Companies















































*Market shares based on standard premiums from policy declarations 
or unit statistical reports.
Source: Michigan Insurance Bureau
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* 1982-1991 market shares based on standard premium from unit statistical reports.
1992-1993 market shares based on total estimated annual premium from policy 
declarations.
Source: Michigan Insurance Bureau
V-126

















































































* Market shares based on direct premiums written from annual statements.
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners
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* Market shares based on direct premiums written from annual statements.
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners
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* Percent of previous year's insurers.



































































































































































































* Percent of previous year's insurers.
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Source of Data: Compensation Advisory Organization of Michigan
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* As percent of standard earned premium.
Departures from advisory loss costs not included.
** NCCI states only.
Source: National Council on Compensation Insurance
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Source: Compensation Advisory Organisation of Michigan, Workers' 



















































































































Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners
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* As percent of direct premiums earned (losses incurred for loss adjustment 
expense).
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners
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* Total profits including investment income attributable to capital and surplus as a percentage 
of net premiums earned.
** Total profits as a percentage of estimated net worth.
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners
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Source: National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation & Workers' Compensation, National Council on Compensation 
Insurance, and NAIC





















































* Calendar year for market share and policy year for burden.
** Percentage of direct premiums written in residual market mechanism.
*** Residual market net operating loss as a percentage of voluntary premiums written.
Source: National Council on Compensation Insurance
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* Insurers with workers' compensation as principal line of business.
** Insurers with principal line other than workers' compensation.
Source: A.M. Best
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Table 5.13 Workers' Compensation Insurance State Rate Regulatory Systems















































































































































































































































































a Classified as required when adherence is required for all companies or bureau members. 
Classified as advisory when adherence is either prohibited or there is no provision for 
adherence.
b Alaska does allow the filing of a schedule rating plan as an independent not subject to the 
adherence provision.
c Deviations from the class rates, schedules, rating plans or rules respecting any kind or 
combination of insurance are permitted.
d Under Delaware law, Delaware is a file and use state. However, traditionally, no rates 
are used unless first approved.
e Illinois has a loss rate option available to insurers since 1/84. Insurers are allowed to use 
either loss costs or rates.
f Uniform % downward with support, upward deviation not allowed.
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g Loss costs effective 01/01/92, but National Council on Compensation Insurance is 
exempt from filing loss costs until 7/1/93. There is no provision for deviations, as of yet, 
in the new regulation.
h In Oklahoma insurers may increase or decrease a filed rate by no more than 15% without 
prior approval (Flex Filing).
' Rates are filed for the residual market and insurers with less than 1% market share. Loss 
costs are filed for insurers with 1 % or greater market share.













Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners

VI. COMPARATIVE WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM PERFORMANCE: 
BRITISH COLUMBIA AND MICHIGAN MODELS
Introduction
Nearly 25 years ago, the U.S. National Commission on State Workmen's (sic) 
Compensation Laws enunciated the broad objectives for a modern workers' compensation 
program. They included:
Broad coverage of employees and of work-related injuries and diseases.
  Substantial protection against interruption of income.
Provision of sufficient medical care and rehabilitation services.
  Encouragement of safety.
  Effective system for delivery of the benefits and services. 
(National Commission, 1972)
Over the intervening years, especially the past decade, the emphasis has shifted somewhat. 
The goal of cost effectiveness has assumed much greater importance in many jurisdictions. 
Provision of "sufficient" medical care has come to be defined largely in terms of managed 
care, employer choice of physician, and other such initiatives. Some states have actually 
reduced wage-replacement proportions while maintaining that they still provide "substantial" 
protection against income interruption. The emphasis on early return to work is another 
example of shifting program values. Nevertheless, the goals enunciated by the U.S. National 
Commission still provide a framework to evaluate workers' compensation systems today.
An authoritative evaluation on these general principles remains an elusive goal; our 
objectives hi this report are somewhat more modest. We are not trying to definitively evaluate 
the overall performance of these two workers' compensation systems; we are trying to learn 
what we can about the ways in which system features and performance seem to reflect the 
degree of public sector or private sector participation. In particular, we are interested in 
lessons that can be derived from examining the way in which public monopoly and private 
market insurance systems influence workers' compensation outcomes. In this section, we
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present a comparative analysis of system performance, touching on the general issues 
identified by the U.S. National Commission. In the final section of the report, we will present 
observations that relate to workers' compensation insurance issues.
It is important to begin this comparative analysis with some strong cautionary notes. In 
truth, workers' compensation systems cannot be directly compared, as each system is an 
organic whole, embedded hi a specific legal, political, social, and economic environment. As 
such, it is clear that there is a danger of improper attribution of specific behavioral patterns to 
one systemic cause, when there may well be much broader forces at work to shape such 
behaviors. In addition, making comparisons across systems necessarily highlights some system 
features and ignores others. In particular, features that can be quantified, whether accurately 
or not, are more likely to be selected for comparison than features that are more qualitative in 
nature. This does not mean that the quantitative dimensions are more important, it simply 
means that they are easier to compare. This report is undoubtedly guilty of these failings, but 
before proceeding with our comparative analysis, some specific influences that lie behind our 
comparisons should be made explicit.
Noncomparable Aspects
As discussed earlier, the jurisdictions selected for this comparative exercise were 
chosen for a number of reasons. While they are "representative" of two different system types 
(for convenience labeled public and private), they are not "typical" of all the systems that 
might be called public or private. British Columbia and Michigan workers' compensation 
systems were selected as "exemplary" models of the public and private approaches to workers' 
compensation respectively. But as noted in the previous paragraph, no workers' compensation 
system exists in a vacuum, and it is hazardous to label these two specific systems as "public" 
and "private" and then imply that conclusions about the characteristics or performance of such 
systems can be generalized.
It is not possible to be certain which factors are affecting system performance hi any 
specific aspect. Given a particular finding, one cannot be certain that one is looking at a 
public-private system difference, or a Canadian-U.S. difference, or a West Coast-Midwest
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difference, or any of a dozen other competing explanations. We offer our informed 
observations, based on considerable familiarity with these two workers' compensation systems. 
It is up to the reader to evaluate this material and decide what is relevant, what is useful, what 
is valuable for his or her purposes. We urge all readers to keep the following qualifications in 
mind, as the final sections of the report are digested.
Influence of Self-Insurance
There is a tremendous difference between these two systems that cannot be captured hi 
a satisfactory way. In British Columbia, self-insurance is restricted to a handful of large 
employers (provincial and federal government, railroads, and airlines), amounting to less than 
5 percent of benefit costs in 1993. In Michigan, by contrast, 46 percent of indemnity benefit 
payments were made by self-insured employers in 1993, the highest proportion in the U.S. 
Undoubtedly this difference has very significant implications for system performance.
It can be presumed that self-insurance is more attractive to "good risks," since they 
have more incentive to avoid the "average pricing" effect of the insurance mechanism.47 Thus 
an employer who feels that his/her accident or claims performance would be better than 
average, might have a financial incentive to self-insure, depending on the experience rating 
regime available. On the other hand, employers who regard themselves as worse than average 
performers in this dimension might believe that they derive a financial advantage from 
accepting the average price, again depending on the experience rating regime. This "adverse 
selection" issue is also an important influence on mechanisms designed to guarantee that every 
employer can secure workers' compensation insurance, regardless of safety and claims 
records. (See Section VII below)
But the other problem is that there are no data available about the performance of self- 
insurers within the Michigan workers' compensation system, beyond the aggregate share of 
indemnity payments. So the problem of population bias that may be introduced by then- 
exclusion from the insurance mechanism is further complicated by a lack of data with which to
47But see Victor (1985) for a contrary view.
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assess the impact of their exclusion. 48 There is no way to adjust for this problem, so it must be 
kept in mind that nearly half of the Michigan workers' compensation system is missing from 
many of our observations, and that this would be expected to bias measures of overall system 
performance due to adverse selection.
Claim Termination
There is another significant difference between British Columbia and Michigan 
workers' compensation systems that cannot be controlled in a comparative analysis. British 
Columbia claims never "close," that is, they always have the potential for additional benefit 
payments, depending on the circumstances of the claimant. In Michigan, and most other U.S. 
jurisdictions, there is a legal mechanism to "close" workers' compensation claims, so that the 
insurance carrier (or self-insured employer) can be certain that no additional dollars will flow 
to that claimant for that particular injury. In Michigan, this has evolved into a highly stylized 
"redemption" system, which allows insurers and employers to make "compromise and 
release" agreements with injured workers that specify a financial payment in exchange for 
release from further liability for the named injuries (See Section IV for more details). This is 
not allowed in British Columbia, or other Canadian jurisdictions.
The existence of such an option probably changes the workers' compensation system in 
many fundamental ways. It introduces an element of certainty into an uncertain business for 
workers' compensation insurers. However, it also provides the incentive for "nuisance claims" 
that may be filed with the intention of soliciting a small cash settlement in exchange for 
avoiding the trouble and expense of a formal hearing. There is no way to demonstrate the 
actual existence of such claims, but employers and insurers in Michigan firmly believe that 
they exist.
48See Hunt (1982) for evidence that, in fact, large differences in performance do exist between the self- 
insured sector and the insured sector in Michigan.
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Role of Administrative Agencies
The WCB of British Columbia is relatively unique in North America in that it 
combines the functions of prevention, compensation and rehabilitation for work-related injuries 
and illnesses into one administrative agency. These are important policy missions, and one 
would presume that combining them into one agency would provide some unity of purpose 
and, perhaps, economies of scope or scale. Without an adequate study, it is impossible to 
determine if these theoretical advantages have actually been realized.49 However, the 
difference in size of the public sector is startling.
The WCB of British Columbia has over 2,500 employees, while Michigan's public 
sector complement is less than 450 for these "same" functions. Of course, there is no direct 
comparability between the tasks performed, and the private sector employees (insurance 
companies, rehabilitation firms, prevention consultants, etc.) that are performing the bulk of 
these tasks in Michigan's predominantly private workers' compensation system cannot be 
counted. But the point is that the entire landscape of disability prevention, compensation, and 
rehabilitation services is vastly different hi the two environments, and one must assume that 
this has implications for system performance. This will become clearer as we proceed through 
this section of the report.
Stakeholders' Role
Another striking difference between British Columbia and Michigan workers' 
compensation systems is the involvement of stakeholders in the system. Until 1991, with the 
formal institution of worker and employer stakeholder representation in WCB governance, 
British Columbia really was not constrained by the direct involvement of stakeholders, other 
than injured workers and their representatives, in the workers' compensation system.
In Michigan, hi contrast, private stakeholders make most of the decisions, and their 
self-interest is never far from the surface. From the private physician who provides initial 
treatment of an injured worker, through the private sector claims adjuster who decides whether
49But see Hunt, Earth, and Leahy (1991) for a dubious opinion of such synergy in British Columbia.
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to accept the claim in the first instance, to the for-profit rehabilitation provider who assists the 
worker with return-to-work, to the contingency fee attorney who may assist the worker to 
settle a litigated claim, many private stakeholders are involved.
Further, change in the workers' compensation system in Michigan involves a delicate 
balance between the "public interest" and many competing "private interests." All the people 
who make their living, to one degree or another, from the workers' compensation system have 
a legitimate concern about their self-interest. They each bring a unique one-dimensional 
perspective to their evaluation of system change. The practical effect of this diversity of 
private interests is to make the public interest considerably harder to identify, as it is 
complicated by the arguments put forth by various private interests.
Effect of Other Institutions
Last, but by no means least, is the effect of other institutions that are not a part of the 
workers' compensation system, but that can have powerful influences on its results. For 
example, since access to medical care is guaranteed in Canada, the issue of compensability or 
noncompensability of a given condition for workers' compensation benefits may be a matter of 
relative indifference to the worker, and perhaps to the provider, when seeking initial medical 
treatment. The final assignment of treatment costs to the health plan or to the WCB is really 
just a bookkeeping exercise. 50
In Michigan, however, the compensability or noncompensability of a given condition is 
a critical question when seeking initial medical treatment. To the worker, it may mean the 
difference between being treated or not, or whether he/she will be able to see a given 
provider, since the employer has first choice of physician and some professionals simply will 
not take workers' compensation claimants as patients. Compensability is critical to the treating 
physician as well, because it not only indicates which insurance carrier should be billed (and 
what kind of documentation the injured worker needs to establish his/her coverage), but also
50But see Hunt, Barth, and Leahy (1996) Chapter 5 for a discussion of perverse incentives for providers 
in the British Columbia system.
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whether the potential exists for disputes over the claim, involving deposition of medical 
testimony, extra forms, etc. Most medical intake forms in the U.S. ask whether the presenting 
condition is work-related. To the employer, the difference between a charge on his/her health 
care plan (probably not experience rated) or workers' compensation insurance plan (probably 
experience rated) may also be very significant.
This is just one obvious example; there are doubtless many more. The pension plans, 
other disability insurance schemes, unemployment insurance systems, tax treatment of 
benefits, labor relations environment, and many other dimensions of working life differ 
substantially among Canadian and U.S. jurisdictions, and between British Columbia and 
Michigan. Some, or all, of these probably affect the behaviors of each and every participant in 
the workers' compensation systems of British Columbia and Michigan. Our analysis cannot 
control for these myriad differences, but the reader is forewarned not to forget them entirely.
System Performance Comparisons
We will begin our comparative analysis with the issue of coverage. It is obvious that 
the degree of protection of wage-earning capacity offered by the workers' compensation 
system depends critically on whether the injured worker is covered or not. Thus, this issue is 
treated even before questions of prevention incentives and adequacy of wage replacement.
Coverage
British Columbia moved very close to "universal" workers' compensation coverage in 
1994. The only exceptions are "casual" workers (less than 8 hours per week), day care 
workers (less than 15 hours per week), professional athletes, and owner/operators (and certain 
family members) of individual businesses and independent labor contractors (who are eligible 
for Personal Optional Protection coverage by application). All other employed workers, 
including farm workers and fishery workers) are covered by the Workers' Compensation Act. 
(AWCBC, Comparison of Workers' Compensation Legislation in Canada, 1995)
In Michigan, nonagricultural employers of three or more workers are covered. 
However, if at least one of these is employed full-time (at least 35 hours per week) for a
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significant portion of the year (13 of 52 weeks), then all employees must be covered. So, 
effectively coverage begins with one full time worker. Agricultural employers are covered 
only if they employ at least three workers under these same duration and time requirements. 
Household employees are covered if they are employed full-time (35 hours or more per week). 
Real estate salespersons and brokers are excluded from coverage. (USDOL, State Workers' 
Compensation Laws, 1995)
There are no reliable numerical estimates available of covered individuals under either 
system. However, British Columbia seems to have a slight advantage in coverage with no 
numerical exemptions, and in offering coverage by application for small business owner- 
operators and labor contractors. There is no elective coverage available in the Michigan 
market.
Injury and Illness Incidence
While the incentive structures that influence behavior may differ, there are some broad 
system outcome measures that would appear to be comparable. One of these is the incidence of 
lost workday cases. It is logical that the incidence of workplace injuries and illnesses that give 
rise to lost work time should be comparable across systems, even if the factors determining 
their incidence are not. This would provide a "bottom-line" measure of the effectiveness of 
prevention incentives. Unfortunately, it is necessary to present the measure without controlling 
for industry structure, behavioral differences resulting from benefit provisions, measurement 
differences, etc.
In Michigan, these data are collected by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics and are not derived from the workers' compensation system. They arise from 
the employer's requirement under the 1970 federal and 1974 Michigan Occupational Safety 
and Health Acts to keep a log of all work-related injuries and illnesses, whether these are 
compensable or not. These data are definitely not used for firm-level enforcement activities,
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but still may be thought of as self-incriminating by many employers, and are therefore 
regarded as an understatement of actual experience.51
In British Columbia, the comparable statistics arise as a by-product of the workers' 
compensation system, and may therefore be influenced by coverage and compensability 
considerations. Since the uncovered workers in British Columbia are included hi the 
denominator of total employment, there is a significant underestimate of injury rates. 
Fortunately the lack of a waiting period in British Columbia means injuries and illness 
involving at least one lost workday are included in WCB figures. The major discrepancy that 
compensability might introduce is due to the noncompensability of some repetitive trauma 
injuries in British Columbia. Presumably these are excluded from the statistics available from 
the WCB, and this might result hi some downward bias for the British Columbia figures, as 
well.
Another difference is that U.S. figures are calculated on the basis of full-time- 
equivalent employment rather than on a head-count basis. The effect is to inflate the Michigan 
incidence compared to a head-count employment basis, since the denominator is smaller. The 
magnitude of this overstatement is estimated to be 3-4 percent, based on analysis of the various 
employment figures collected by Bureau of Labor Statistics. In addition, Michigan injury and 
illness data are for 1992 (the last available) while British Columbia data are for 1993; this is 
not thought to introduce any particular bias to the comparisons.
Table 6.1 indicates that British Columbia has a slightly higher incidence of work- 
related injuries and illnesses. Since the Michigan economy is about 2.5 tunes the size of the 
British Columbia economy (as measured by employment levels), the per employee figures 
should be used for comparisons. Total incidence of work injuries and illnesses per 100 
employees is about 12 percent higher, but cases involving tune away from work are nearly 50 
percent more common hi British Columbia. This difference presumably reflects, hi part, the
51According to a study of Michigan injuries and illnesses in 1986 that compared the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics survey results with workers' compensation records, only about one-fourth of lost workdays are actually 
included on the logs. This reflects both underreporting of injuries and lost workday durations. See Oleinick, et. al. 
(1993).
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more generous wage-loss benefits in British Columbia, as well as the absence of any waiting 
period for wage-loss benefits. 52 Of course, it would also reflect incentives for loss prevention 
and reporting differences between the two systems.
Unfortunately it is not possible to standardize these measures for the industrial 
structure of the two areas, because of the noncomparability of the classification systems within 
which the data are reported. However, it seems likely that the dominant primary (extractive) 
industries in British Columbia (fishing, logging, mining) might be expected to have higher 
injury rates than the secondary (manufacturing) industries which are so important in Michigan.
WC Claims Incidence
As discussed earlier, there is a wide discrepancy in the entitlement to wage-loss 
benefits between Michigan and British Columbia. For the purpose of claims incidence, the 
most important of these is the 7-day waiting period for wage-loss benefits in Michigan. Since 
British Columbia pays wage-loss benefits from day 1, and since most injuries and illnesses do 
not involve a full week of lost work time, it is obvious that British Columbia's claims 
incidence will be very large compared to Michigan's. That is reflected in Table 6.2, where 
British Columbia shows a wage-loss claim incidence more than three times the Michigan rate.
Also not surprising are the figures shown hi Table 6.2 for "medical-only" claims. 
These are workers' compensation claims that involve no wage-loss benefits, but only payment 
for medical treatment. In this case, the Michigan incidence is 2.5 times that shown for British 
Columbia. 53 This difference also reflects the Michigan waiting period, since the bulk of British 
Columbia cases will involve both wage-loss and medical benefits, and therefore are not 
counted as "medical-only" claims. When these two very disparate figures are summed, the 
total workers' compensation claims incidence for Michigan is revealed to be nearly 30 percent 
higher than for British Columbia.
52See Worrall and Butler (1985) for an early U.S. study of this relationship.
53It is worth noting that the average cost of the medical-only claims is comparable at $254 (US) for 
British Columbia and $279 (US) for Michigan.
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In summary, British Columbia reports more work-related injuries, but fewer workers' 
compensation claims per 100 workers, when including both wage-loss and medical-only 
claims. So how is this paradox to be explained? Since the differences are so great, and reflect 
known reporting differences, it would be unwise to speculate on the degree to which system 
incentives and behavioral responses contribute to these results. However, it seems clear that 
the impact of the health care system is critical. Particularly since all of the Michigan 
disadvantage arises from medical only claims, it is likely that the availability of universal 
health care coverage in British Columbia reduces the incentive for injured workers to make 
sure that their claim gets treated as a workers' compensation claim.
Vocational Rehabilitation Benefits
As discussed in Sections II and IV respectively, British Columbia and Michigan both 
provide very significant vocational rehabilitation services for injured workers. In British 
Columbia, the WCB provides these services directly with a staff of nearly 100 Vocational 
Rehabilitation Consultants and Managers. Michigan relies on outside vendors to provide 
vocational rehabilitation services, with only a handful of staff at BWDC to scan claims for 
rehabilitation potential, make referrals to private sector and public sector providers, monitor 
performance, handle complaints, etc. Interestingly, the state vocational rehabilitation agency 
(Michigan Rehabilitation Services) operates in direct competition with private sector agencies 
for referral of workers' compensation clients (Insurance Division of MRS).
Data kept by Michigan and British Columbia on vocational rehabilitation outcomes is 
very limited, so only the most basic statistics can be cited here. Both systems record about 
9,000 referrals for vocational rehabilitation services each year. Since the Michigan working 
population is 2.5 times the size of British Columbia's, this implies that Michigan's referral rate 
for vocational rehabilitation services is considerably lower. In terms of outcomes, during 1994 
a total of 2,490 individuals were returned to work through vocational rehabilitation in British 
Columbia. Approximately 55 percent of these are returned to their original employer. The
VI-161
British Columbia system claims a success rate of 49 percent for those claims with significant 
interventions. 54
In Michigan, 3,621 individuals were successfully returned to work in 1993, with a 
claimed success rate of 38 percent. (BWDC Annual Report, 1995) It is further reported that 85 
percent of the successful cases involved a return to work with the original employer. While 
these statistics are not directly comparable, they do serve to indicate that British Columbia has 
substantially more vocational rehabilitation activity (and expense) than Michigan. 
Unfortunately, data are not sufficient (even in British Columbia) to firmly establish the cost- 
benefit ratios for vocational rehabilitation services.
Aggregate WC Benefit Payments
Table 6.3 shows aggregate benefit payments in 1993 for the British Columbia and 
Michigan workers' compensation systems. The aggregate benefit payments hi British 
Columbia in 1993 were about $307 (US) per employed person, compared to $329 (US) in 
Michigan, a difference of about 7 percent. This includes the effects of the more generous 
benefit structure in British Columbia (75 percent of gross to a maximum of $566 (US) per 
week, versus Michigan's 80 percent of net pay to a maximum of $457 (US) per week), the 7- 
day waiting period for wage-loss benefits in Michigan (versus no waiting period in British 
Columbia), differences in average wage levels, and a host of program specific and 
measurement distortions that are contained within the data. Of course, the annual payout is not 
the most meaningful way to measure the cost of the system, since it simply represents the flow 
of expenditures to a dynamic case population. We report it because it is the only workers' 
compensation system measure available for self-insured employers in Michigan. It is also 
remarkably similar across the two systems.
54See Hunt, Earth, and Leahy (1996), Chapter 6 for a full exposition of vocational rehabilitation services 
and outcomes in British Columbia.
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Incurred Benefit Costs
A more meaningful comparison is obtained from Table 6.4 which shows estimated 
incurred benefit costs, including capitalized costs of future payments. These figures more 
properly measure the number of claims incurred in 1993 and their estimated cost, in present 
value terms.55 Table 6.4 indicates that the insured sector in Michigan incurred future wage-loss 
obligations of $522.7 million (US) in 1993. Assuming that employment in the insured sector is 
proportional to wage-loss payments (probably an understatement), one can assign this figure to 
54 percent of the employment base in Michigan, yielding an average cost of incurred wage- 
loss benefits per employee of $244 (US). This compares to $299 (US) per employee in British 
Columbia, a difference of over 20 percent.
On the other hand, Table 6.4 also shows that Michigan's incurred health care costs are 
only slightly higher than in British Columbia. When both wage-loss and health care costs 
are added together, it is shown that incurred benefit costs are about 13 percent higher in 
British Columbia than for the privately insured sector in Michigan. Given the exclusion of the 
self-insured employers from the Michigan numbers, and assuming they have better "than" 
average workers' compensation experience, this figure would probably understate the incurred 
cost differences for the average employer. Still, the rather remarkable conclusion is how 
similar these levels are, considering all the system differences that have been discussed here.
Promptness of Payment
This is an interesting comparison, since it is fairly objective but still complicated by 
system procedures, case populations, noncomparabilities, etc. Table 6.5 shows the measures of 
promptness of payment that are available for these two systems. The figures for British 
Columbia were developed in a special study of promptness of payment that applied to claims 
registered in the first half of 1994. British Columbia pays considerable attention to "pay-lag" 
figures, but since they use a formal standard of 17 days, routine data reporting concentrates on
55The Michigan numbers include allowances for IBNR (incurred, but not reported). This is a very rough 
estimate in any case. Trying to estimate what the ultimate costs of a workers' compensation claim will be is not an 
exact science.
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the proportion of all claims that are paid within the 17 day standard (usually around 50 to 60 
percent).
Michigan keeps pay-lag statistics to monitor private insurer/employer performance in 
making prompt payments. The Michigan data on tune from injury to notification come from a 
study conducted by the Upjohn Institute for the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation 
in 1989, and reflect a sample of cases closed in October of 1986 (Hunt and Lance, 1989). 
Unfortunately there are no more recent data available from Michigan, and it is unknown how 
representative these results may be of current performance. However, it is worth noting that 
the average pay-lag from these data was 29 days, the same figure as reported by BWDC for 
1993.
Table 6.5 reports mean time (in days) from date of injury to notification of the 
administrative agency (WCB or BWDC, respectively) and mean time (in days) from 
notification to first payment. The difference in performance between the two systems is clear 
in the injury to notification discrepancy. While this takes an average of 15 days hi British 
Columbia, it takes over two months on average (67 days) in Michigan. This reflects the 
influence of the large number of litigated claims in Michigan, where the claimed injury is 
frequently very old before either the employer/insurer or the BWDC hears about it. On the 
other hand, the median (50th percentile) value for Michigan is 13 days, a very good 
performance considering that there is a 7-day waiting period before benefits begin. Of course, 
some would say it is unfair to call these delays "pay-lag" since presumably the payer likely 
has no knowledge of the existence of the claim until notification. 56
The actual "pay-lag" is represented by the second entry in Table 6.5, "notification to 
payment." This measures the time from awareness of a compensable claim to mailing the first 
benefit payment. In this case, the mean performance of the two systems is quite comparable at 
27 days and 29 days respectively. In addition, analysis of the Michigan data and interpolation
56Although this is not so clear in the Michigan case, where it is the employer who is required to notify 
BWDC of the probable claim. It may be that the employer has known of the injury for some time before deciding 
to acknowledge that it might become a workers' compensation claim.
VI-164
of the British Columbia data indicate that the typical (median) claim receives payment in about 
11 or 12 days from notification. These are both good promptness of payment performances.
Dispute Resolution
As indicated earlier, the Michigan workers' compensation system is a great deal more 
litigious than that of British Columbia. Table 6.6 indicates that when considered against the 
base of new wage-loss claims established, the Michigan "dispute" rate is nearly four tunes 
higher than that of British Columbia. However, there are a number of qualifications that 
should be entered here about the specifics of the comparison. First, the table ignores the 
Medical Review Panels hi British Columbia and understates the impact of the Mediation 
Division in Michigan. Both are ignored for the sake of simplicity and comparability. However, 
it should not obscure the fact that a large share of disputes are settled informally in Michigan 
via mediation services, particularly disputes over health care service and vocational 
rehabilitation matters and these are not shown in the table.
Because the Mediation Division annually disposes of nearly 5,000 disputes over 
medical claims, it was also judged to be appropriate to drop the much smaller separate appeal 
channel of Medical Review Panels in British Columbia. Second, the denominator for this 
calculation is somewhat inappropriate. The requests for review do not arise simply from one 
year's claims, but reflect the entire history of successful and unsuccessful claims hi the past. In 
particular, the Michigan system looks substantially more litigious in Table 6.6 than 
conventional wisdom would dictate, because the denominator includes only accepted wage-loss 
claims and magistrate awards from the previous year, not redemptions, wash-outs, and other 
miscellaneous dispositions. However, using the current year new claims as a denominator 
provides a rough yardstick to assess the relative magnitude of disputation in the systems.
Third, it is clear that the "request for review" in Michigan serves to involve the public 
agency as a party hi determinuig the facts or relevant law in compensation matters, whereas hi 
British Columbia it is an appeal from a public agency decision on these matters. Thus, there is 
a vastly different degree of public participation hi the decision making before the request for 
review. In addition, since the Michigan adversarial system provides the employer/insurer with
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the opportunity to exercise the initiative to refuse a claim, it is to be expected that more claims 
will be disputed than in the inquiry system of British Columbia.
Nevertheless, it is true that the Michigan system is a great deal more contentious and 
that it is dominated by lawyers in a way that would be horrifying to the Canadians. Nearly 
every contested case in Michigan has a plaintiff attorney attached, while appeals to the WC 
Review Board hi British Columbia only have about 15 percent attorney involvement. Further, 
attorney fees are prohibited by the WCB, while it is routine for the plaintiff attorney to take 
between 15 and 30 percent of the award, on a contingent fee basis, hi Michigan. Thus, the 
discrepancy in benefit levels noted earlier in this report is further compounded when the case 
becomes contested, since the lower Michigan benefit levels must be shared with the worker's 
attorney.
After the initial review level, it is interesting to note that Table 6.6 indicates that the 
situation is reversed, with British Columbia having the higher appeal rate.57 This reflects two 
major factors. First, a great majority (over 60 percent) of the Michigan "dispositions/ 
decisions" are negotiated compromise and release settlements, or redemptions, that terminate 
the employer/insurer liability. Appeal from these decisions is allowed only hi extreme 
circumstances, since both parties are presumed to have been represented by counsel and 
capable of making an informed decision. So, the actual number of first level decisions that 
could be appealed is less than half that indicated in the table.
Second, appeal is nearly costless in the British Columbia system. There is probably no 
attorney involvement, and there is no financial consequence to seeking an additional "bite at 
the apple." In the Michigan system, if the claimant has pursued the matter through the 
magistrate hearing level and secured no benefit award, the attorney has usually not only not 
been compensated but will have absorbed the costs of the litigation. Thus, he/she would not be 
expected to push the appeal to the next level with uncertain returns.
57Plus for comparability, we have excluded WCB Appeal Division cases (about one-third of total activity) 
that do not emanate from WC Review Board decisions.
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Employer Costs
Table 6.7 compares the costs of workers' compensation coverage from the employer 
perspective. The average 1993 assessment rate for employers in British Columbia was $2.11 
per $100 of payroll (in Canadian Dollars). Applying the average assessment rate to the average 
weekly wage in 1993 of $561 (CD) (or $435 US), and assuming a 52-week work year, yields a 
total annual cost per employee of $477 (US). The Michigan average standard premium rate in 
1993 for the combined voluntary and assigned risk markets was $2.79 per $100 of payroll 
(US). Applying this rate to the Michigan average weekly wage of $507 (US) in 1993 and 
assuming a 52-week work year yields a total per employee cost of $736 (US), or some 54 
percent higher than in British Columbia.
There are three major explanations for the magnitude of this difference. First, the 
average weekly wage is about 17 percent higher in Michigan than in British Columbia. In 
addition, all wages are assessable for workers' compensation premium in Michigan, whereas 
wage payments of over $39,225 (US) to any individual would not be assessed in British 
Columbia. Since we know that Michigan employers pay a higher average premium rate, and 
that they pay it on higher wages on average, it is no surprise that Michigan employers pay 
more overall for workers' compensation coverage. Second, the British Columbia public 
workers' compensation system enjoys the benefit of the earnings from the $4 billion (CD) in 
reserves it is holding to pay long-term claims into the future. 58 The WCB uses a discount rate 
of 3 percent for calculating the reserves required for long-term disability claims and other 
obligations. Thus, if the real rate of return earned on funds held as claim reserves is greater 
than 3 percent, the additional earnings effectively go to reduce the amount of assessment 
income that must be raised in the current period. The investment portfolio that the WCB 
manages earned an average return of 9.2 percent in 1993 (7.5 percent after inflation). The 
result was that about 33 percent of WCB income was derived from investments.
58At the end of 1993, the WCB of British Columbia was estimated to be 97 percent funded against future 
expected benefit costs, a remarkable achievement for a public workers' compensation system.
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Third, on the U.S. side, the incurred benefit payments made to claimants must be 
"marked up" to allow private insurers to recover their administrative costs, plus a fair return 
on their investment. It was shown earlier (Table 5.8) that Michigan workers' compensation 
insurance carriers incurred loss adjustment costs of 15.9 percent, sales expenses of 9.7 
percent, and state tax costs of 2.9 percent of the premiums collected. In addition, an average 
of 2.9 percent was returned to policyholders in the form of dividends. Thus, at least 30 
percent of the premium dollar goes to cover operating expenses. Table 5.9 presented earlier 
also showed that in most years, workers' compensation insurers in Michigan made profits of 
about 13 percent of net premiums. In other words, the administrative costs, taxes, dividends, 
and profit for private insurance carriers create a gap of approximately 40 to 45 percent 
between the benefits paid to workers and the costs to employers.
Administrative Costs
Table 6.8 compares the public administrative costs of the workers' compensation 
systems in Michigan and British Columbia. As expected, given the nearly total public 
responsibility for adrninistering the workers' compensation system in British Columbia, the 
public administrative costs are much higher. Table 6.8 indicates that the public cost of 
administering the system is about $77 (US) per worker in British Columbia. This includes 
adjudication, record keeping, dispute resolution, public advisers for both employees and 
employers, three layers of appellate bodies and all the other overhead associated with a public 
workers' compensation system. In Michigan, public administration costs were approximately 
$5 (US) per worker in 1993, but this only provides a record keeping system and a dispute 
resolution system, all the rest of the costs are borne privately. 59
It is impossible to get a precise assessment of the private cost burden, but a start can be 
made by applying the loss adjustment costs and sales expenses of approximately 25 percent 
(Table 5.8) to the $1.3 billion (US) in benefit payments in Michigan in 1993 (from Table 6.3).
59It is a part of the cost of the dispute resolution system because only the mediators and magistrates are on 
the public payroll. Representation of the parties is a private obligation.
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The result would be a private administrative cost estimate of $325 million (US) in 1993 for 
both the insured and self-insured sectors. Adding this to the public administrative cost figure 
in Table 6.8 would bring total public and private administrative costs in Michigan to $345 
million (US), or $86 (US) per worker. These are very rough approximations, of course.
In addition, this figure does not include the private costs of litigation. There are very 
few private lawyers operating in the workers' compensation system in British Columbia, so we 
can disregard this cost item, and the cost of the public advisory services is included among the 
WCB administrative costs. However, in Michigan with a fairly litigious system, very 
substantial additional private transaction costs are incurred in disputed cases. On average, 
from one-fourth to one-third of the successful worker litigant's award goes to legal costs and 
attorney fees. Presumably, this is matched by a similar cost on the defendant side (representing 
the insurance carrier or the self-insured employer). Thus, overall, as much as one-half of 
lump-sum benefit payments may be charged to private transaction costs.
Unfortunately, there are no sufficient data with which to estimate the overall cost 
contribution of the litigated sector. However, data from several years ago indicate that 
approximately 26 percent of all successful claims were litigated, and 73 percent of those 
received some lump sums (56 percent received only lump sums), it is obvious that it could be 
a very large number. 60 If we assume that just half of the total compensation received by 
litigated claimants is a result of the successful litigation, then the estimated private transaction 
costs would be one-fourth of these benefit payments. Since litigated claims constitute about 25 
percent of all successful claims in Michigan, this would yield an estimated total of 6 to 7 
percent of overall benefit payments. This figure is a very rough estimate, but gives an 
appreciation of the overall magnitude of these hidden private transaction costs in Michigan. 
It also helps us understand why employer costs in Michigan are so much higher, even though 
incurred benefit payments are roughly comparable hi the two systems.
^These parameters are drawn from Hunt (1982) and relate to Michigan workers' compensation claims 
closed in 1978.
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Table 6.8 also shows the public expenditures on prevention activities in the two 
jurisdictions. The costs are reflected in activity levels, as the WCB completed nearly 48,000 
workplace inspections in 1993, writing a total of 61,487 orders and levying penalties and fines 
of $1.2 million (US). In addition, the WCB conducted over 4,600 educational presentations 
and completed over 7,000 consultation reports. By comparison, the MIOSHA Division of the 
Bureau of Safety and Regulation in Michigan, facing a workforce 2.5 times that of British 
Columbia, completed about 7,000 workplace inspections, writing about 12,000 citations, and 
levying penalties of $50 million (US). In addition, the Safety, Education and Training Division 
conducted over 4,500 training sessions and made over 18,000 consultation visits in fiscal year 
1993. This analysis makes it clear that British Columbia mounts a considerably greater effort 
at prevention, particularly on the enforcement side. Michigan does relatively well at voluntary 
compliance efforts, but simply does not put enough inspectors in the field to cover the 
employer population in Michigan.
Summary
The British Columbia public workers' compensation system reports 12 percent more 
work-related injuries, and 48 percent more lost workday injuries than does Michigan. Yet, it 
apparently identifies fewer workers' compensation claims on a per capita basis. However, all 
of this difference is hi the medical-only claims, since British Columbia actually pays three 
times as many wage-loss claims. These differences are thought to be due to the lack of a 
waiting period for wage-loss benefits in British Columbia, and to easier access to the general 
health care system for both job-related and non job-related injuries and illnesses than is true in 
Michigan.
Overall, annual benefit payments to injured workers are slightly lower in British 
Columbia (about 7 percent), but incurred benefits are slightly higher (about 13 percent). This 
difference presumably reflects the prevalence of lump-sum payments in Michigan, which are 
very rare hi British Columbia. All of the incurred cost differences are among the wage-loss 
claims, as British Columbia reports 22 percent greater incurred wage-loss benefits per worker. 
Incurred medical and rehabilitation benefits are remarkably similar.
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Michigan and British Columbia are both very good hi promptness of payment, given 
notification of injury. However, approximately four tunes as many claims are litigated hi the 
Michigan system, reflecting the presence of plaintiff attorneys and a presumption of initiative 
on the insurer, or self-insured employer, side. In Michigan, insurance carriers generally have 
the right to deny benefits initially, or to stop benefits subsequently. Both actions are subject to 
administrative hearing upon request of the injured worker, but the initiative is still with the 
employer. This is true of choice of physician as well, where Michigan permits the employer to 
select the physician for at least the first 10 days of treatment, while British Columbia allows 
the worker to choose.
In terms of employers' costs of workers' compensation coverage, British Columbia 
enjoys an advantage of about 35 percent, when measured in U.S. dollars per worker. This is 
due to lower average wages, lower combined public and private administrative costs, and 
much lower transaction costs. The transaction cost differences are comprised of both sales and 
promotion expenses in the private system and the friction costs of litigation. Given that the 
average wage difference is about 17 percent, we hazard the guess that about half the employer 
cost advantage hi British Columbia is due to the workers' compensation system itself.
This review has shown some striking similarities and some surprising differences 
between the performance of the British Columbia and Michigan workers' compensation 
systems. In general, the advantage goes to British Columbia. Benefits are paid without a 
waiting period and with considerably higher maximum weekly wage-loss protection. 
Nevertheless, incurred benefit costs are roughly similar. British Columbia pays higher public 
administrative costs, but when an estimate of Michigan's private administration and transaction 
costs are factored in, British Columbia actually looks significantly less expensive. Finally, 
when we look at the bottom line, employer's costs of workers' compensation coverage, British 
Columbia wins hands down. In the final section, we will consider the insurance implications of 
system differences, and some lessons that may be drawn from this review of public and private 
workers' compensation insurance mechanisms.
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Table 6.1 Incidence of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses





















* British Columbia data came from WCB reports and reflect different reporting 
standards than MIOSHA log data shown for Michigan.
** Lost workday injuries for British Columbia include only those resulting in some 
payment for wage-loss before 12/31/93. Michigan figures are based on a survey of 
MIOSHA log data and reflect only cases with days away from work.
Source: British Columbia data from WCB 1993 Annual Report; Michigan data 
(unpublished) from MIOSHA Information Division.
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Table 6.2 Incidence of Workers' Compensation Claims, 1993
Wage-Loss Claims 
Established























Source: British Columbia data came from WCB 1993 Annual Report. Michigan data 
are from unpublished tabulations provided by BWDC (wage-loss claims) and BWDC 
Annual Report, 1993 (medical only claims).
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Table 6.3 Workers' Compensation Benefit Payments, Calendar Year 1993, in U.S. Dollars
























* Total includes wage-loss, health care, and rehabilitation benefits on a paid basis for 
calendar year 1993.
Source: British Columbia figures from 1993 Annual Report, Note 6, p. 41. Michigan 
figures from Funds Administration and BWDC 1993 Annual Report, p. 9.
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* Insured sector only. It is assumed that employment is proportional to paid indemnity 
losses in 1993.
Source: British Columbia figures from 1993 Annual Report, p. 36. Health care benefits 
include rehabilitation expenses. Michigan figures from Michigan Data Collection Agency 
Publication, 1995, Exhibit I, pp. 3-4. Michigan figures exclude loss based assessments and 
claim adjustment costs and are based on 1993 calendar/accident year data with appropriate 
loss development factors.
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Table 6.5 Promptness of Payment
Injury to Notification (mean value)







* British Columbia data are from a special study of timeliness based on all claims 
registered hi the first half of 1994.
** Michigan data are from BWDC statistics for 1993 and from a random slice in-time 
sample of claims closed hi 1986. The sample of claims was compiled by the W.E. 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Source: British Columbia data are from WCB Performance Reports, 1994, pp. 27, 31. 
Michigan data are from Intrastate Differences in Workers ' Compensation Costs: 
October 1986 Closed Case Study (Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research) September 1989, p. 37.
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Table 6.6 Dispute Resolution Activity, 1993



















* For British Columbia, the Requests for Review refer to Workers' Compensation 
Review Board appeals received and Dispositions/Decisions refer to Review Board 
panel findings and summary decisions. Appeals refer only to Review Board decisions 
appealed to WCB Appeal Division.
** For Michigan, Requests for Review refers to Petitions for Hearing received and 
Dispositions/Decisions includes decisions and redemptions, but not mediator 
resolutions. Appeals refers to Appellate Commission activity only.
Source: For British Columbia, Annual Report of the Appeal Division for 1993; for 
Michigan, BWDC Annual Report 1993.
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Table 6.7 Employer Cost of Workers' Compensation Coverage for 1993, in U.S. Dollars*


















* Employer costs per worker are estimated by applying the average assessment or 
premium rate to the average weekly wage times 52 weeks.
** Insured sector only. It is assumed that employment is proportional to paid 
indemnity losses in 1993. Michigan figure includes the placement facility results.
Source: British Columbia data from WCB Annual Report, 1994, p. 54. Michigan 
data are from Michigan Insurance Bureau, Preliminary Report and Certification 
Regarding the State of Competition in the Workers ' Compensation Insurance Market, 
1995, Exhibit 7.
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* See text for estimates of private transaction costs.
Source: For British Columbia, WCB 1993 Annual Report; for Michigan, compiled from 
statistics provided by Deputy Director, Michigan Department of Labor.
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VH. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR VICTORIA
Introduction
This section outlines the most important considerations involved hi making policy 
choices about the relative roles of the public and private sectors hi Victoria's workers' 
compensation insurance system. The outcomes of any particular set of choices depend on the 
specific circumstances of a workers' compensation system and its environment. Thus, it is not 
possible to make predictions about the effects of different policy decisions that would 
necessarily hold true for any system (e.g., moving from public to private financing will always 
improve economic efficiency). However, it is possible to share insights from the British 
Columbia and Michigan experiences that may have some application to the policy options 
facing Victoria.
In a broad sense, there are two interrelated sets of institutional arrangements that must 
be considered. As discussed earlier, there is a continuum of public and private sector 
participation hi workers' compensation systems. But accompany ing these options is another 
continuum with respect to the degree of regulation. In essence, policy makers must choose a 
set of institutions and policies from the available array that promises to achieve the social 
objectives of adequate and equitable benefits for injured workers at fair and reasonable costs 
for employers. The linkage between these choices is illustrated by the apparently universal 
need to monitor the adequacy of insurer performance where private insurers have a substantial 
role in assuming risk and administering benefits and other workers' compensation services. 
Most governments act as though some system outcomes are too important to be left entirely to 
unregulated private market forces.
Although this report contrasts public and private models for workers' compensation 
systems, it is obviously possible to have various "mixed" systems which could assign some 
functions to a government agency or public insurer and other functions to the private sector. 
For example, as in Victoria, the government could assume risk and finance benefits but private 
firms could administer claims. But choices about different features of a workers' compensation
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system are interdependent and should not be considered in isolation. For instance, the impact 
of delegating claims administration to private firms might be influenced by whether claim costs 
are publicly or privately financed. So it is not possible to identify a combination of public and 
private functions that would necessarily be optimal for every workers' compensation system. It 
is feasible to utilize the framework of the core workers' compensation insurance functions 
outlined in the introduction to this report to discuss the implications of different approaches to 
public and private provision of these functions.
Marketing and Distribution
Even a public insurer must perform some administrative functions in issuing and 
servicing workers' compensation coverage, but marketing and distribution activities become 
much more significant when a number of private insurers compete for business. Private 
insurers must inform potential buyers about their products and prices and solicit business. 
Constraints on private insurers' products and prices might induce insurers to limit their 
expenditures on marketing and distribution, but this also could lower the potential efficiency 
gains from competition and innovation. Moreover, even with regulatory limits on prices and 
products, private firms will seek ways to differentiate and market themselves to buyers.
Additionally, in the U.S., private insurers are able to reap economies of scope in using 
the same marketing and distribution facilities for several lines of commercial insurance, 
including workers' compensation. It is not uncommon for agents and insurers to package and 
sell workers' compensation insurance with other commercial property and liability coverages. 
Agents and insurers are able to acquire information about the risk characteristics and various 
insurance needs of a firm at the same time and use that contact to market and sell several 
policies to the firm. This lowers per-unit marketing and distribution costs as reflected in 
premium discounts to buyers of multiple policies. The potential for achieving these economies 
in other jurisdictions, such as Victoria, depends on the marketing and distribution systems 
employed by private insurers.
At the same time, competition among private insurers in soliciting business necessarily 
adds an additional layer of cost in terms of expenditures on advertising, in-house sales
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facilities and activities, commissions and brokerage fees, and other acquisition costs. 
Expenditures on commissions and direct acquisition costs alone constituted 8.1 percent of 
workers' compensation insurance premiums in the U.S. in 1993. This figure does not include 
costs for marketing and distribution facilities and activities that are not separately detailed in 
financial reports. These additional costs must be balanced against any efficiency gains that 
would be achieved from utilizing private insurers competing for business.
Underwriting Selection
It is easier for a public monopoly insurer to provide workers' compensation insurance 
for all or most employers, as it is not subject to the same problem of adverse selection to 
which private insurers are exposed. 61 A public monopoly insurer need not worry about adverse 
selection as long as all employers are forced to buy coverage from it. This allows a public 
monopoly insurer to pool high-risk employers with low-risk employers and exercise greater 
flexibility in allocating benefit costs between these groups. On the other hand, private insurers, 
and public insurers that compete with private insurers or self-insurance, are subject to adverse 
selection unless they have the ability to reject certain risks. In the U.S., private insurers seek 
to coordinate their pricing structures and their selection of risks to avoid an excessive 
concentration of high-risk employers, or they seek to specialize in these types of risks.
U.S. insurers also use underwriting selection to specialize in certain industries and 
types of employers. Because it is costly for insurers to acquire information about an industry 
and specific employers that is relevant to risk selection and proper pricing, insurers can gain a 
comparative advantage over competitors through specialization. This allows insurers to offer 
more competitive prices and services to employers for whom they have acquired information 
that is not readily accessible to other insurers. The regulation of insurer underwriting selection 
and pricing can have significant effects on the efficiency and equity of a workers' 
compensation system.
61This assumes that self-insurance is limited as an option under a public monopoly system.
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Ensuring Availability of Coverage
In theory, the proper coordination of pricing and underwriting selection should ensure 
that most employers are able to obtain coverage at an actuarially fair price. However, hi 
practice, certain structural problems can occur which may make it difficult for some employers 
to obtain coverage on a voluntary basis. An availability problem can arise when private 
insurers' rating structures do not accommodate certain high-risk employers, or employers for 
whom it is difficult to calculate and charge a proper premium. Insurers will be disinclined to 
offer coverage voluntarily to these employers who must seek coverage from some other source 
or go out of business.
Given incomplete information and insurers' need to make subjective assessments about 
employers' risk characteristics, this problem can be driven by false perceptions as well as hard 
facts. For instance, in the U.S., small employers historically have had a difficult time 
acquiring voluntary market coverage, although some state funds and specialty carriers have 
demonstrated that such employers can be written profitably at competitive rates. Availability 
problems also can arise in the "hard-market" phase of the underwriting cycle when insurers 
tighten their underwriting criteria and reject or fail to renew policies for some employers.
Some U.S. states have restricted insurers' ability to reject risks in personal auto and 
homeowners insurance, but such restrictions have generally not been imposed in workers' 
compensation. Attempts to force insurers to accept all risks who meet certain minimum criteria 
have generally failed, as insurers have found other ways to avoid business that they do not 
want. Insurers can discourage certain risks by raising their rates, providing lower quality 
service, or failing to market policies to them. In 1993, hi response to legislation promoting 
depopulation of its residual market, the Missouri insurance director sought to promulgate a 
depopulation plan that would have required workers' compensation insurers to accept an 
application for insurance from any employer that met certain minimum criteria. 62 Insurers 
blocked implementation of the plan based on a legal technicality.
62The employer's classification would have to be one that the insurer was writing.
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Regardless, reliance on private insurers to provide workers' compensation insurance 
requires a mechanism to provide coverage to employers who are unable to obtain coverage 
from the voluntary market. The options are some form of residual market facility or a public 
insurer that will cover risks rejected by the voluntary market. Various types of residual market 
mechanisms have been employed in the U.S., including reinsurance pools, joint underwriting 
associations, and assigned risk plans. Reinsurance pools are the predominant mechanism used 
in the U.S. for workers' compensation.
The structure of residual market mechanisms and the regulation of the voluntary market 
can have significant implications for the performance of the overall workers' compensation 
system. Regulatory suppression of voluntary and/or residual market rates below costs can 
cause the voluntary market to shrink and the residual market to grow at an accelerating rate. 
This can ultimately result in the implosion of the voluntary market as increasing assessments 
on voluntary market premiums to cover the soaring residual market deficit drives more 
employers into the residual market (e.g., Maine). Residual markets have remained relatively 
small hi states like Michigan where rates are generally adequate to cover costs.
Other aspects of residual market mechanisms can affect system performance and the 
quality of service to employers and workers. Mechanisms that assume all or most of the risk 
and use private insurers as servicing carriers are subject to cost inflation as servicing carriers 
have little economic incentive to contain costs or provide good service if then* performance has 
no effect on the fees they receive. Until recently, this was a serious problem in the U.S., with 
its primary reliance on a reinsurance pool for residual market workers' compensation risks that 
assumes 100 percent of the losses. Insurance regulators and workers' compensation 
administrators pressured the NCCI to institute a number of reforms to better monitor and 
correct servicing carriers' performance. Initial indications are that these reforms are having a 
positive effect and contributing to the overall improvement in the workers' compensation 
market (NCCI, 1995).
It also should be pointed out that efforts to make residual market mechanisms self- 
supporting can have adverse impacts on low-risk employers who are forced into such 
mechanisms. Ideally, every risk hi the residual market would pay an actuarially fair premium,
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but this is difficult to accomplish in practice given the inherent imperfections in workers' 
compensation pricing schemes. In the U.S., residual market losses have been reduced by 
eliminating certain pricing discounts available to voluntary market risks and adding rate 
surcharges. These indiscriminate pricing adjustments may have resulted in more adequate 
prices for high-risk employers, but they also may have resulted in excessive prices for low-risk 
employers forced into the residual market. The presumption that any employer unable to 
obtain voluntary market coverage is high-risk and should be charged an extra premium will not 
always be true.
The combination of a properly administered reinsurance pool and a competitive public 
insurer may offer the best solution to the availability dilemma for some private systems. With 
appropriate pricing and administration, the reinsurance pool could be operated with a minimal 
subsidy (if any) and retained for only the highest-risk employers who cannot be insured by the 
voluntary market. The public insurer could insure low-risk employers unable to obtain 
voluntary coverage and gain efficiencies by specializing in certain types of employers (e.g., 
small employers) who tend to be rejected by private insurers. This approach would help to 
keep the residual market small and manageable while avoiding penalties against low-risk 
employers who might otherwise be forced into the residual market. This scheme has worked 
fairly well for states such as Michigan. 63
Benefit Provisions and Policy Design
The "social contract" nature of workers' compensation requires the government to 
mandate the benefits to which workers are entitled. The basic insurance coverage which 
employers are required to carry ensures that these benefits are paid. Allowing private insurers 
to underwrite workers' compensation insurance raises the question of whether they will be 
constrained to a standard policy or will be allowed to develop different policies to respond to 
employers' needs and preferences. Workers would receive the same benefits regardless, but
63But note that Michigan sold its competitive state fund to a private health insurance carrier in 1995. It 
will be interesting to see how this affects the availability and price of coverage to small employers.
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insurers could sell and employers could choose among insurance policies which offer various 
options in terms of risk assumption, as well as services such as loss prevention and claims 
management. Varying insurance policies would directly affect employers' costs and incentives 
and indirectly affect workers. In theory, permitting variation in insurance policies could 
improve economic efficiency by allowing the market to respond to differences among 
employers in terms of their ability to assume risk, or need for related services. A public 
insurer need not be constrained to one standard insurance policy, but innovation in policy 
design is more likely to be facilitated by competition among private insurers.
The structure of the market and regulation will affect the types of policies that are 
offered by private insurers and purchased by employers. Because of the agent-principal 
problems discussed in Section I, there is potential for system objectives to be undermined by 
allowing private insurers to offer different kinds of policies. For example, if an insurer sells a 
policy that pays lowers benefits than those prescribed by law, the employer would be 
responsible for paying the difference. However, the employer might seek to avoid or be unable 
to cover its residual obligation to an injured worker, forcing legal action by the government or 
the worker. Hence, regulators would need to ensure that the insurance policies that are sold 
satisfy employers' requirements for coverage and that workers' interests are not compromised.
Workers' compensation administrators and insurance regulators in the U.S. are 
currently wrestling with these issues in making decisions about allowing the sale of alternative 
workers' compensation coverages, such as various forms of 24-hour coverage and large 
deductible policies. The managed care "movement" hi the U.S. offers another example. As 
private and public insurers have moved aggressively to add managed care, especially of health 
care costs, to their array of policy services over the last five years, regulators have largely 
been silent in the face of these initiatives. While there seems to be clear evidence that managed 
care techniques can reduce workers' compensation medical costs, there has been very little 
investigation of the implications for the quality of care. It is worth noting that organized labor 
has definitely been skeptical of these changes. Thus, one could argue that this policy 
innovation remains unproven, even though remarkably widespread. Interestingly, neither 
Michigan nor British Columbia have been leaders in this particular policy evolution.
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Pricing and Premium Verification
A public monopoly insurer can implement an array of different pricing or cost 
allocation schemes depending on public policy objectives and the political and economic 
environment. A public monopoly insurer has more flexibility in allocating costs among 
employers because it is not subject to the problem of adverse selection if all employers are 
required by law to purchase workers' compensation insurance from it. The particular pricing 
scheme implemented will have an impact on economic efficiency and equity, however, even if 
employers have no choice hi terms of the amount of coverage they purchase.
Employers who pay premiums less than their expected losses will be induced to over- 
consume insurance by hiring more labor or increasing their risk in other ways beyond what is 
optimal for society. Conversely, employers who pay more than an actuarially fair premium 
will be induced to under-consume insurance by hiring less labor or taking other actions to 
lessen their risk which are not efficient. Consequently, workers' compensation pricing 
schemes that contain cross-subsidies lead to efficiency losses which ripple through the 
economy. Cross-subsidies also can cause claim costs to escalate and ultimate cripple a public 
insurer.
The pricing schemes that are feasible under a private market system are more limited 
than those that can be implemented by a public monopoly insurer. In a competitive market, 
insurers are induced to approximate actuarially fair prices based on the information available 
to them. Insurers will seek to circumvent regulatory attempts to enforce pricing structures 
other than what would be established by the market. Insurers can circumvent regulatory 
restrictions through devices such as revising then: adjustments to manual rates, modifying 
dividend plans, reclassifying employers, and changing their quality of service. Regulators can 
affect prices but they cannot totally control them as long as insurers retain some flexibility in 
determining premiums for particular employers and varying their quality of service. 
Regulatory efforts to restrict overall rate levels below costs or enforce cross-subsidies through 
the rate structure will cause market dislocations and reduce economic efficiency.
Over tune, states in the U.S. have moved away from a uniform, administered pricing 
system for workers' compensation to an approach that embraces a fair degree of price
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competition among insurers. The historical concern that unfettered price competition would 
produce a rash of insolvencies and undermine system protections has not proven to be well 
founded. On the whole, competitive rating has seemed to work relatively well compared to 
prior approval and administered-pricing systems. Several previous studies indicate that prices 
tend to fall after the institution of competitive rating, although they may also rebound to some 
extent after several years. Other studies suggest that, over the long run, workers' 
compensation prices are either no different or are possibly even higher under competitive 
rating.
However, this does not necessarily mean that the prices in competitive rating states are 
excessive, as some prior approval jurisdictions may have suppressed prices below competitive 
levels. There can be strong economic and political pressures on regulators and legislators to 
suppress rates when they are subject to prior approval, particularly in high-cost states. This, in 
turn, can cause losses to escalate further and increase pressure on prices as employers fail to 
pay the full cost of coverage and incur excessive risk.
The experience in the U.S. indicates that prior approval rate regulation can lead to 
severe market problems and even at best does not appear to offer efficiencies which justify its 
additional costs. It is not surprising then that 31 states have followed Michigan's lead in 
implementing competitive rating for workers' compensation, and other states are considering 
such a move. Of course, competitive rating is facilitated in the U.S. by the generally 
competitive structure of the insurance industry and the workers' compensation market.
There does appear to be a cyclical aspect to workers' compensation pricing, shared 
with other commercial lines, resulting in some market instability which could be more severe 
under competitive rating. Regulatory attempts to prevent cyclical pricing are likely doomed to 
failure (see Cummins, Harrington, and Klein, 1991), however. As noted above, it is difficult 
to prevent insurers from circumventing regulatory restrictions, although regulators may 
hamper insurers' efforts in ways that are not necessarily efficient. Indeed, Cummins and 
Outreville (1987) contend that regulatory lag in approving rate changes can even exacerbate 
cyclical pricing.
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However, there is a role for regulation in a competitive rating system. At a minimum, 
regulators should monitor market structure, conduct and performance to ensure that prompt 
regulatory intervention occurs if competition fails and serious problems develop. Michigan has 
developed a system for monitoring competition in workers' compensation markets that could 
be used as a model for other jurisdictions. 64 Second, while it is not essential for regulators to 
prior approve rates, there are advantages to requiring insurers to file rates and authorizing 
regulators to disapprove rates if competition is lacking or if an insurer's rates threaten its 
solvency.
While filing requirements necessarily introduce some lag in implementing price 
changes, the exercise of filing and supporting rates can force some insurers to develop more 
actuarially sound rates than they might otherwise implement. Regulatory standards also can 
limit indiscriminate use of certain pricing adjustments by insurers, such as "schedule credits," 
which can contribute to pricing volatility. Third, there is value to having one or more advisory 
organizations collect statistical data on loss experience and disseminate cost analysis that can 
help insurers develop more accurate rates. These organizations should be regulated to ensure 
that they disseminate only information that facilitates competition and not information that 
provides a focal point for reducing competition.
Loss Prevention
Loss prevention and safety engineering services play an important role in helping to 
reduce workplace accidents and workers' compensation costs. 65 A public insurer can perform 
loss prevention services or rely on private companies to provide these services to employers. 
A government agency, such as the WCB of British Columbia, could gain efficiencies from 
coordinating workplace safety regulation and loss prevention programs. Such services can be 
bundled with other workers' compensation services, or unbundled and funded by separate 
assessments or user fees. Allowing employers to purchase different levels and kinds of loss
^See Michigan Insurance Bureau (1995). 
65See Hunt, Habeck, VanTol, and Scully (1993).
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prevention services should enable them to purchase the optimal amount and kinds of services 
and improve economic efficiency. This presumes that the allocation of workers' compensation 
costs to employers provides an incentive to reduce their risk of loss.
Similarly, private insurers could provide loss prevention services to their policyholders 
or delegate this function to other private vendors or even a government agency. In a private 
market system with actuarially fair prices, insurers and insureds both have incentives to make 
optimal investments in loss prevention services. As part of their competitive strategy, private 
insurers hi the U.S. have enhanced their loss prevention services to combat rising costs. The 
private market can be a good source of innovation in this area if incentives are structured 
properly. For example, Firemen's Fund Insurance Group in the U.S. has instituted a program 
called SmartComp that enables an employer to determine the long-term financial impact of its 
workers' compensation claims and assess the savings from loss prevention measures. Private 
insurers and other vendors also may be able to take advantage of loss prevention methods they 
have developed for other types of risk, such as product liability and property damage.
Claims Adjustment and Case Management
A public insurer can perform claims adjustment and case management functions or 
outsource these activities to private companies. What is most efficient will depend on the 
particular system. Retaining these activities within a government agency could help to ensure 
that claims are administered in the best interests of injured workers, presuming that is what 
administrators understand their role to be. Certain economies of scope also might be achieved 
if a public insurer combines these activities with other workers' compensation functions it 
performs. For instance, a public insurer could utilize information obtained from investigating 
and adjusting claims to help identify causes of work-related accidents and strategies to reduce 
them.
There also could be advantages to outsourcing claims administration for some public 
systems. Competition among private vendors could lead to greater efficiency. This is more 
likely to be the case if private vendors can take advantage of economies stemming from their 
expertise and facilities hi administering claims for other types of insurance, e.g., health
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insurance. However, the efficiency of outsourcing also will be affected by how vendors are 
selected and reimbursed. If vendors' performance is not effectively controlled through the 
enforcement of standards and/or economic incentives, they could deliver poor service and 
claim costs could escalate.
Privatizing the financing of workers' compensation costs, as well as claims 
administration, could yield additional efficiencies. If private insurers have a financial stake hi 
paying benefits, they will have an increased incentive to minimize costs through effective 
claims management. However, in a private workers' compensation insurance market, there is 
an inherent tension between the interests of private insurers, employers, and workers hi 
administering claims. This necessitates administrative supervision and regulation to balance the 
interests of the different stakeholders and ensure that system objectives and workers' interests 
are not unduly compromised by insurers' incentive to minimize claim costs.
Effective regulation is needed to harness private market incentives to keep costs low 
while protecting injured workers' right to adequate benefits. 66 However, additional government 
monitoring costs will offset some of the efficiencies which may be achieved with private 
market systems. Moreover, it is not feasible for regulators to closely monitor every 
transaction, so some claims will still be mishandled and disputes will arise. Regulation also 
could induce insurers to overpay some claims to avoid sanctions and adverse administrative 
rulings.
Depending on the legal framework, a private market system may also lead to greater 
litigation and higher transaction costs hi providing benefits to injured workers. Comparisons 
between Michigan and British Columbia hi Section VI of this report make that clear. The 
litigation rate is much higher hi Michigan, partly because of the system characteristic that the 
employer/insurer usually takes the initiative and the worker reacts. Typically, the worker 
reacts by retaining an attorney. With attorney fees ranging from 15 percent to 30 percent of 
the recovery, it is easy to see that substantial transaction costs are incurred. What is not so
is does not presume that public monopoly insurers are perfect in terms of meeting public goals in the 
administration of workers' compensation benefits, but the process by which public choice and policy are 
reconciled is a different one than that employed with private firms.
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obvious is whether there is truly unnecessary litigation in such a system. In a cost driver study 
of six U.S. states, the Workers' Compensation Research Institute estimated that attorney 
involvement contributed from -0.2 percent (Michigan) to 3.9 percent (Florida) per year to 
overall system cost growth. While this is a very substantial range, it also raises the issue of 
whether a significant portion of the attorney representation observed was unnecessary. 67
Another example is the transactions costs necessary to properly allocate claim costs to 
individual employers. In Michigan, there is a great deal of disputation among 
employer/insurers where the injured employee had multiple employers. This is particularly 
problematic hi the case of occupational illnesses that may have resulted from exposures over 
many years. Insurance carriers spend significant resources in attempting to shift the cost, in 
whole or in part, to another insurer, or to the second injury fund. Until recently, this kind of 
activity was almost completely unknown in British Columbia, presumably owing to the limited 
private incentives inherent hi such activity. Hunt, Earth and Leahy (1996) document the 
beginnings of a private consulting industry in British Columbia to take advantage of such 
opportunities created by the workers' compensation experience rating program that was 
implemented in the late 1980s.
Solvency Protection
Solvency is a concern for both public and private insurers, but different potential 
problems arise under the two systems. For public insurers, there is the danger that political 
pressures or poor management will cause revenues to lag behind expenditures, causing a 
deficit. Employers and workers are not directly threatened if this occurs, assuming that the 
government guarantees that benefits will be paid. However, the means by which accumulated 
debt is repaid (e.g., increased premiums, special employer assessments, general tax revenue, 
etc.) can result in inequities among those who benefited from the deficit and those who bear 
the burden of paying the accumulated debt.
67See Victor, et al. (1992).
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Private insurers also face the risk of insolvency, which can be exacerbated by corporate 
structures that limit the liability of owners for any debts they may incur. Insolvency risks can 
be further increased hi lines such as workers' compensation where an employer buys insurance 
to cover a third party. If its insurer becomes insolvent, an employer also may seek to escape 
its obligations to injured workers by declaring bankruptcy. Consequently, employers' incentive 
to purchase insurance from "safe" insurers is diminished. Additionally, political pressures can 
cause regulators to suppress rates below costs which can ultimately result in insurer 
insolvency.
To ensure that workers' compensation claims are paid, government must limit the 
insolvency risk of private insurers and cover the claims of those insurers that become 
insolvent. The U.S. utilizes a combination of relatively stringent insurer solvency regulation 
and state guaranty funds to provide this protection. Solvency regulation and guaranty fund 
mechanisms must be properly coordinated to ensure that insolvency costs are minimized and 
do not overwhelm the market. While there have been relatively few insolvencies of workers' 
compensation insurers in the U.S., the flat pricing of guaranty fund coverage encourages 
greater insolvency risk that must be offset by tighter financial controls on insurers (Barth and 
Klein, 1995).
Less stringent regulation must be compensated by greater risk sharing by insureds, but 
this is difficult to accomplish for a line such as workers' compensation where injured workers 
may ultimately bear the cost of unpaid claims due to insurer insolvency. Any jurisdiction that 
contemplates moving from public to private provision of workers' compensation insurance will 
need to carefully consider the regulatory and guaranty mechanisms that must be in place to 
ensure that insurers' claims obligations are met. A system that provides extensive guarantees 
to employers and workers will encourage an excessive amount of insolvencies unless 
regulators constrain insurers' financial risk and the price of solvency guarantees are risk- 
sensitive.
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Statistical Reporting and System Monitoring
As with any social insurance scheme, monitoring the performance of the workers' 
compensation system is essential to ensuring that its objectives are being met in a cost-effective 
way. A public insurer can compile and analyze the necessary data internally as part of its 
management information system. With private insurers, some mechanism must be established 
by which data related to their activities are collected and analyzed. The functions of collection, 
compilation and analysis can be delegated to public and/or private entities. This requires 
additional regulation to ensure that private insurers report the required data to the appropriate 
entities, that those entities properly perform their functions, and that the various data are 
integrated to evaluate system performance.
Until recently, workers' compensation statistical reporting lagged far behind 
information needs in the U.S. because of inattention. Further, integration of workers' 
compensation statistical data in the states has been hampered by the division of functions 
between regulatory agencies and private entities. Recent enhancements to workers' 
compensation databases hi the U.S. have played a key role in facilitating analysis of and 
support for the system reforms that have helped many states to improve their markets.
Conclusion
We have considered many issues in this report, from the arcane question of how 
availability of workers' compensation insurance coverage can be guaranteed for all employers 
to the basic question of who is in charge of making sure that injured workers receive their 
benefits in a timely manner. We have used two exemplars to carry our discussion. The systems 
of Michigan and British Columbia illustrate many of the policy choices that must be made to 
structure a logically consistent workers' compensation system. What we have not done is to 
prescribe solutions for Victoria. Only those intimately familiar with Victorian institutions and 
traditions can perform that task. Thus, we offer no conclusions with respect to what Victoria 
should do, only the observations that our comparative analysis has provided.
First, there are many paths to an effective and efficient workers' compensation system. 
We have examined two of them, and offered our observations about the implications of these
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different paths. Second, we have used the issue of public vs. private institutions to attempt to 
generalize our discussion, but we are well aware that the choices are not so stark as that 
implies. Third, we have explored, by implication, the apparent tradeoffs between direct public 
agency action and alternative approaches to the regulation of private agent actions in the 
context of workers' compensation systems.
Ultimately, the goals of workers' compensation systems are simple. The means of 
achieving those goals are anything but simple. They involve sophisticated choices among a 
considerable array of policy options. Our hope is that this analysis will help to provide insights 
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